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Abstract 
 
 
 Allegations of market manipulation abound in the popular press, particularly 
during the recent financial turmoil.  However, many aspects of manipulation are 
poorly understood.  The purpose of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of 
market manipulation by providing empirical evidence on the prevalence, effects and 
determinants of closing price manipulation. 
   The first issue examined in this thesis is the prevalence of closing price 
manipulation.  This thesis uses a hand collected sample of prosecuted closing price 
manipulation cases from US and Canadian stock exchanges, and methods that 
explicitly model the incomplete and non-random detection of manipulation.  The 
results suggest that approximately 1.1% of closing prices are manipulated.  For 
every prosecuted closing price manipulation there are approximately 300 instances 
of manipulation that remain undetected or not prosecuted.  Closing price 
manipulation is more prevalent on larger exchanges than smaller ones, but is 
detected at a higher rate on small exchanges. 
 Second, this thesis examines the effects of closing price manipulation.  Using 
a sample of prosecution cases, this thesis finds that closing price manipulation is 
associated with large day-end returns, subsequent return reversals, increases in day-
end spreads and increases in day-end trading activity.  At the broader level of market 
quality, this thesis provides evidence from a laboratory experiment that closing price 
manipulation decreases both price accuracy and liquidity.  Even the mere possibility 
of manipulation decreases liquidity and increases trading costs. 
 The third issue analysed in this thesis is the determinants of closing price 
manipulation and its detection.  Estimating an empirical model of manipulation and 
detection, this thesis finds that the likelihood of closing price manipulation is 
increased by smaller regulatory budgets, greater information asymmetry, mid to low 
 xii
 xiii
levels of liquidity, month-end days and lower volatility.  Manipulation is more likely 
to be detected when regulatory budgets are larger and when the manipulation causes 
abnormal trading characteristics.  Further evidence from laboratory experiments 
suggests that regulation helps restore price accuracy by deterring some manipulation 
and making remaining manipulation less aggressive.  These experiments also show 
that regulation has an insignificant effect on liquidity because participants in 
regulated markets still face relatively high uncertainty about the presence of 
manipulators. 
 This thesis also examines how closing price manipulation is conducted and 
how other market participants respond.  It develops an index of closing price 
manipulation that can be used to study manipulation in markets or time periods in 
which prosecution data are not available.  It also provides a tool for the detection of 
manipulation, which can be used by regulators in automated surveillance systems. 
 Finally, this thesis has implications for economic efficiency and policy.  
Closing price manipulation is significantly more prevalent than the number of 
prosecution cases suggests.  Further, it harms both pricing accuracy and liquidity 
and therefore undermines economic efficiency.  The prevalence of closing price 
manipulation can be reduced by increasing regulatory budgets, improving the 
accuracy of market surveillance systems by using the detection tools developed in 
this thesis, structuring markets such that participants are better able to identify 
manipulation, and implementing closing mechanisms that are difficult to 
manipulate.  These actions would enhance market integrity and economic efficiency. 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Among the plays which men perform in taking different parts in this 
magnificent world theatre, the greatest comedy is played at the Exchange.  
There, … the speculators excel in tricks, they do business and find excuses 
wherein hiding places, concealment of facts, quarrels, provocations, 
mockery, idle talk, violent desires, collusion, artful deception, betrayals, 
cheatings, and even tragic end are to be found 
- Joseph de la Vega (1688), describing the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
 Since the beginning of trading on organised exchanges, speculators have 
manipulated markets to profit at others’ expense.  This is illustrated by Joseph de la 
Vega’s eloquent description of one of the earliest organised exchanges, in which he 
lists a variety of strategies used by speculators, many of which would today be 
labelled ‘market manipulation’.  Numerous cases of manipulation exist in history, 
such as when the influential Rothschilds sold large amounts of stock to create the 
false impression that Napoleon had defeated Wellington, causing prices to crash and 
allowing them to repurchase the stock at depressed prices (Griffin, 1980).  The 
magnitude of manipulation’s effects can be extraordinary; for example, the price of 
nearly bankrupt NEI Webworld Inc. shot up by 11,400% within a day in response to 
rumour mongering on the internet.1  Manipulation is not confined to small and illiquid 
                                                 
1 See “Stock pump-n-dump fraudsters settle suit, earn jail time”, by Brian Krebs, Newsbytes, 24 
January 2001. 
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companies; for example, multibillion dollar Lucent Technologies was successfully 
manipulated (Leinweber and Madhavan, 2001).  The amount of funds used in 
manipulation and scale of profits can be immense; for example, in 2004 Citigroup 
netted €18.2 million profit from manipulation that involved placing €12.9 billion 
worth of sell orders in 200 different government bonds within 18 seconds and later 
repurchasing them.2  Manipulation is not confined to sophisticated market 
participants; for example, Jonathan Lebed, a teenager from New Jersey successfully 
manipulated stocks 11 times by posting messages on Yahoo Finance message boards 
and made profits of $800,000 (Lewis, 2001).  Nor is manipulation confined to 
individual securities; for example, in 1996 Nomura Int. Plc. manipulated an entire 
market index (Australian All Ordinaries) by selling a $600 million basket of stocks 
(more than the average daily market turnover) within minutes of the close of trading.3   
 Allegations of manipulation abound in the popular press.  During bull markets, 
media attention tends to be focussed on manipulation that inflates stock prices.  
However, during the recent market turmoil manipulation has been widely blamed for 
contributing to sharp price declines and collapses of companies.  Regulators such as 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have introduced a number of new 
rules and implemented temporary short selling bans, citing combating manipulation as 
an underlying reason.   
 Despite the significant interest in manipulation, many aspects of manipulation 
are not well understood.  This thesis enhances our understanding of manipulation by 
providing evidence on the prevalence, effects and determinants of a particular type of 
manipulation, closing price manipulation. 
 
                                                 
2 See “The day Dr Evil wounded a financial giant”, by Avinash Persaud and John Plender, Financial 
Times, 23 August 2006. 
3 See “The financial monster that tried to eat Australia”, by Ben Hill, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 
December 1998.  
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1.1.1 Closing price manipulation 
 Closing price manipulation is the illegal act of intentionally forcing a closing 
price to an artificial level.  It is usually conducted by aggressively buying or selling 
stock at the end of a trading day.  Figure 1.1 illustrates a typical example of closing 
price manipulation obtained from a prosecution case.  At the beginning of the day the 
stock is trading below $20 and the manipulator instructs his broker, “do your buying 
today, at the end of the day … up into the twenties” (recorded telephone conversation, 
see Case 3 in Appendix B for further details).  Later that day, the broker requests from 
the manipulator, “give me some more sugar to buy”, and shortly before the close he 
executes a series of trades in quick succession raising the price and setting an inflated 
closing price.  
 
 
“do your buying today, at the end  
of the day … up into the twenties”  
"Give me some more sugar to buy”  
    |                     | 
Open               Close 
 
Figure 1.1 An example of closing price manipulation 
This figure plots the best bid (bottom line), best ask (top line), last trade price (middle line), and trades 
(dots) for Southern Union Company (SUG) on the New York Stock Exchange during 25 October 1999.  
The quoted text is from telephone conversations between the manipulator and his broker recorded by 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
 
 3
 This thesis’s focus on closing price manipulation is driven by the importance 
of closing prices.  A large number of contracts are based specifically on closing 
prices, creating incentives for many different parties to manipulate them.  For 
example, mutual fund net asset values (NAV) and fund performance are often 
calculated using closing prices.  The performance of a fund determines its ranking 
relative to competitors and is also commonly used to determine fund manager 
remuneration.  Given these incentives, it comes as little surprise that some fund 
managers manipulate closing prices.4  Closing prices have also been manipulated in 
order to profit from positions in derivatives on the underlying stock5 and by brokers 
attempting to alter their customers’ inference of their execution ability.6  Closing 
prices have been manipulated during pricing periods for seasoned equity issues and 
takeovers, to maintain a stock’s listing on an exchange with minimum price 
requirements, to avoid margin calls, and on stock index rebalancing days for a stock 
to gain inclusion in an index. 
 Recognising the problems closing price manipulation can create, numerous 
stock exchanges have introduced closing call auctions to make manipulation more 
difficult.  Several contracts have been redesigned to be more robust to manipulation, 
for example, by using volume weighted average prices (VWAP) in place of closing 
prices.  Despite these measures, closing price manipulation remains a significant issue 
because many exchanges still utilise simple closing mechanisms, cases of closing 
price manipulation are still found in markets with closing call auctions, and many 
contracts today still provide incentives to manipulate closing prices.   
 
                                                 
4 This type of manipulation is commonly conducted on the last day of a reporting period such as a 
month-end or quarter-end.  See Carhart et al. (2002) and Bernhardt and Davies (2005).  This practice is 
also known as ‘marking the close’, ‘painting the tape’, ‘high closing’, ‘marking up’ or ‘portfolio 
pumping’. 
5 See, for example, Kumar and Seppi (1992) and Ni et al. (2005). 
6 See, for example, Hillion and Suominen (2004). 
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1.1.2 Why manipulation matters 
 Most market manipulation is detrimental to stock markets and their 
participants.  Manipulation can discourage participation and cause investors to trade 
in alternative markets, thereby decreasing liquidity and increasing trading costs.  
Consequently, manipulation can lead to an increase in the cost of capital, making 
firms reluctant to list their shares in markets known for manipulation.  Manipulation 
impairs price discovery through reduced order flow and distorts prices from their 
natural levels.  This reduces market efficiency and causes deadweight economic 
losses due to distorted resource allocation and wealth redistribution (Pirrong, 1995).  
The price distortions caused by closing price manipulation are particularly harmful 
because of the widespread use of closing prices (Kahan, 1992).  For these reasons, 
understanding closing price manipulation is of great importance to academics, 
exchanges and regulators.    
 
1.2 Purpose and contributions  
 The purpose of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of market 
manipulation.  Thel (1994, p. 287) points out “[w]e do not know how often prices are 
manipulated, how much harm manipulation does or how existing manipulation rules 
influence behavior.”  The main contribution of this thesis is providing evidence on 
precisely these issues - the prevalence, effects and determinants - in the specific 
context of closing price manipulation. 
 The first issue is the prevalence of closing price manipulation.  This thesis 
estimates the frequency of closing price manipulation on US and Canadian stock 
exchanges.  The estimates are obtained using a hand collected sample of prosecuted 
closing price manipulation cases and methods that explicitly model the incomplete 
and non-random detection of manipulation.  The results suggest that approximately 
1.1% of closing prices are manipulated.  For every prosecuted closing price 
manipulation there are approximately 300 instances of manipulation that remain 
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undetected or not prosecuted.  Closing price manipulation is more prevalent on larger 
exchanges than smaller ones, but is detected at a higher rate on small exchanges. 
 The second issue is the effects of closing price manipulation.  Using a sample 
of prosecution cases, this thesis finds that closing price manipulation is associated 
with large day-end returns, subsequent return reversals, increases in day-end spreads 
and increases in day-end trading activity.  At the broader level of market quality, this 
thesis provides evidence from a laboratory experiment that closing price manipulation 
decreases both price accuracy and liquidity.  Even the mere possibility of 
manipulation decreases liquidity and increases trading costs.  Following the 
arguments of Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), closing price manipulation therefore 
undermines economic efficiency and should be prohibited.   
 The third issue is the determinants of closing price manipulation and its 
detection.  Using a sample of prosecuted manipulation cases, this thesis finds that the 
likelihood of closing price manipulation is increased by smaller regulatory budgets, 
greater information asymmetry, mid to low levels of liquidity, month-end days and 
lower volatility.  Manipulation is more likely to be detected when regulatory budgets 
are larger and when the manipulation causes abnormal trading characteristics.  Further 
evidence from a laboratory experiment suggests that regulation helps restore price 
accuracy by deterring some manipulation and making remaining manipulation less 
aggressive.  These experiments also show that regulation has an insignificant effect on 
liquidity because participants in regulated markets still face relatively high uncertainty 
about the presence of manipulators. 
 This thesis makes some further contributions.  It examines how closing price 
manipulation is conducted and how other market participants respond.  It develops an 
index of closing price manipulation that can be used to study manipulation in markets 
or time periods in which prosecution data are not available.  It also provides a tool for 
the detection of manipulation, which can be used by regulators in automated 
surveillance systems. 
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1.3 Structure of this thesis 
 The next chapter discusses what constitutes market manipulation and reviews 
the relevant literature.  Chapter 3 analyses the determinants of closing price 
manipulation and its detection, and estimates its prevalence.  It describes the hand 
collected sample of prosecution cases that is also used in Chapters 4 and 6.  Chapter 4 
examines the trading characteristics (returns, return reversals, trading frequency, 
spreads and trade size) around cases of closing price manipulation.  Chapter 5 
analyses the effects of closing price manipulation on market quality, using a 
laboratory experiment.  Chapter 6 constructs an index of closing price manipulation 
and a closely related tool for the detection of manipulation, drawing on the findings of 
earlier chapters.  Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
 
 
 This chapter reviews the literature on market manipulation.  It begins by 
summarising the debate on what constitutes market manipulation.  The intent is to 
provide context to the trading strategies studied in the literature and illustrate how 
closing price manipulation, the focus of this thesis, fits among the diverse range of 
manipulation strategies.  Next, this chapter reviews the theoretical work on market 
manipulation, followed by the less numerous and more recent empirical and 
experimental studies.  This chapter finishes with a summary of the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the literature.  
 
2.1 Definition and forms of market manipulation 
 There is no generally accepted definition of market manipulation.  This may 
seem surprising given the long history of manipulation in world financial markets7 
and the fact that more than three quarters of a century has passed since the inception 
of US federal securities regulation against market manipulation.8  Legal definitions 
                                                 
7 For example, one of the most famous of the early manipulation prosecutions during the Napoleonic 
wars involved a group of manipulators spreading false rumours about the death of Napoleon and that 
the allies had entered Paris.  The Court of King’s Bench in England ruled that it was an offence to 
conspire to raise the price of Government securities by false rumours with the intent of injuring 
purchasers (Rex v De Berenger in Maule and Selwyn’s reports 67 (1814), see Baxt et al. (1996)). 
8 A common view is that regulation against market manipulation in the US began in the 1930s with the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934, largely in response to the massive losses suffered by the public 
in the Great Depression.  However, Berle (1938) points out that while the reforms of the 1930s 
contributed significantly to bringing legal action against market manipulators, the forms of 
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are often intentionally not explicit, and much of the finance and economics literature 
uses the term market manipulation in an imprecise manner.  This situation has led to a 
longstanding debate and controversy over the definition of market manipulation.  This 
section reviews the legal interpretation of market manipulation, the definitions used in 
academic studies and the range of practices commonly regarded as market 
manipulation.  
 
2.1.1 Legal interpretation of market manipulation 
 Legal definitions vary across jurisdictions and in many cases are not explicit 
about what constitutes market manipulation.  For example, the Corporations Law in 
Australia, the Securities Exchange Act 1934 in the US and the Market Abuse 
Directive in the European Union (EU) prohibit market manipulation and contain 
various provisions to achieve this purpose, but none of these laws attempt to precisely 
define manipulation (Goldwasser, 1999).  The task of defining manipulation is largely 
left to the courts on a case-by-case basis.  According to US statutory law it is unlawful 
“to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security … any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”.9  In Australia, statutory law 
prohibits “transactions that have or are likely to have; the effect of … creating an 
artificial price”.10  The EU has recently adopted a principles-based approach to 
describing prohibited practices.  EU statutory law stipulates, “market manipulation 
shall mean transactions or orders to trade which give, or are likely to give, false or 
misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for or price of financial instruments, or 
which secure … the price of one or several financial instruments at an abnormal or 
                                                                                                                                            
manipulation banned by the Acts of 1933-1934 were already effectively outlawed by the courts through 
common law. 
9 Section 10(b), Securities Exchange Act 1934.  For a detailed discussion see Thel (1990) and 
Goldwasser (1999). 
10 Section 1041A, Corporations Act 2001. 
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artificial level”.11  A definition that captures the essence of the relevant statutory law 
in several jurisdictions, but by itself is neither precise nor objective, is provided by the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX): 
 
“Market manipulation describes a deliberate attempt to interfere with 
the free and fair operation of the market and create artificial, false or 
misleading appearances with respect to the price of, or market for, a 
stock.”12  
 
 Given that statutory law does not provide a precise definition of manipulation, 
one must turn to case law to understand what is viewed as manipulation by courts.  
US case law has established a four part test for manipulation involving ability, intent 
to deceive, causation and artificiality (Johnson, 1981).  Across a number of 
jurisdictions, arguably the two most important elements, and often the most difficult 
to prove, are artificiality and intent.  Artificiality can be with respect to trading 
activity (e.g., creating the appearance of more trading than what would naturally take 
place), or price (e.g., altering the price by raising or depressing it).  Intent 
distinguishes manipulative from non-manipulative trading.  Because intent can rarely 
be determined with certainty, this element causes significant difficulties in identifying 
manipulation.  Proper, non-manipulative market participation can cause an increase in 
market activity or alteration of the market price.  Manipulative trading can have 
exactly the same effects on the market, but is distinguished by the fact that it is 
undertaken for an impermissible purpose (Goldwasser, 1999).  Broadly speaking, case 
law establishes that market manipulation involves actions or trades undertaken with 
the intent of forcing a price to an artificial level, inducing other people to trade, or 
deceiving others.   
                                                 
11 Section 1(2)(a) Market Abuse Directive 2003. 
12 See http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/participants/market_manipulation.htm. 
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2.1.2 Law and economics literature definitions 
 The law and economics literature contains considerable debate about how to 
define manipulation.  In a sharp departure from mainstream legal thought, Fischel and 
Ross (1991) argue that market manipulation is too vague a concept to form the basis 
for criminal charges.  They point out that there is no objective definition of 
manipulation and suggest that manipulation could only be defined as dishonest intent 
to move stock prices.  Fischel and Ross argue that irrespective of intent, trades should 
not be prohibited as manipulative; but fictitious trades (e.g., trades in which the buyer 
and seller is the same person) and spreading false information should be classified as 
fraud.  Their reasoning is that: (i) purely trade based manipulation is unlikely to be 
successful; and (ii) rules that prohibit manipulation deter some legitimate trading.   
 Thel (1994) delivers a strong rebuttal.  Based on evidence in the economics 
literature Thel states that manipulation is easier to accomplish than Fischel and Ross 
claim.  Thel argues that manipulators can sometimes control prices with trades and in 
doing so profit either from pre-existing contracts that are contingent on prices, or by 
inducing other market participants to trade at manipulated prices.   
 Thel uses the term manipulation to mean trading undertaken with the intent of 
increasing or decreasing the reported price of a security.  Jarrow (1992) uses the term 
market manipulation in the context of large uninformed traders to mean a trading 
strategy that generates positive real wealth with zero risk.  Cherian and Jarrow (1995) 
define manipulation as trading by an individual (or group of individuals) in a manner 
such that the share price is influenced to his advantage.  More recently, Kyle and 
Viswanathan (2008) propose that trading strategies should only be classified as illegal 
price manipulation if they undermine economic efficiency both by decreasing price 
accuracy and reducing liquidity.  Unless both of these conditions are satisfied, the 
trading strategy is not unambiguously socially harmful and therefore, according to 
Kyle and Viswanathan, should not be prohibited.   
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2.1.3 Forms of market manipulation 
 The generic term ‘market manipulation’ encompasses many distinct and 
widely varied strategies.  To illustrate some of the relations between strategies, this 
overview constructs a simple taxonomy of the most common types of market 
manipulation (Figure 2.1).  At the broadest level, manipulation can be divided into 
runs, contract-based manipulations and market power techniques.  Within these 
groups, manipulation can be further broken down into trade-based, information-based 
and action-based forms.  This overview first describes the two levels on which 
manipulation can be grouped and then defines the individual techniques. 
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Figure 2.1 Taxonomy of manipulation techniques 
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 In a run the manipulator takes either a long or a short position in a stock, 
inflates or deflates the stock’s price while attracting liquidity to the stock, and finally 
reverses his position at the inflated or deflated price.  Runs that inflate a stock’s price 
are often referred to as ‘pump-and-dump’ manipulation.  The stock ‘pumping’ can 
take anywhere from a matter of hours to several years and make use of techniques 
such as rumour spreading, wash sales and pooling by several manipulators.  ‘Bear 
raids’ are a form of run in which the manipulator short sells a stock, manipulates its 
price downwards by inducing others to sell, and covers his position at a depressed 
price.  A common feature of runs is that the manipulator profits directly from the 
manipulated market by exploiting investors that buy at inflated prices or sell at 
depressed prices.   
 In contract-based manipulation, on the other hand, the manipulator profits 
from a contract or market that is external to the manipulated market.  For example, a 
manipulator might take a position in a derivatives contract then manipulate the 
underlying stock price to profit on the derivatives position.  An important difference is 
that such manipulation does not require the manipulator to induce others to trade at 
manipulated prices and therefore tends to be more mechanical by nature.   
 The third broad group of manipulation techniques involves the manipulator 
exploiting market power by, for example, taking a controlling position in the supply 
of a security.  Like contract-based manipulation, market power techniques are more 
mechanical in nature than runs.  However, they are similar to runs in that the 
manipulator profits by exploiting participants of the manipulated market. 
 Within the three broad types, manipulation techniques can be further broken 
down using Allen and Gale’s (1992) definitions of trade-based, information-based and 
action-based manipulation.  Trade-based manipulation involves influencing the price 
of a stock through trading.  In information-based manipulation a manipulator releases 
false information or rumours about a company in order to inflate or depress its price.  
Action-based manipulation involves taking actions to affect the value or perceived 
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value of a firm.  For example, a company director may shut down a factory to depress 
the share price.   
  Each of the three forms of manipulation consists of a wide variety of 
techniques, particularly trade based manipulation (see Cumming and Johan (2008) for 
a list of the techniques targeted by market surveillance authorities).  Engaging in a 
series of transactions that are reported on a public display facility which give the 
impression of trading activity or price movements is known as ‘painting the tape’.  
This technique often involves ‘wash sales’, i.e., improper transactions in which the 
buyer and seller is the same person such that there is no genuine change in ownership, 
or ‘matched orders’, i.e., pairs of buy and sell orders placed by different but colluding 
parties at the same time for the same price and volume.  ‘Pools’ are when a group of 
manipulators trade shares back and forth among themselves to influence prices and 
create the appearance of trading volume.  Dissemination of false information or 
rumours via the media, internet or other means is commonly known as ‘hype-and-
dump’ when the intent is to inflate a stock price, and ‘slur-and-dump’ when the intent 
is to depress the stock price.   
 ‘Marking the close’ (also known as closing price manipulation and ‘high 
closing’) involves buying or selling securities at or shortly before the close in an effort 
to alter the closing price.  ‘Marking the open’ is similar, but involves influencing the 
opening price rather than closing price.  Closing and opening price manipulation are 
common techniques for contractual manipulation because often contacts are based on 
closing prices (and less often opening prices), but are also used in conjunction with 
other techniques to facilitate runs.  ‘Pegging’ and ‘capping’ refer to placing orders 
that effectively prevent a price from moving up or down.  This is often done to ensure 
a derivatives contract expires in or out of the money.  ‘Corners’ and ‘squeezes’ are 
techniques in which the manipulator secures a controlling position in the supply of an 
asset and/or a derivative contract.  The manipulator then uses this position to 
manipulate the price by exploiting investors that need the underlying asset to close out 
short positions.   
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 To summarise this section, a definition of market manipulation that captures 
the key elements of statutory and case law, as well as the main arguments in the 
economics and law literature, is interference with the free and fair operation of a 
market, conducted with the intent to create a misleading price or a misleading trading 
activity.  Broadly speaking, market manipulation can be divided into runs, contract 
based manipulations and manipulation using market power, each of which can be 
conducted with a range of action-, information- and trade-based techniques.  Closing 
price manipulation is typically a trade-based form of contractual manipulation, 
although it is also sometimes used in conjunction with other techniques to facilitate a 
run.   
 
2.2 Theoretical literature 
 The theoretical market manipulation literature provides insights about the 
conditions under which manipulation is possible and profitable.  The literature, which 
spans the past 20 years, is fairly extensive, particularly regarding trade-based 
manipulation, and to a lesser extent information-based techniques.  Although action-
based manipulation is not explicitly studied in the literature, it can often be viewed as 
a type of information-based strategy because the manipulator’s actions create a false 
signal similar to false information.  Consequently, many of the findings about 
information-based manipulation are relevant for action-based manipulation.   
 
2.2.1 Information-based manipulation 
 Vila (1989) uses game theory to model a simple scenario in which a 
manipulator short sells a stock, releases false and damaging information about the 
stock and then covers his position at the depressed price. Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) 
analyse a model in which a manipulator announces a false takeover bid to drive up the 
price of a stock.  The profitability of both strategies hinges on the credibility of the 
information released by the manipulator.  In repetitions of such games, if market 
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participants are able to deduce that false information originated from a manipulator, 
the manipulator will quickly be discredited and the manipulation strategy will cease to 
be profitable. 
 To overcome the problem of credibility in repeated games, Benabou and 
Laroque (1992) and Van Bommel (2003) model the use of imprecise information to 
influence stock prices.  In Benabou and Laroque (1992), noise in private information 
restricts the ability of traders to verify the truthfulness of a piece of information.  
Consequently traders, such as company insiders, journalists or stock analysts, can 
manipulate stock prices over a long period of time without losing credibility by 
mixing truth and lies in the information they release.  Van Bommel (2003) uses a 
Kyle (1985) framework to model informed investors that manipulate prices by 
spreading imprecise rumours.  In equilibrium, rumours are informative and therefore 
rational profit maximising agents trade on them.  Because the rumours are imprecise, 
prices occasionally overshoot.  This allows the informed rumourmonger to profit not 
only from trading on their information, but also from trading against overshot prices.  
Eren and Ozsoylev (2006) use a similar model to Van Bommel (2003) and find that 
‘hype-and-dump’ manipulation increases market depth and trading volume, but 
decreases market efficiency.   
     
2.2.2 Trade-based manipulation 
 Early theoretical trade-based manipulation literature establishes very general 
conditions under which pure trade-based manipulation in a single market (e.g., a 
series of buys followed by a series of sells) is and is not profitable.  Fischel and Ross 
(1992), among others, argue that trade based manipulation is not possible in an 
efficient market.  Jarrow (1992), Cherian and Kuriyan (1995) and Cherian and Jarrow 
(1995) build on the model of Hart (1977) and derive conditions under which trade-
based manipulation is not possible.  In Cherian and Kuriyan’s model manipulation is 
not possible with rational agents when price responses are symmetric.  Jarrow 
demonstrates that a sufficient condition to exclude market manipulation strategies is 
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that the price response function depends only on a trader’s aggregate stock holdings 
and not on his past sequence of trades, in other words, when prices do not exhibit 
‘momentum’.  Huberman and Stanzl (2004) demonstrate that uninformed trading 
strategies that generate infinite expected profits are ruled out when price update 
functions, i.e., the permanent effect of trade size on future prices, are time 
independent and linear. 
 Many theoretical studies seek to prove that trade-based manipulation is 
possible in variations of the seminal models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985).  Allen and Gorton (1992) argue that the natural asymmetry between liquidity 
purchases and liquidity sales gives rise to profitable trade-based manipulation.  If 
liquidity motivated sales are more likely than liquidity motivated purchases, buy 
orders are more informed on average and therefore have a larger effect on prices.  In a 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, this asymmetry allows an uninformed 
manipulator to generate a profit by executing a series of buys to bid the price up and 
then sell the stock causing a relatively smaller decrease in price.  Allen and Gale 
(1992) similarly use a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) framework, but in their model an 
uninformed manipulator mimics an informed trader with positive information about 
the stock.  The uninformed trader’s manipulation is profitable under certain 
restrictions on the strategy of the informed trader.  Of critical importance to the 
success of such a strategy is information asymmetry.  Investors are uncertain whether 
a large trader who buys the stock does so because he knows it is undervalued or 
because he intends to manipulate the price.  Aggarwal and Wu (2006) extend this 
model and provide the insight that although information seekers (or arbitrageurs) 
generally make markets more efficient, when manipulation is possible more 
information seekers imply greater competition for shares, making it easier for an 
uninformed manipulator to enter the market and harm market efficiency.   
 Unlike the previous studies that examine uninformed manipulators, 
Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004a, 2004b) demonstrate that in Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and Kyle (1985) models, informed traders also benefit from manipulating the 
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market.  When the existence of an informed trader is uncertain and there is a large 
number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived 
informed traders will manipulate the market in every equilibrium by initially trading 
in the opposite direction to their information.  This strategy results in short-term 
losses for the informed traders, however, the increased noise in the trading process 
allows them to retain their informational advantage for longer and extract more profit 
from their information.  When there are many competitive rational traders who hold 
coarser information than the insider but finer information than the market maker, the 
manipulator has added incentive to manipulate because the competitive rational 
traders follow the insiders trades in equilibrium (Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2008). 
 A number of studies model how specific securities (e.g., derivatives), events 
(e.g., seasoned equity offerings), or market design features (e.g., trade reporting 
requirements) give rise to profitable trade-based manipulation.  Jarrow (1994) 
provides evidence of manipulation strategies that arise from derivative securities.  In 
Gerard and Nanda (1993) strategic informed traders short sell a stock just prior to a 
seasoned equity offering to place downward pressure on the price.  The manipulators 
then more than cover their position by purchasing stocks in the offering at a discount 
price and finally liquidate their positions at a profit when the stock price is eventually 
restored to its fair value.  In Fishman and Hagerty (1995) a manipulator takes 
advantage of the Securities Exchange Act (1934) mandatory disclosure rule for large 
trades.  The manipulator declares large buys, thereby forcing prices up, and then sells 
the position anonymously in a series of small trades.  John and Narayanan (1997) and 
Huddart et al. (2001) also examine the effect of mandatory disclosure laws on the 
insider’s incentive to manipulate.  Kyle (1984), Vila (1987) and Allen et al. (2006) 
model corners and squeezes in which manipulators control prices by obtaining a large 
fraction of the supply.  Pirrong (1993) shows that squeezes hinder price discovery and 
create deadweight losses.  In Vila (1989) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) a 
manipulator trades to give the impression of a takeover bid, misleading the market 
and allowing the manipulator to profit by selling at an inflated price.   
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 Theory suggests that another mechanism manipulators can exploit to their 
advantage is the feedback effect from financial markets to the real value of a firm.  
This occurs when directors use their company’s stock price as a signal in making 
decisions about the company’s investment.  In Goldstein and Geumbel’s (2008) 
model manipulators aggressively short sell shares to depress share prices, thereby 
negatively influencing companies’ investment decisions, harming fundamentals and 
allowing the short sellers to cover their positions at depressed prices.  Khanna and 
Sonti (2004) demonstrate that feedback effects from stock prices to fundamental 
values can also be exploited in the other direction.  In their model long-term 
shareholders manipulate prices upwards to encourage value creating investment.  
These studies illustrate that manipulation can reduce economic efficiency by 
distorting resource allocation.   
 In contrast to much of the theoretical literature, Hanson and Oprea (2009) do 
not seek to demonstrate the possibility or profitability of manipulation, but rather they 
examine the effects of manipulators on price accuracy.  They find that in a Kyle 
(1985) model adapted to the case of a thin prediction market a manipulator with an 
exogenous preference for manipulation has the somewhat counter-intuitive ex-ante 
effect of increasing price accuracy.  This effect arises because in the presence of a 
manipulator, the profitability of informed trading is higher and consequently more 
traders exert costly effort to become informed.    
 A few studies specifically analyse closing price manipulation.  Kumar and 
Seppi (1992) use a Kyle (1985) framework to model a manipulator that takes a 
substantial long position in the futures market and then aggressively bids up the spot 
price before the close to profit from a more favourable futures settlement price.  In 
Hillion and Suominen (2004) brokers manipulate closing prices to alter customers’ 
perceptions of their execution quality.  Their model demonstrates that closing call 
auctions reduce manipulation and enhance price efficiency.  A recent model of a 
mutual fund manager’s investment decision (Bernhardt and Davies, 2009) suggests 
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that fund managers have incentives to use short-term price impacts to manipulate 
closing prices at the ends of reporting periods.   
 
2.3 Empirical literature 
 The theoretical literature is valuable, particularly in: (i) providing insights 
about the conditions under which manipulation is possible; and (ii) identifying 
circumstances in which profitable manipulation opportunities may exist even if no 
such cases have yet been reported.  However, many manipulation strategies are too 
complicated to be modelled theoretically and the assumptions and simplifications 
made in order for theoretical models to be tractable lead to questions about the 
validity of their results in real markets.  For these reasons empirical research is crucial 
to understanding market manipulation.  Compared to the theoretical literature, 
empirical studies are fewer and more recent.  This is largely due to the difficulties in 
obtaining data.  This section reviews studies that provide circumstantial or indirect 
evidence on manipulation, followed by studies of known manipulation cases and 
finally, the small number of experimental studies. 
  
2.3.1 Indirect empirical evidence 
 Early empirical asset pricing and market microstructure literature identifies 
various abnormalities in closing prices, but does not link the abnormalities to market 
manipulation.13  More recently, however, several studies attribute seasonal patterns 
and anomalies in day-end trading to closing price manipulation.  Felixson and Pelli 
(1999) examine whether closing prices are manipulated in the Finnish stock market 
using regression analysis.  Although their results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that closing prices are manipulated, they concede that further research is required to 
be conclusive.  Carhart et al. (2002) find more conclusively that in US equities 
                                                 
13 See Keim (1983), Ariel (1987) and Ritter (1988) on seasonal patterns and Wood et al. (1985) and 
Harris (1989) on intraday anomalies. 
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markets price inflation is localised in the last half hour before the close and that it is 
more intense on quarter-end days.  They report that 80% of funds beat the S&P 500 
Index on the last trading day of the year, but only 37% do so on the first trading day 
of a new year.  They attribute this phenomenon to manipulation by fund managers.  
Similarly, Hillion and Suominen (2004) find on the Paris Bourse that significant rises 
in volatility, volume and bid-ask spreads occurs mainly in the last minute of trading 
and they attribute this to manipulation.  Akyol and Michayluk (2009) make use of the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange’s design involving two trading sessions per day to isolate 
end of period effects from end of day effects.  They report evidence of closing price 
manipulation.    
 Empirical studies that analyse underlying stock prices around options 
expiration generally find that effects of manipulation can be found in the last hour 
before options expire and that the price effect is reversed in the first half hour of 
trading after expiration (Stoll and Whaley, 1987; Chamberlain et al., 1989; Stoll and 
Whaley, 1991).  Ni et al. (2005) find evidence that on option expiration dates the 
closing prices of stocks with listed options cluster at option strike prices.  They 
attribute this finding to closing price manipulation.  McDonald and Michayluk (2003) 
examine whether manipulators exploit the trading halt mechanism on the Paris 
Bourse, where trading is halted in a stock when an order is submitted outside the daily 
price limits.  They document suspicious trading characteristics around some trading 
halts, consistent with manipulators submitting trade-ending orders to secure the most 
recent trade price as the closing price.  Onayev and Zdorovtsov (2008) find patterns of 
abnormal returns around the reconstitution of the Russell 3000 index.  They suggest 
the patterns of returns are caused by closing price manipulation that is intended to 
influence the index reconstitution.     
 Two recent studies find evidence of manipulation by examining the trading 
records of likely manipulators, rather than market prices.  Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
find evidence of ‘pump-and-dump’ market manipulation by brokers in Pakistan’s 
main stock exchange.  Brokers earn at least 8% higher returns on their own trades and 
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neither market timing nor liquidity provision offer sufficient explanations for this 
result.  They conclude that traders in developing markets resist stronger regulation to 
maintain high rents, suggesting poor regulatory systems hinder market development.  
Gallagher et al. (2009) support the earlier findings of Carhart et al. (2002) that some 
fund managers manipulate closing prices to influence their fund’s reported 
performance.  Gallagher et al. find that on the last day of the quarter, fund managers 
tend to purchase illiquid stocks in which they already hold overweight positions.  
Unlike in Carhart et al. (2002), however, Gallagher et al. (2009) find that poor 
performing managers are more likely to manipulate prices.      
 A limitation of studies that are based on indirect evidence is that usually there 
are alternative explanations for their results and it is virtually impossible to eliminate 
all alternative explanations.  Despite this limitation, they provide some indication of 
the magnitude of price distortions caused by manipulation (in the order of 0.5% to 2% 
in Carhart et al. (2002)) and the scale of profits earned by a manipulator (in an 
emerging market, 50% to 90% higher annual returns than the average investor 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005)).  These studies support theoretical models (e.g., stock price 
manipulation related to derivatives) and identify motivations for manipulation not 
studied in the theoretical literature (e.g., around index reconstitutions).   
 
2.3.2 Empirical studies of known manipulation cases 
 Studies of known manipulation cases are relatively few and in several 
instances resemble case studies due to the unavailability of larger and more 
representative datasets.  A recent and significant study in this area due to its relatively 
large sample of cases is Aggarwal and Wu (2006).  Aggarwal and Wu analyse ‘pump-
and-dump’ manipulation cases obtained from The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) litigation releases.  They identify 142 cases of manipulation, of 
which they are able to obtain data on 51 manipulated stocks during the period 1990-
2001.  The minimum length of a manipulation periods is two days, the median is 202 
days and the maximum is 1,373 days, highlighting the variation in the nature of 
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pump-and-dump manipulation.  They find that in their sample of prosecution cases 
stocks generally experience a price increase during the manipulation period, a 
subsequent decrease during the post-manipulation period, and increased volatility.  
Their sample of cases is more concentrated in illiquid stocks and most of the 
manipulation is conducted by informed insiders such as management, substantial 
shareholders, market-makers or brokers.  Aggarwal and Wu (2006), however, do not 
address the sample selection bias arising from incomplete detection.  This is discussed 
further in Chapter 3. 
 A widely stated reason for the introduction of closing call auctions on stock 
exchanges is to minimise the ability for the closing price to be manipulated.  Despite 
this, Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) identify several cases of closing price 
manipulation in exchanges with closing call auctions.  In their sample of 25 closing 
auction manipulations from six developed markets, manipulators exhibit similar 
behaviour across markets in that they tend to submit large, unrepresentative orders in 
the final seconds of the auction.  Their analysis indicates that the design of the closing 
auction algorithm influences how easily the closing price can be manipulated.  Some 
algorithm designs are more effective than others in reducing the impact of 
manipulation.    
 A small number of studies examine corners, squeezes, the stock pools of the 
1920s.  Although the widespread manipulation through stock pools before the crash of 
1929 is vividly documented in Galbraith (1972) and one of the main reasons for the 
introduction of the US federal securities legislation in the 1930s, Mahoney (1999) and 
Jiang et al. (2005) find little evidence of manipulation in the alleged stock pools of the 
1920s.  They conclude that these pools did not harm investors.  Their sample consists 
of 55 stock pools identified from a US Senate report.  Allen et al. (2006) examine 
several well-known stock and commodity market corners which occurred between 
1863 and 1980. They find that manipulation by large investors and corporate insiders 
using market power increases market volatility and has an adverse price impact on 
other assets.  They also find that the presence of large investors makes it risky for 
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would-be short sellers to trade against the mispricings, which in some cases are 
severe.  Merrick et al. (2005) examine a case of manipulation involving a delivery 
squeeze on a bond futures contract traded in London, while Jegadeesh (1993) and 
Jordan and Jordan (1996) examine the Salomon brothers’ market corner of a Treasury 
note auction in 1991. 
 Besides the somewhat obvious limitation of small sample sizes, a less obvious 
limitation of these studies is non-randomness of their samples that arises as a result of 
incomplete detection (and prosecution) of manipulation.  The biases in inference that 
can arise when this problem is ignored are well documented by Feinstein (1990).  
Despite this limitation, studies of known manipulation cases provide rich insights 
about manipulation that can not be gained using other approaches.  
 
2.3.3 Experimental studies 
 In an unusual field experiment, Camerer (1998) attempts to manipulate horse 
racing odds by making bets and then cancelling them shortly before the race.  
Although making and then cancelling bets is costless, this is not widely known by 
bettors at the time.  Camerer finds that that the bets placed by the experimenter do not 
distort prices.   
 Hanson et al. (2006) conduct the first laboratory work on price manipulation.  
In their study, 12 participants trade stock and cash in an electronic limit order book 
market.  In their manipulation treatment, half of the participants are given monetary 
incentives to manipulate the stock price.  Their main result is that manipulators are 
unable to distort price accuracy because other traders counteract the actions of the 
manipulator.   
 Experimental studies are able to overcome many of the limitations of other 
empirical methods because the experimenter is able to observe and control 
information, incentives and fundamental asset values, as well as being able to 
overcome the problems caused by incomplete detection of manipulation.  The main 
limitation in this type of research is in the ability to construct the experimental setting 
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in a sufficiently realistic manner so that results have external validity and offer 
meaningful insights for real markets.  Despite this limitation, experimental studies are 
a promising and underutilised method for enhancing our understanding of market 
manipulation.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 The generic term ‘market manipulation’ refers to a very large number of 
highly varied strategies generally involving the intent to create a misleading 
appearance regarding the price or trading activity of a security.  Closing price 
manipulation is typically a trade-based form of contractual manipulation, although it 
is also sometimes used in conjunction with other techniques to facilitate a run on a 
stock.   
 The large body of theoretical market manipulation literature provides insights 
about the conditions under which manipulation is profitable.  A limitation of this 
literature is that the assumptions and simplifications made in order for theoretical 
models to be tractable lead to questions about the validity of their results in real 
markets.   The empirical literature by comparison is scarce, largely due to the 
difficulties in obtaining data, but provides some rich insights.  The greatest difficulty 
for studies based on circumstantial or indirect evidence is ruling out alternative 
explanations.  Studies of known manipulation cases use small non-random samples, 
which brings into question the ability to generalise their results.  Controlled 
experiments can overcome many of the difficulties faced by empirical studies, 
however, there is almost no work in this area yet.  Many aspects of market 
manipulation are not yet well understood, such as its prevalence, determinants and 
effects.  Further empirical evidence on these issues would be valuable.  Future 
empirical studies might seek to obtain more comprehensive datasets of manipulation 
cases, addressing the incomplete detection problems in existing datasets, or using 
controlled experiments.   
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 There is only a small amount of work specifically on closing price 
manipulation, despite the many uses of closing prices and the perceived pervasiveness 
of this form of manipulation.14  Theoretical studies demonstrate that derivative 
traders, brokers and fund managers have incentives to manipulate closing prices and 
empirical studies find evidence that these market participants engage in closing price 
manipulation.  There is scope for research that furthers our understanding of closing 
price manipulation, particularly its prevalence, determinants and effects. 
 This thesis contributes to the empirical literature using the approaches 
suggested by this review: collection of a comprehensive dataset of closing price 
manipulation cases, application of econometric methods that address the incomplete 
detection problem, and a controlled experiment.  This thesis adds to the small number 
of studies specifically focussed on closing price manipulation.  Unlike many existing 
studies, this research is not limited to specific motivations for closing price 
manipulation or specific groups of market participants, and examines closing price 
manipulation more broadly.  Rather than providing evidence of the possibility or 
profitability of closing price manipulation, this thesis focuses on the prevalence, 
determinants and effects of manipulation. 
                                                 
14 For example, an article in news magazine Maclean’s (10 July 2000, Vol. 113 No. 28, page 39) 
comments “nearly everyone seems to agree that high closing is common”. 
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Chapter 3 
Prevalence and determinants of closing 
price manipulation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 Our understanding of the pervasiveness and underpinnings of closing price 
manipulation is limited by the fact that only some non-random fraction of 
manipulation is detected and prosecuted by market regulators.  Thel (1994, p. 223) 
remarks “manipulation is theoretically possible and probably occurs fairly often”.  
Closing price manipulation in particular is perceived by market participants to be 
common, but how common is common?  Similarly, the underpinnings of manipulation 
are not well understood.  For example, fund managers have been prosecuted for 
manipulating closing prices on quarter-ends but is closing price manipulation more 
likely on quarter-ends than on other days?    
 This chapter makes two main contributions.  First, it quantifies the extent to 
which various factors drive closing price manipulation and its detection, and second, 
it estimates the prevalence of closing price manipulation in stock markets.  The 
analysis uses a hand collected sample of actual manipulation cases and detection 
controlled estimation (DCE) methods, which explicitly take into consideration that 
only a non-random subset of manipulation is detected.  The sample of prosecuted 
manipulation cases is from four US and Canadian stock exchanges: the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) and the TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V). 
 The results indicate that stocks with high levels of information asymmetry and 
mid to low levels of liquidity are most likely to be manipulated.  A significant 
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proportion of manipulation occurs on month-end and quarter-end days suggesting 
fund managers are responsible for a considerable fraction of manipulation.  Stock 
price volatility deters manipulation by drawing the attention of regulators.  The DCE 
models estimate that approximately 1.1% of closing prices are manipulated.  For each 
prosecuted instance of closing price manipulation approximately 280 to 310 instances 
of manipulation remain undetected or not prosecuted.  The rates of manipulation and 
detection differ substantially across exchanges.  Larger government regulatory 
budgets increase the rate of prosecution and deter manipulation.  Therefore, increased 
government regulatory budgets are likely to enhance market integrity. 
 The estimates of the fraction of manipulation that remains undetected are 
crucial in evaluating the effectiveness of regulation and deciding whether or not 
current regulatory effort is sufficient.  The insights into what drives manipulation have 
implications for improving the efficiency with which scarce regulatory resources are 
utilised in detecting and deterring manipulation.  The estimates of the frequency of 
closing price manipulation and where it is most likely to occur help quantify the harm 
caused by manipulators to market efficiency and social welfare. 
 
3.2 Empirical model of manipulation and detection 
 Many violations of laws and regulations, such as manipulation and insider 
trading, are not detected and not prosecuted.  Analysing only the detected and 
prosecuted fraction can lead to substantial biases in inference about the characteristics 
or frequency of violations.  This problem is overlooked or inadequately addressed in 
much of the empirical literature.   
 Biases in inference about the characteristics of market misconduct arise when 
the set of detected cases systematically differ from all violations because of non-
random detection.  Due to their limited resources, regulators such as the US Securities 
and Exchange commission (SEC) are unable to pursue all violations and are likely to 
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focus enforcement effort on egregious violations and high-profile cases that will have 
the most deterrence effect (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).   
 The biases caused by non-random detection become particularly problematic 
when some aspect of the detection process is related to the effects being examined.  
For example, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) analyse a sample of ‘pump-and-dump’ 
manipulation cases prosecuted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).  In a pump-and-dump scheme a manipulator takes a long position in a stock, 
inflates the price through aggressive trading or by releasing false information and then 
profits from selling the stock at the inflated price.  If cases of manipulation that cause 
large price changes are more likely to be detected and prosecuted by the SEC, then the 
inferences of Aggarwal and Wu about the effect of manipulation on prices, or what 
types of stocks are more likely to be manipulated, are potentially significantly biased.  
The difficulty in estimating the underlying rate of violations (consisting of detected 
and undetected violations) is more obvious – if undetected violations cannot be 
observed, how can one infer what fraction goes undetected?   
 The econometric problems caused by incomplete detection are well 
documented by Feinstein (1990, 1991).  To overcome these problems, Feinstein 
(1990) develops detection controlled estimation (DCE) methods that allow inference 
about undetected violations, which are not directly observable.  DCE models have 
been applied to the regulation of nuclear power plants (Feinstein, 1989), income tax 
evasion (Feinstein, 1990, 1991), compliance with environmental protection legislation 
(Brehm and Hamilton, 1996; Helland, 1998) and false positives in mammograms 
(Kleit and Ruiz, 2003).  The idea behind DCE is simple: jointly estimating models of 
the detection and violation processes explicitly allows for incomplete detection.  In its 
simplest form, a DCE model is a system of two equations: one modelling violation 
and the other modelling detection conditional on violation having occurred.   
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3.2.1 The model setup  
 This chapter modifies the basic DCE model in Feinstein (1990) to represent 
the detection of closing price manipulation as a two stage process.  Therefore, the 
model used in this analysis consists of three stages.  The first stage models the 
probability that the closing price of a particular stock on a particular date is 
manipulated and the second two stages model the probability that a particular 
manipulation is detected.   
 The reason for modelling detection as a two stage process is as follows.  
Closing price manipulation can be detected by a regulator when price and volume 
movements trigger ‘alerts’ in automated market surveillance systems.  This is more 
likely when a pattern emerges of several alerts generated from trades made by a 
particular broker, in a particular stock or on a particular day (Cumming and Johan, 
2008).  I refer to this as direct detection.  Once a trader has been detected for 
manipulating prices, further investigation of their trading records often reveals other 
instances of manipulation, attempted manipulation or conspiring manipulators that 
were not detected by automated surveillance system alerts.  Also, some instances of 
manipulation that do not trigger alerts in surveillance systems are brought to the 
attention of the regulator by complaints from market participants.  I refer to detection 
of manipulation that does not trigger alerts in surveillance systems as indirect 
detection.   
 The manipulation sample contains examples of indirect detection: instances in 
which day-end returns are zero or even negative despite the manipulator’s intent to 
inflate the closing price.  These instances represent unsuccessful attempts at 
manipulation or cases in which the manipulator reduced a day-end price decrease, for 
example, by keeping prices flat when they would have fallen without the manipulative 
buying.  This chapter models direct and indirect detection separately because their 
empirical characteristics are quite different.  For example, directly detected 
manipulation is likely to have a large abnormal return on the day of manipulation, 
whereas indirectly detected manipulation may not.  
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 Prosecution is implicit in the model of detection.  Although the two processes 
could be modelled separately, such a model is likely to suffer from identification 
problems due to the lack of observable variables that affect one process but not the 
other.  To separately identify detection and prosecution requires variables that are 
generally not available, such as whether incriminating telephone conversations are 
recorded or whether incentives and gain to the manipulator can be convincingly 
demonstrated in court.  Therefore, this chapter models detection and prosecution as a 
single process and simply refers to this as detection, consistent with other DCE 
models in the literature.  The limitations of constructing the model this way are 
discussed together with the results. 
 The propensity for closing price i (the closing price of a particular stock on a 
particular day) to be manipulated is modelled as a continuous latent variable, , that 
is a function of market-, stock- and time-specific attributes, . 

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iY1  is the binary variable for whether closing price i has been manipulated.   cannot 
be directly observed if detection is incomplete.  Manipulation is only directly 
observable if the closing price is manipulated and the manipulation is detected. 
iY1
 Conditional on manipulation having occurred, the propensity for closing price 
i to be directly detected by a regulator is modelled as a continuous latent variable, , 
that is a function of market-, stock- and time-specific attributes, . 
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Similarly,  is the binary variable for whether manipulated closing price i is directly 
detected.   
iY2
 Conditional on manipulation having occurred and not having been directly 
detected, the propensity for closing price i to be indirectly detected is modelled as a 
continuous latent variable, , that is a function of market-, stock- and time-specific 
attributes, . 

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iY3  is the binary variable for whether the manipulated closing price i is indirectly 
detected. 
 Figure 3.1 provides a graphical illustration of the three-equation DCE model.  
A sample of closing prices falls into two disjoint sets, A and Ac.  Set A consists of 
closing prices that have been manipulated and either directly or indirectly detected.  
Set Ac consists of closing prices that have either not been manipulated or have been 
manipulated but have evaded both direct and indirect detection.  It is important to 
recognise that , and cannot be separately observed.  The data identify sets A 
and Ac.  This information is used to estimate the model’s parameters by maximising 
the likelihood of the sample given the model.  This procedure takes into consideration 
the incomplete detection of manipulation.   
iY1 iY2 iY3
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Figure 3.1 Modified detection controlled estimation model 
 
 
 This DCE model is similar to Heckman-style selection bias correcting models 
in that both explicitly model the process that causes the sample to be a non-random 
subset of the population.  However, Heckman-style models are not suited to 
incomplete detection problems.  The reason is that one of the outcomes of the 
selection process, undetected or not prosecuted manipulation, cannot be directly 
observed as it would be in a Heckman-style application (non-respondents in survey 
data, for example). 
  
3.2.2 Estimation 
 I use the maximum likelihood method proposed by Poirier (1980) and 
Feinstein (1990) to estimate this model.  I define M( ), D( ) and I( ) to be monotonic 
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link functions that link ,  and , to latent probabilities for 
manipulation, direct detection and indirect detection respectively.
11 iX 22 iX 33 iX
15  That is,     
   1Pr 111  ii YXM       (3.7) 
   1|1Pr 1222  iii YYXD      (3.8) 
   0,1|1Pr 21333  iiii YYYXI     (3.9) 
 In order to observe a detected manipulated closing price, that closing price 
must have been manipulated and either directly or indirectly detected.16  Therefore, 
the likelihood that closing price i is from set A (the set of detected manipulation) is: 
          3322112211 1  iiiiiiA XIXDXMXDXML  


                                                
 (3.10) 
The log-likelihood of the entire set of detected manipulated closing prices (set A), is 
therefore:  
          


Ai
iiiiiA XIXDXMXDXML 3322112211 1loglog       (3.11) 
 Similarly, for a closing price in which manipulation has not been detected, 
either: (i) manipulation has not occurred; or (ii) manipulation has occurred and evaded 
both direct and indirect detection.  Therefore, the likelihood that closing price i has no 
detected manipulation (falls into set Ac) is: 
          33221111 111  iiiiicA XIXDXMXML    (3.12) 
 
15 In this implementation of this model the link functions are cumulative logistic distribution functions, 
that is,   1111 1 1  iXi eXM  ,   2222 1 1  iXi eXD   and   3333 1 1  iXi eXI  .  The disturbance terms, 
,  and , are from independent logistic distributions with mean zero and variance i1 i2 i3 3
2
 (scale 
parameter of one).  In robustness tests I examine alternative distributions for the disturbance term. 
16 I make the simplifying assumption of no false detection, that is, the probability of detecting and 
prosecuting manipulation given that manipulation has not occurred is zero.  This seems reasonable 
considering the strength of evidence required to prosecute closing price manipulators. 
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 The log-likelihood of the entire set of observations in which manipulation is not 
detected  (set Ac) is therefore:  
           


cAi
iiiicA
XIXDXMXML 33221111 111loglog     (3.13) 
The log-likelihood of the full sample is the sum of the log-likelihoods of each of the 
two sets of observations.  To estimate this model with data collected from endogenous 
stratified sampling (choice-based sampling) I add weights to the observations and the 
resulting weighted maximum-likelihood estimator (due to Manski and Lerman 
(1977)) becomes:  
           
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1loglog


(3.14) 
where ,  and swA / )1/()1( sw cA     and s  are the fractions of stock-days 
with prosecuted manipulation in the population and sample respectively. 
 Maximum likelihood estimation maximises the likelihood of the sample 
(Equation 3.14) through an iterative process, allowing consistent estimation of the 
coefficients for the factors that affect manipulation and detection, ,  and . 1 2 3
 
3.2.3 Alternative models 
 Identification is a potential problem in all DCE models.  The model 
decomposes a single datum, detected manipulation, into three components, 
manipulation, direct detection and indirect detection.  The identification issue arises 
because initially it is unknown if this decomposition can be uniquely performed.  
Intuitively, the model needs to ascertain whether a sample of cases for which the rate 
of detected manipulation is low is characterised by a low rate of manipulation or a low 
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rate of detection.  The model also needs to ascertain for cases of detected 
manipulation whether they were directly or indirectly detected.17  
 Identification requires predictor variables uniquely associated with each stage.  
That is, the model needs at least one variable that predicts manipulation but not direct 
or indirect detection, at least one variable that predicts direct detection but not 
manipulation or indirect detection and at least one variable that predicts indirect 
detection but not manipulation or direct detection.  While this condition is 
theoretically satisfied by the three-equation DCE model, the estimates must be treated 
with caution because identification can, in practice, still be a problem.  Identification 
also depends on the amount of variation in the explanatory variables and the strength 
of their relations with the dependent variables.  
 I estimate an alternative two-equation model, similar to the original DCE 
model used in Feinstein (1989, 1990), because such a model is expected to have fewer 
problems with identification.  This model allows detection to result from direct or 
indirect detection but, in contrast to the three-equation model, it makes no effort to 
distinguish between the two.  Appendix A contains the equations and likelihood 
function for this model.   
 Another model specification issue is that the model used in this analysis, like 
the rest of the DCE literature, assumes errors are independently distributed.  In 
practice, the errors of one process (e.g., manipulation) may be correlated with the 
errors of another (e.g., detection), or errors from the one process may be correlated in 
cross-section or time.  I address these two distinct forms of correlation separately.   
 Brehm and Hamilton (1996) demonstrate with Monte Carlo simulations that 
using an uncorrelated error DCE model when errors are correlated between processes 
may lead to modest underestimation of the most significant coefficients and increased 
error around those estimates.  Expectations simultaneity, if not incorporated into the 
model, can cause error correlation between processes.  Two examples of expectations 
                                                 
17 For a more formal discussion of the identification issue see Feinstein (1990).  
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simultaneity are: (i) a regulator that is more likely to investigate stock-days that have 
a higher probability of being manipulated; and (ii) manipulators that choose to 
manipulate stocks with a lower probability of investigation.    
 To overcome the potential correlation of errors between processes and allow 
for more sophisticated behaviour I estimate a third model with expectations 
simultaneity.  Based on the three-equation modified DCE model I replace the 
equations of the propensities for direct and indirect detection with the following: 
 
iiii XMXY 2211222  

   (3.15) 
 
iiii XMXY 3311333  

    (3.16) 
 In this model the probability that a regulator investigates a closing price for 
manipulation, and therefore the propensity for manipulation to be detected, depends 
on the regulator’s assessment of the probability of manipulation,  11 iXM .  Appendix 
A contains the full set of equations and likelihood function. 
 Correlation of errors in cross-section or time does not bias the parameter 
estimates (as it would be in some other models), but may lead to under- or over-
estimation of standard errors depending on the nature of the correlation (Robinson, 
1982).  To minimise the potential bias in standard error estimates, I include dummy 
variables to absorb the effects of the most plausible scenarios causing error 
correlation.  For example, cross-sectional error correlation may arise if, for example, a 
fund manager decides to manipulate several stocks in his portfolio on the same day or 
several derivatives traders manipulate stock prices on an option expiry day.  To 
absorb these effects I also include month-end and options expiry day dummy 
variables.  I include dummy variables for the different exchanges to absorb error 
clustering by exchange.     
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3.3 Variables and model specifications 
 Most variables primarily influence either manipulation or detection, but may 
also have indirect effects on the other process due to interaction between manipulators 
and regulators.  Regulators, to some extent, anticipate the behaviour of manipulators 
and manipulators anticipate the behaviour of regulators.  For example, if fund 
managers manipulate closing prices at quarter-ends then a primary determinant of the 
probability of manipulation is whether or not a day is a quarter-end.  A regulator that 
is aware of this association is more likely to investigate suspicious trading on quarter-
end days and therefore whether or not a day is a quarter-end is a secondary 
determinant of the probability of detecting manipulation.  Another example is that if 
regulatory budget affects the detection rate, the probability of manipulation will 
depend on regulatory jurisdiction because manipulators are likely to take into 
consideration the probability of being caught. 
 Table 3.1 defines the variables.  The following paragraphs discuss variables 
according to their primary association - first those associated with manipulation, then 
detection and, finally, both manipulation and detection.   
 An order can move prices for at least two reasons: (i) it mechanically moves 
price from the bid quote to the ask quote (or vice versa), or beyond the prevailing best 
quotes by executing the volume at the best quotes; and (ii) it conveys information and 
subsequently causes the market to revise its belief about the value of the stock.  A 
manipulator can exploit one or both of these mechanisms to influence prices.  While 
the first mechanism is possible in all stocks to differing degrees depending on the 
depth, spread and trading volume, the second mechanism only arises if information is 
distributed asymmetrically between market participants.  The following discussion 
refers to the two mechanisms as liquidity and information asymmetry, respectively. 
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Table 3.1 
Definitions of variables 
This table defines the variables used in the models of manipulation and detection.  The third column reports the 
transformation that is applied to the raw data to normalise and scale the variables.  Where required by the 
transformation, negative values are multiplied by negative one before and after applying the transformation.  
Variable Definition Transform
Panel A: Variables associated with both manipulation and detection 
Detected 
manipulation  
Indicator variable for the 184 instances of detected and prosecuted closing price manipulation.  
 
 
 
 
Exchange Four indicator variables for the exchanges: American Stock Exchange (AMEX), New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V).   
 
 
Industry 
 
Ten indicator variables based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) to represent the 
industry of a stock.  The industries are (1) oil and gas, (2) basic materials, (3) industrials, (4) 
consumer goods, (5) health care, (6) consumer services, (7) telecommunications, (8) utilities, 
(9) financials and (10) technology.   
 
 
Panel B: Variables associated primarily with manipulation 
Market 
capitalisation  
Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares on issue. The number of shares on 
issue is updated whenever new tranches of stock are issued or after a capital change.  
Calculated on the first day of each month in millions of US dollars. 
 
)log(  
Turnover 
 
 
Median number of trades per day in the stock during the previous month.   Alternative 
definitions used for robustness tests:  
Turnover (2) - median daily traded US dollar volume in previous month.   
Turnover (3) - median daily US dollar volume traded in previous month divided by market 
capitalisation. 
 
)ln(  
 
)log(  
)log(  
Spread The median of the past month’s daily mean proportional spreads for that stock.  Daily mean 
proportional spreads are calculated as the equal weighted mean of the difference between the 
best bid and ask divided by the bid-ask midpoint price at every quote update and trade. 
 
  
Closing price The price of the last trade before the market closes at 4:00pm.  The closing time is adjusted on 
days when the close is delayed. 
 
3   
Institutional  Institutional following defined as the total number of IBES analyst forecasts of that financial 
year’s earnings per share (EPS).  Calculated on the first day of each month. 
 
  
Index stock Indicator variable for whether a stock is a constituent of the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 
Index or the S&P/TSX Composite Index (TSE 300 Index prior to May 2002).  Calculated on 
the first day of each month. 
 
 
Optionable Indicator variable for whether the stock has options trading on it that expire within a month.   
 
 
Option expiry Indicator variable for whether an optionable stock is in its last day of trade before options on 
that stock expire.   
 
 
Trend Close to close return over previous calendar month. 
 
3   
Month-end  Indicator variable for the last trading day of a month. 
 
 
Quarter-end  Indicator variable for the last trading day of a quarter, that is, the last trading days in the months 
of March, June, September and December. 
 
 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily returns calculated from closing prices over the previous month.   
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Variable Definition Transform 
Panel C: Variables associated primarily with detection 
Prosecutions  Number of closing price manipulation prosecutions filed by the market regulators in that 
country in the previous year (rolling one year window) based on the date of filling the statement 
of allegations. 
 
 
Regulator budget  Budget of the principal government regulator divided by the number of common stocks for 
which the regulator is responsible.  The principal regulator for AMEX and NYSE is the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and for TSX and TSX-V it is the Ontario 
Securities Commission (OSC).  Budgets are taken from the annual reports of the regulators for 
each regulator’s financial year, deflated by the OECD published CPI of the corresponding 
country and converted to US dollars.  The units of this variable are ’00,000s of US dollars in 
real (August 1998) terms per common stock. 
 
 
Abnormal return 
(AR) 
 
Abnormal day-end return calculated as the return from the bid-ask midpoint 30 minutes before 
the close to the closing price (or in the absence of trades in the last 30 minutes then the return 
from the midpoint at time of the last trade to closing price), less that stock’s previous month’s 
median day-end return.  Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
AR2 - as per AR1 but using last 60 minutes of trading in place of 30. 
AR3 - abnormal daily return calculated as close to close return less that stock’s previous 
month’s median close-to-close return. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
Reversal (RV) Overnight return reversal calculated as the return from the closing price to the next morning’s 
11am bid-ask midpoint price. 
 
  
Abnormal 
volume (AV) 
 
Abnormal day-end dollar volume, V, relative to benchmark daily traded dollar volume.  
Calculated as ((V/Turnover2)*100), where V is the traded US dollar volume in the last 30 
minutes before the close less that stock’s previous month’s median day-end volume.  Turnover2 
is the median daily traded US dollar volume in that stock in the previous month. Alternative 
definitions used for robustness tests:  
AV2 - as per AV but using the last 60 minutes of trading in place of 30. 
AV3 - abnormal daily volume calculated as per AV but using daily traded dollar volume in 
place of the last 30 minute traded dollar volume. 
 
4   
 
 
 
 
4   
4   
AR time-series  Abnormal day-end return aggregated over a period of time for a particular stock.  Calculated as 
the median value of AR for that stock in a two-week period starting seven days back in time 
and ending seven days forward in time.  Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
AR2 time-series – as per AR time-series but using AR2 in place of AR. 
AR3 time-series – as per AR time-series but using AR3 in place of AR. 
 
  
 
 
  
  
RV time-series  
 
Reversal aggregated over a period of time for a particular stock.  Calculated as the median 
value of RV for that stock in a two-week period starting seven days back in time and ending 
even days forward in time.   s  
  
AV time-series 
 
Abnormal day-end volume aggregated over a period of time for a particular stock.  Calculated 
as the median value of AV for that stock in a two-week period starting seven days back in time 
and ending seven days forward in time.  Alternative definitions used for robustness tests:  
AV2 time-series – as per AV time-series but using AV2 in place of AV. 
AV3 time-series – as per AV time-series but using AV3 in place of AV. 
 
4   
 
 
4   
4   
AR cross-section  
 
Abnormal day-end return aggregated in stock cross-section.  Calculated as the median value of 
AR for all stocks on the corresponding exchange on that day.  Alternative definitions used for 
robustness tests:  
AR2 cross-section – as per AR cross-section but using AR2 in place of AR. 
AR3 cross-section – as per AR cross-section but using AR3 in place of AR. 
 
 
RV cross-section  
 
Reversal aggregated in stock cross-section.  Calculated as the median value of RV for all stocks 
on the corresponding exchange on that day.   
 
 
AV cross-section  Abnormal day-end volume aggregated in stock cross-section.  Calculated as the median value 
of AV for all stocks on the corresponding exchange on that day.  Alternative definitions used 
for robustness tests:  
AV2 cross-section – as per AV cross-section but using AV2 in place of AV. 
AV3 cross-section – as per AV cross-section but using AV3 in place of AV. 
 
  
 
 
  
  
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 I use market capitalisation, turnover, bid-ask spread and closing price as 
measures of liquidity, although at no stage are all four variables included in a model at 
the same time.  Trades in relatively illiquid stocks, with little depth and wide spreads, 
generally have more substantial price impact than similar trades in relatively liquid 
stocks.  Further, the manipulator of a low-turnover stock has to compete with fewer 
trades to control the price and is more likely to be successful in making the last trade 
of the day and setting the closing price.  This intuition is consistent with Hillion and 
Suominen’s (2004) model of closing price manipulation, in which illiquid stocks are 
more frequently manipulated.   
 I include two variables to measure the degree of information asymmetry in a 
stock.  The first is the number of analysts’ forecasts of a stock’s earnings and the 
second is whether or not the stock is included in a broad market index.18  Allen and 
Gale (1992) demonstrate the theoretical possibility of profitable stock price 
manipulation under a rational expectations framework.  The basis of their argument is 
information asymmetry.  Investors are uncertain whether a large trader who buys the 
stock does so because he knows it is undervalued or because he intends to manipulate 
the price.  The models of manipulation in Kumar and Seppi (1992) and Aggarwal and 
Wu (2006) are constructed on the same basis.  The implication of this is that 
manipulation is more likely in stocks with higher levels of information asymmetry.   
 I also include variables that capture various motivations for manipulation.  
Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that stock prices are manipulated to 
profit from options on the underlying stock or from futures contracts on indices, 
particularly in the period immediately prior to expiry.19  Therefore, I include an 
                                                 
18 Whether or not a stock is a constituent of an index may also be associated with effects other than 
those that occur through information asymmetry.  Kumar and Seppi (1992) show that cash settled 
options (such as futures on stock indices) provide a profitable manipulation strategy.  An Australian 
prosecution case (Australian Securities Commission v Nomura International Plc. – 29 ACSR 473) 
provides evidence that such a manipulation strategy is possible. 
19 Jarrow (1994) demonstrates by example that a derivative security creates market manipulation 
trading strategies that would otherwise not exist.  Kumar and Seppi (1992) develop a model in which 
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indicator variable for whether or not a stock has listed options and a second indicator 
variable indicating, for stocks with listed options, whether it is the last trading day 
prior to expiry of the options. 
 Fund managers are known to manipulate closing prices at the end of reporting 
periods such as the last day of a month or a quarter (Carhart et al., 2002).20  
Therefore, I include indicator variables for the last trading day in each month and 
quarter.  Closing prices are also known to have been manipulated to avoid margin 
calls and to maintain a stock’s listing on an exchange with a minimum price 
requirement.  These incentives for manipulation are triggered when a stock’s price 
falls to a critical level and therefore are more likely to occur following declines in a 
stock’s price.  I include a price trend variable (a stock’s rolling one-month return) to 
examine these two and other similar motivations related to price movements.  
                                                                                                                                           
 Volatility is likely to have more than one effect on manipulation.  Hillion and 
Suominen (2004) model the behaviour of brokers that manipulate closing prices to 
alter their customers’ inference about their execution ability.  Their model implies that 
stock price volatility increases the likelihood of manipulation because broker ability is 
more valuable when volatility is higher.  However, it is also possible that volatility 
attracts the attention of regulators and therefore deters manipulation.  I measure 
volatility using the standard deviation of daily returns.   
 
the manipulator takes a position in the futures market and then manipulates stock prices at expiry to 
profit from the futures position.  Empirical studies on the effect of expiry days on the underlying stock 
prices generally find that effects of manipulation can be found in the last hour before expiry and that 
the price effect is reversed in the first half hour of trading after expiry (Stoll and Whaley, 1987; 
Chamberlain et al., 1989; Stoll and Whaley, 1991).  Ni et al. (2005) find evidence that on option expiry 
dates the closing prices of stocks with listed options cluster at option strike prices.  They attribute this 
finding to closing price manipulation. 
20 Bernhardt and Davies (2009) develop a theoretical model of a mutual fund manager’s investment 
decision and prove that fund managers have incentives to use short-term price impacts to manipulate 
closing prices at reporting period ends. 
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 The variables associated primarily with detection and prosecution include 
government regulatory budget, number of closing price manipulation prosecutions 
and various indicators of abnormal trading activity that is likely to draw the attention 
of a regulator.  Government regulatory budgets, in this case the budgets of the US 
SEC and the Ontario Securities Commission, determine the amount of resources 
available to conduct investigations and prepare cases for prosecution.  Therefore, 
larger regulatory budgets are likely to be associated with greater capacity to prosecute 
manipulation.  Stock exchanges also have responsibility for manipulation 
surveillance, so government regulatory budget only measures part of the total amount 
spent on regulation.21  The number of closing price manipulation prosecutions 
measures the effectiveness and experience of the regulator in detecting and 
prosecuting closing price manipulation. 
 Closing price manipulation is often detected by a regulator when abnormal 
trading triggers ‘alerts’ in automated market surveillance systems – described earlier 
as direct detection.  The measures of abnormal trading characteristics that I use are 
abnormal return, abnormal volume, and price reversal (the return from the closing 
price to the following morning’s price).  These trading characteristics are influenced 
by manipulation for the following reasons.  First, the aim of a manipulator is to cause 
changes in the price of a stock.  Second, to affect the closing price, the manipulator 
trades or releases information which is likely to induce additional trading by 
speculators or arbitrageurs.  Finally, an examination of actual closing price 
manipulation cases documented in litigation records suggests that manipulation is 
often carried out by aggressive trading in the last minutes before the close creating 
liquidity imbalances.  Given overnight for new orders to enter the market and resolve 
                                                 
21 A potential problem with this measure of regulator budget is that it is endogenous, i.e., government 
regulatory budgets are increased in times or countries in which manipulation is more widespread.  The 
consequence of this potential endogeneity is to underestimate regulation’s deterrence effect on 
manipulation.  
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the liquidity imbalance, prices often revert towards their original levels the following 
morning, as demonstrated by Carhart et al. (2002).   
 Many instances of manipulation, however, do not create the abnormal trading 
characteristics that trigger alerts, but may be detected through investigations of other 
instances of manipulation or investor complaints – discussed earlier as indirect 
detection.  Indirect detection is more likely if other closing prices in near proximity 
(nearby days in the same stock, or other stocks on the same day) are also manipulated 
because the probability of an alert and subsequent investigation is higher.  Therefore, 
as factors that affect the probability of indirect detection, I include measures of 
abnormal trading aggregated through time in a particular stock, and measures of 
abnormal trading on a particular day aggregated across all stocks on the 
corresponding exchange.  In the two-equation model the direct and indirect detection 
variables are combined into a single detection equation, thereby reducing the potential 
problem of weak identification of direct and indirect detection.   
 Table 3.2 specifies the variables that are used in each of the equations.  I use 
two approaches to address the fact that many variables influence both manipulation 
and detection.  In models without expectations simultaneity (Model 1 and Model 2) I 
include some variables in both equations, for example, regulatory budget and number 
of manipulation prosecutions.  These variables measure the capacity and effectiveness 
of the regulator and, at the same time, affect the manipulator’s perceived probability 
of being caught.  On the other hand, I do not include the abnormal trading variables as 
determinants of manipulation because manipulation influences these variables and 
therefore their values can only be observed ex-post the manipulation, not ex-ante. 
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Table 3.2 
Specification of models 
This table specifies which variables are used in each of the equations for the three models.  Model 1 is a 
three-equation modified detection controlled estimation (DCE) model, Model 2 is a standard two-
equation DCE model and Model 3 is a modified three-equation DCE model with expectations 
simultaneity.  M( ) is the probability of manipulation, D( ) is the conditional probability of direct 
detection (conditional probability of detection in the standard two-equation DCE model) and I( ) is the 
conditional probability of indirect detection.  Variables are defined in Table 3.1.  The symbol + 
indicates a variable is included as a factor in the corresponding probability equation.  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable 
M( ) D( ) I( )  M( ) D( )  M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Exchange + + +  + +  + + + 
Industry + + +  + +  + + + 
Market capitalisation  +    +   +   
Turnover +    +   +   
Spread +    +   +   
Closing price +    +   +   
Volatility +    +   +   
Institutional  +    +   +   
Index stock +    +   +   
Optionable +    +   +   
Option expiry +    +   +   
Trend +    +   +   
Month-end  +    +   +   
Quarter-end  +    +   +   
Prosecutions  + + +  + +  + + + 
Regulator budget  + + +  + +  + + + 
Abnormal return (AR)  +    +   +  
Reversal (RV)  +    +   +  
Abnormal volume (AV)  +    +   +  
AR time-series    +   +    + 
RV time-series    +   +    + 
AV time-series   +   +    + 
AR cross-section    +   +    + 
RV cross-section    +   +    + 
AV cross-section   +   +    + 
M( )         + + 
 
 
 The primary determinants of manipulation are not included in the detection 
equation.  In this regard, the regulators in the first two models are somewhat naïve in 
that they do not take advantage of all the information available about the determinants 
of manipulation.  In these models the regulator treats all alerts equally rather than 
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devoting more resources to investigating particular alerts, such as those on quarter-
end days or in illiquid stocks.     
 The third model addresses the secondary associations of variables by 
incorporating the probability of manipulation as a determinant of the probability of 
detection.  Regulators are modelled as being sophisticated, i.e., they are aware of the 
probability of manipulation and use this information in their detection processes.  The 
manipulators, as in the first two models, also take into consideration the regulator’s 
budget and previous manipulation prosecutions when deciding whether or not to 
manipulate.  
 Conceptually, identification in these models can be thought of in the following 
simplified way.  Suppose that for a manipulated closing price the larger the day-end 
price increase the greater the probability of detection and prosecution.  The subset of 
observations with very large day-end price increases have a high probability that 
manipulation, if present, gets detected and therefore this subset is used to identify the 
determinants of manipulation.  Having identified the determinants of manipulation, 
the subset of observations that are likely to have been manipulated is used to identify 
the other factors that influence detection.  Of course, this process is not sequential as 
in this simplified description, but rather, simultaneous.      
 
3.4 Data  
 I construct samples of prosecuted closing price manipulation cases (events) 
and stock-days in which no manipulation is detected or prosecuted (non-events) using 
endogenous stratified sampling.  Due to the rare nature of events, I collect all 
available events and only a fraction of non-events.   
 I manually collect all of the closing price manipulation cases detected and 
prosecuted by market regulators in the US and Canada in the period 1 January 1997 to 
1 January 2009.  I systematically identify the cases from searches of the litigation 
releases and filings of the market regulators SEC, OSC, RS, IDA, MFDA, IIROC, 
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NYSE Reg and AMEX DRC22 and searches of the legal databases Lexis, Quicklaw 
and Westlaw.  From the appendices of SEC annual reports I obtain lists of the case 
names and filing dates of all the instances of market manipulation against which the 
SEC took legal action.  I manually examine the litigation releases of each case in 
these lists to identify instances of closing price manipulation.  For cases in which 
insufficient details are provided by the market regulators I obtain court records and 
filings through the Administrative Office of the US Courts using the PACER service. 
 I eliminate cases from the sample if: (i) insufficient information is available to 
determine which stocks were manipulated on which days; (ii) the manipulation 
occurred in an over-the-counter market; (iii) the manipulated securities were not 
common stock; (iv) the manipulation did not involve trade-based techniques; (v) trade 
and quote data are not available; or (vi) the manipulated stocks do not have at least 
three months of trading prior to the start of manipulation.23   
 The final sample of detected and prosecuted closing price manipulation is 
comprised of 184 instances of manipulation with complete data.  These 184 instances 
of a stock manipulated on a particular day are obtained from eight independent legal 
cases, each containing multiple instances of closing price manipulation.  These 
instances of closing price manipulation involve 31 stocks from four exchanges: 
NYSE, AMEX, TSX and TSX-V.  The case names, alleged misconduct and legal 
outcomes are described in Appendix B. 
                                                 
22 The full names of these regulators are US Securities and Exchange Commission (USA), Ontario 
Securities Commission (Canada), Market Regulation Services Inc. (Canada), Investment Dealers 
Association (Canada), Mutual Funds Dealers Association (Canada), Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (Canada), NYSE Regulation Inc. (USA) and AMEX Division of Regulation 
and Compliance (USA), respectively. 
23 Although cases in which insufficient information is available to determine the manipulated stock and 
date cannot be included in the manipulation sample, they are included in the population count of 
prosecuted manipulation.  Consequently, these cases affect the model estimates via their influence on 
the weights in Equation 3.14. 
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 To obtain the sample in which manipulation is not detected and not 
prosecuted, for each manipulated stock-day I take all other stock-days on the 
corresponding exchange in a period of one month up to and including the 
manipulation date.  After eliminating stock-days with missing or erroneous data the 
sample includes 1,249,748 observations.  I obtain intra-day trade and quote data, 
expiry dates for listed options, and index composition data from a Reuters database 
maintained by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  The 
remaining data are from Thomson’s Datastream and the websites of the regulators.  I 
apply normalising transformations to the data as documented in Table 3.1. 
 Table 3.3 reports the means, standard deviations and medians of the variables 
for the sample of detected and prosecuted closing price manipulation and the sample 
in which manipulation is not detected and not prosecuted.  The summary statistics 
provide an indication of the magnitude and dispersion of these variables to allow a 
quantitative interpretation of the coefficient estimates reported in the following 
section.  Due to incomplete detection, a simple comparison of the means between the 
two samples may lead to biases in inference about the effects of these variables on 
manipulation and detection.   
 Ignoring the potential biases for now, the difference in means and medians 
between the two samples is consistent with prior literature and anecdotal evidence.  
The sample of detected and prosecuted manipulation involves less liquid stocks 
(lower market capitalisation, turnover, closing prices and larger spreads), lower levels 
of institutional following (less analyst forecasts and index constituency), higher 
volatility, and is more concentrated in month-end and quarter-end days.  The detected 
manipulation sample is also associated with lower government regulatory budgets, 
higher abnormal returns, greater return reversals and higher abnormal volume, as well 
as higher aggregate levels of the abnormal trading on other days in the same stock.      
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Table 3.3 
Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in the model of manipulation and detection.  
The variables are defined in Table 3.1.  Raw data are actual observed values.  Normalised and 
scaled are values after applying normalising transformations to the variables.  Detected 
manipulation refers to the sample of stock-days in which manipulation has been detected and 
prosecuted by a regulator (Yes) and the sample of stock-days without detected and prosecuted 
manipulation (No). Medians and standard deviations (Std dev) are not reported for dichotomous 
variables.  
 Raw data  Normalised and scaled 
Variable 
Detected 
manipulation Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median
Panel A: Variables associated with both manipulation and detection 
Exchange (AMEX) Yes  0.17 0.17   
 No  0.13 0.13   
Exchange (TSX) Yes  0.46 0.46   
 No  0.25 0.25   
Exchange (TSX-V) Yes  0.20 0.20   
 No  0.05 0.05   
Exchange (NYSE) Yes  0.18 0.18   
 No  0.56 0.56   
Panel B: Variables associated primarily with manipulation 
Market capitalisation Yes  442 1,579 67 2.01 0.58 1.83
 No  2,963 12,737 236 2.39 1.01 2.37
Turnover (2) Yes  973,184 4,980,952 77,306 4.96 0.61 4.89
 No  8,066,446 31,288,453 205,415 5.43 1.29 5.31
Spread Yes  2.71 1.44 2.56 1.57 0.49 1.60
 No  2.32 3.68 0.88 1.22 0.91 0.94
Closing price Yes  9.06 8.68 5.75 1.90 0.62 1.79
 No  17.4 20.4 12.69 2.26 0.93 2.33
Institutional Yes  1.63 4.42 0.00 0.62 1.12 0.00
 No  3.93 5.94 1.00 1.32 1.48 1.00
Trend Yes  2.81 22.1 1.59 0.21 2.35 1.17
 No  -0.14 17.5 0.00 0.01 2.06 0.00
Volatility Yes  4.01 2.13 3.80 1.93 0.52 1.95
 No  3.53 3.71 2.40 1.72 0.77 1.55
Index stock Yes  0.11 0.11   
 No  0.18 0.18   
Optionable Yes  0.09 0.09   
 No  0.28 0.28   
Option expiry Yes  0.00 0.00   
 No  0.01 0.01   
Month-end Yes  0.31 0.31   
 No  0.05 0.05   
Quarter-end Yes  0.20 0.20   
 No  0.02 0.02   
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
 Raw data  Normalised and scaled 
Variable 
Detected 
manipulation Mean Std dev Median  Mean Std dev Median 
Panel C: Variables associated primarily with detection 
Prosecutions Yes  0.47 0.66 0.00 0.47 0.66 0.00
 No  0.73 0.99 0.00 0.73 0.99 0.00
Regulator budget Yes  58.1 75.5 9.80 0.58 0.76 0.10
 No  130 90.9 165 1.30 0.91 1.65
Abnormal return (AR) Yes  1.24 2.39 0.86 0.72 1.17 0.93
 No  0.04 2.54 0.00 0.01 1.06 0.00
Reversal (RV) Yes  1.55 3.72 1.71 0.93 1.40 1.31
 No  -0.19 3.66 0.00 -0.05 1.39 0.00
Abnormal volume (AV) Yes  64.7 143 9.99 1.51 1.84 1.78
 No  12.5 102 0.00 0.34 1.52 0.00
AR time series Yes  0.20 0.77 0.14 0.20 0.72 0.37
 No  0.01 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00
RV time series Yes  1.15 1.28 1.12 0.81 0.85 1.06
 No  -0.17 1.78 0.00 -0.06 0.91 0.00
AV time series Yes  16.1 60.2 0.00 0.33 1.56 0.00
 No  1.32 10.7 0.00 0.14 1.09 0.00
AR cross-section Yes  -0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.00
 No  0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
RV cross-section Yes  -0.29 0.54 -0.18 -0.29 0.54 -0.18
 No  -0.06 0.49 0.00 -0.06 0.49 0.00
AV cross-section Yes  0.86 2.63 0.00 0.34 0.89 0.00
 No  0.20 1.66 0.00 0.15 0.68 0.00
Observations Yes  184           
  No   1,249,748
 
 
3.5 Results 
 First, this section presents the estimated model coefficients and discusses the 
determinants of manipulation and detection.  This is followed by the analysis of the 
frequency of manipulation and detection.  Finally, this section reports results of 
robustness tests.  
 
3.5.1 The determinants of manipulation and detection 
 I use maximum likelihood estimation to obtain the model coefficients.  To 
select variables for the final models from the large number of potential variables and 
alternative measures (e.g., the several proxies for liquidity), I use two approaches.  In 
the first approach I include all of the variables suggested by theory (as specified in 
 50
Table 3.2), then remove insignificant variables and re-estimate the models.  The 
second approach is a forward stepwise variable selection procedure.24  Both 
approaches give similar sets of variables so I only report the results from the first 
procedure.  For robustness I also estimate models with alternative sets of variables 
including those not deemed to be significant by the stepwise procedure.  I use various 
starting values to ensure convergence to a consistent set of estimates. 
  Table 3.4 reports the coefficient estimates.  Because probabilistic model 
coefficients are difficult to interpret, Table 3.4 also reports (in parentheses) the 
marginal effect of each variable on the dependant variable (probability of 
manipulation, direct detection and indirect detection).25  For continuous variables, the 
marginal effects measure the percentage change in the probability of either 
manipulation, direct or indirect detection for a one percent change in the value of the 
independent variable.   
                                                 
24 Starting with just the constant terms, in each iteration I add variables that result in the largest increase 
in log-likelihood and re-estimate the model.  This is repeated until additional variables do not yield a 
significant improvement in the log-likelihood.   
25 Marginal effects are calculated as 2)1(
Pr
X
X
e
e
X 






, where: Pr is the estimated probability of 
manipulation, direct detection and indirect detection; , are the coefficient estimates; and  X  are the 
observed variable values.  They are reported as a percentage of Pr.  Marginal effects are calculated for 
each observation and then averaged over the entire sample. 
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Table 3.4 
Model estimates 
This table reports estimated model coefficients.  Model 1 is a three-equation modified DCE model, Model 2 is a standard 
two-equation DCE model and Model 3 is a modified three-equation DCE model with expectations simultaneity.  M( ) is the 
probability of manipulation, D( ) is the conditional probability of direct detection (detection in the standard two-equation 
DCE model) and I( ) is the conditional probability of indirect detection.  Variables are defined in Table 3.1.  Numbers not 
in parentheses are the coefficient estimates.  Numbers in parentheses are the marginal effects (partial derivatives of the 
dependent probability with respect to the explanatory variables, reported as a percentage of the estimated dependent 
probability).  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable M( ) D( ) I( )  M( ) D( )  M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Constant -0.78 -12.0*** -333*** 2.01* -14.2*** -2.73** -9.88*** -330***
Regulator budget -2.87*** 1.85*** 71.1*** -3.95*** 3.13*** -3.34*** 1.87*** 72.5***
 (-2.81) (1.82) (69.0) (-3.87) (2.95) (-3.32) (1.83) (70.4)
Institutional -0.37***  -0.39*** -0.37*** 
 (-0.37)  (-0.38) (-0.37) 
Index stock -0.80***  -0.77*** -0.93*** 
 (-0.79)  (-0.75) (-0.93) 
Market capital. 0.78***  0.57*** 0.80*** 
 (0.77)  (0.56) (0.80) 
Turnover (2) 0.24**  0.10* 0.31** 
 (0.24)  (0.10) (0.31) 
Month-end 1.58***  1.54*** 1.56*** 
 (1.55)  (1.51) (1.55) 
Quarter-end 2.11***  2.18*** 2.38*** 
 (2.07)  (2.14) (2.37) 
Volatility -0.85***  -0.65*** -0.85*** 
 (-0.83)  (-0.64) (-0.84) 
Abnormal return  0.80*** 0.54***  0.82***
    (AR)  (0.79) (0.51)  (0.80)
Reversal   0.23*** 0.16**  0.21***
    (RV)  (0.23) (0.15)  (0.21)
Abnormal volume   0.93*** 0.81***  1.05***
    (AV)  (0.91) (0.76)  (1.03)
AR time series   2.81*** 0.07  1.69**
   (2.73) (0.06)  (1.64)
RV time series   59.4*** 1.45***  54.3***
   (57.6) (1.37)  (52.7)
AV time series   -8.27*** 0.15**  -7.26***
   (-8.03) (0.14)  (-7.05)
Exchange (AMEX) -5.05*** 5.31*** 178*** -5.66*** 6.25*** -2.78*** 2.61*** 178***
 (-4.94) (5.23) (172) (-5.55) (5.88) (-2.77) (2.55) (172)
Exchange (TSX) -7.30*** 6.82*** 243*** -10.2*** 11.2*** -5.76*** 4.55*** 247***
 (-7.15) (6.71) (236) (-10.0) (10.59) (-5.74) (4.44) (240)
Exchange (TSX-V) -6.87*** -0.02 262*** -8.65*** 10.1*** -5.13*** -2.25 261***
 (-6.73) (-0.02) (255) (-8.47) (9.54) (-5.11) (-2.19) (254)
M( )    -9.36** -5.35
Observations 1,249,932 1,249,932 1,249,932
Log likelihood -2,542 -2,586 -2,530
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 The results indicate that government regulator budget has a strong effect on 
both manipulation and detection.  Across all three models larger government regulator 
budgets increase the probability of detecting and prosecuting manipulation and also 
decrease the probability of manipulation.  The latter effect is likely to be because 
increased regulator capacity has a deterrence effect on manipulation.  This is 
consistent with the conclusions made by Pirrong (1995) based on a historical 
overview of manipulation under various regulatory regimes.  The results suggest that 
a 1% increase in a government regulator’s real budget per stock results in a 3.3% 
decrease in the amount of closing price manipulation and a 2.9% increase in the rate 
of prosecution.26  Because the models include dummy variables for each of the 
markets, the effect of budget on manipulation and detection is identified primarily 
through its time series variation. 
 The coefficients of the number of analyst forecasts and the index constituency 
indicator suggest that stocks with greater information asymmetry are more likely to be 
manipulated.  The results indicate that a 10% reduction in the number of analysts’ 
forecasts increases the probability of manipulation by approximately 4%.  This 
finding holds across all three models and the two information asymmetry variables 
make the largest contribution to maximising the model likelihood.  The estimates 
suggest that information asymmetry is among the most important determinants of 
manipulation.  This result is consistent with the key assumption and underlying 
intuition of the theoretical models in Allen and Gale (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992) 
and Aggarwal and Wu (2006). 
                                                 
26 The former estimate is the average marginal effect across the three models and the later is from 
Model 2.  Because Model 2 aggregates direct and indirect detection, it provides a single estimate for 
the effect of budget on the total amount of detection (direct and indirect).  Models 1 and 3 provide 
separate estimates for the effect of budget on direct and indirect detection. 
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 The coefficients of the two liquidity variables, market capitalisation and 
turnover, are positive.27  The interpretation of this result is not straightforward.  The 
liquidity variables are correlated with the asymmetric information proxies.  Therefore, 
highly liquid stocks, which also tend to have low information asymmetry, are given a 
low probability of manipulation by the information asymmetry variables.  The 
positive coefficients of the liquidity variables therefore suggest that manipulators do 
not favour the most illiquid stocks.  Taken together, the information asymmetry and 
liquidity coefficients suggest that manipulators generally prefer stocks that are at 
neither end of the liquidity spectrum.  To confirm this interpretation I re-estimate the 
models replacing the continuous market capitalisation and turnover variables with 
quintile dummy variables.  The results indicate that the probability of manipulation is 
highest for stocks in the third and fourth quintiles where the first quintile is defined as 
having the highest liquidity.  I conclude that manipulators favour stocks with mid to 
low levels of liquidity.   
 An explanation of the previous result is that highly liquid stocks are difficult to 
manipulate because of the high levels of trading activity, substantial order book depth 
and low information asymmetry.  Very illiquid stocks are not favoured by 
manipulators because they generally lack the incentives or magnitude of potential 
profits that middle-range and highly liquid stocks have.  For example, fund managers, 
in general, hold relatively liquid stocks and any illiquid stocks they may hold only 
represent a small proportion of their portfolios.  Therefore, manipulating the closing 
prices of very illiquid stocks is unlikely to give fund managers much benefit in 
overstating their portfolio’s performance.  Similarly, derivatives are less frequently 
available on very illiquid stocks and such stocks are typically not constituents of 
major indices.  Finally, brokers are more likely to manipulate stocks for the purpose 
of altering their clients’ inference of their execution ability when the clients and 
orders are large.  This seldom occurs in very illiquid stocks.  
                                                 
27 Using spread as an alternative measure of liquidity produces similar results.  However, the model fit 
(measure by the log-likelihood) is better for market capitalisation and turnover. 
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 The results in Table 3.4 also indicate that stocks are significantly more likely 
to be manipulated on month-end and quarter-end days.  Carhart et al. (2002) present 
evidence that stock price manipulation on month-end and quarter-end days is largely 
attributable to fund managers.  Therefore, the results suggest that fund managers are 
responsible for a significant proportion of all manipulation.  On the other hand, the 
listed options indicator variables are not statistically significant in the model.  Because 
options tend to be listed on relatively liquid stocks, the results do not rule out the 
possibility that options do affect manipulation but that this effect is overshadowed by 
the liquidity variables.  Whether a stock’s price has been increasing or decreasing 
over a period of one month (trend) does not have a significant effect on manipulation.    
 Stock price volatility reduces the likelihood of manipulation.  The estimates 
suggest that a 10% increase in the standard deviation of daily returns decreases the 
probability of manipulation by 8%.  This finding is consistent with the explanation 
that volatility attracts the attention of regulators and therefore deters manipulation.  
Hillion and Suominen’s (2004) model of brokers that manipulate closing prices 
predicts that volatility increases the likelihood of manipulation.  My finding is not 
necessarily inconsistent with Hillion and Suominen because there are many other 
reasons why people manipulate closing prices and it could be that these dominate the 
effects of brokers attempting to alter perceptions of their execution ability.   
 Turning to the variables that affect detection, in all three models the abnormal 
trading characteristics (abnormal returns, reversals and abnormal volume) increase the 
probability of direct detection.  Indirect detection of manipulation in a particular 
stock-day is more likely when there is abnormal trading in that stock during a period 
of a few days either side of that day.  In particular, manipulation of stocks that have a 
number of overnight return reversals in a period of two weeks has an increased 
probability of being indirectly detected.  The regulator notices the abnormal pattern of 
return reversals and upon investigation reveals instances of manipulation that did not 
trigger alerts in surveillance systems.   
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 On the other hand, abnormal trading in stock cross-section on a particular day 
does not increase the likelihood of indirect detection.  This may be because on any 
particular day, at most, a small proportion of stocks are manipulated and the effect of 
the manipulation is negligible in cross-section.  When both direct and indirect 
detection processes are combined into a single detection process, as in the two-
equation model, similar results are obtained regarding the effect of the abnormal 
trading characteristics on the probability of detection.   
 The effect of the probability of manipulation, M( ), on the probability of 
detection (in Model 3) is somewhat surprising.  The results suggest that ceteris 
paribus, i.e., after controlling for things such as the effect of abnormal trading 
characteristics on detection, the probability of detection decreases as the probability of 
manipulation increases, although this result has low statistical significance.  Viewing 
the interaction between manipulators and regulators as a strategic game, one way to 
interpret this result is that manipulators are the more strategic party and that regulators 
do not take advantage of all available information.  This interpretation is supported by 
the previous finding that manipulators react strategically in response to changes in 
regulatory budget and volatility.  However, alternative explanations exist such as the 
implicit role of prosecution in the model of detection.  It may be that where 
manipulation is most likely to occur it is more difficult to prosecute and consequently 
the probability of detection and prosecution in such circumstances decreases.  For 
example, the probability of manipulation is higher on month-end days but prosecution 
of manipulation on such days may be more difficult due to the legitimate reasons to 
trade at the close on month-end days.  
 I include the exchange indicator variables in all equations to allow for 
different levels of manipulation and detection in each of the two countries (US and 
Canada) or in different exchanges within a country.28  On the other hand, I do not 
                                                 
28 Although the exchange indicator coefficients are highly statistically significant they cannot, in 
isolation, be used to infer differences in the overall levels of manipulation and detection between the 
exchanges because there are significant systematic differences in the other explanatory variables across 
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include industry indicator variables in the final models as they are generally not 
statistically significant.   
 
3.5.2 The frequency of manipulation and detection 
 The three models of manipulation and detection allow estimation of the 
underlying rate of manipulation (detected and not detected) and the fraction of 
manipulation that remains undetected.  Denoting the parameter estimates by ,  
and , applying Bayes’s law for the three-equation models gives the probability of 
an undetected manipulated closing price in the sample with no detected or prosecuted 
manipulation (set Ac) as: 
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For the two-equation model this probability is: 
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  The estimates of the probability of manipulation (given that manipulation has 
not been prosecuted) are useful in efficiently allocating regulators’ resources.  The 
probability estimates can also be used to study the characteristics of undetected or not 
prosecuted closing price manipulation.  I use Equations 3.17 and 3.18 in Chapter 6 as 
part of a manipulation detection tool designed for use in automated market 
surveillance systems.  
 Using a similar approach to Feinstein (1990), the fraction of undetected 
manipulation in the population can be consistently estimated as: 
                                                                                                                                            
the exchanges.  For this reason the levels of manipulation and detection by market are examined 
separately in the following subsection. 
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where T is the total number of observations in the population (the sum of the number 
of observations in sets A and Ac), N is the population number of observations in set Ac 
and n is the sample number of observations in set Ac. 
 Models 1 and 2 estimate the fraction of undetected closing price manipulation 
in the population as 1.17% and 1.06% of all stock-days, respectively.  The rate of 
detected and prosecuted manipulation in the population (number of observations in set 
A divided by T) is 0.004%.  This suggests that there are many more instances of 
manipulation that are not prosecuted than there are prosecuted manipulations.  In fact, 
the estimates suggest that only about 0.4% of all manipulation is prosecuted.  For 
every prosecuted closing price manipulation approximately 280 to 310 instances of 
manipulation remain either undetected or not prosecuted.  Here the limitation of 
modelling detection and prosecution together becomes clear – one cannot infer what 
fraction of the not prosecuted manipulation was detected.  Adding the rates of 
prosecuted and not prosecuted manipulation, the underlying rate of manipulation in 
the population is estimated at 1.17% to 1.06% of stock-days – not significantly 
different from the rate of manipulation that is not prosecuted, because such a small 
fraction of manipulation is prosecuted. 
 Table 3.5 reports estimates of the frequency of manipulation and detection by 
exchange and reveals some interesting differences between exchanges and countries.  
The two smaller exchanges in each country by market capitalisation, AMEX and 
TSX-V, have equal or lower rates of closing price manipulation than the 
corresponding larger exchanges.  This finding differs from Aggarwal and Wu (2006) 
who conclude that manipulation occurs more frequently in small and illiquid markets.  
While Aggarwal and Wu (2006) also use a sample of prosecuted manipulation cases, 
they do not address the bias introduced by incomplete detection.  This is likely to be 
the reason why our findings differ, and the difference in findings highlights the 
importance of controlling for incomplete detection.   
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Table 3.5 
Estimated frequency of manipulation and detection by exchange 
This table reports estimates of the frequency of manipulation and detection from Model 1 (three-
equation modified DCE model).  NYSE is the New York Stock Exchange, AMEX is the American 
Stock Exchange, TSX is the Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX-V is the TSX Venture Exchange.  
Fraction detected and Fraction undetected are the fraction of detected closing price manipulation and 
the estimated fraction of undetected or not prosecuted manipulation in the population, respectively.  
Multiplier estimates the number of manipulations that remain undetected or not prosecuted for every 
prosecuted manipulation (calculated as Fraction undetected divided by Fraction detected).  
Manipulation rate is the sum of Fraction detected and Fraction undetected. 
Exchange  Fraction detected 
Fraction 
undetected Multiplier 
Manipulation 
rate 
NYSE 0.0032% 2.06% 635 2.06% 
AMEX 0.0048% 0.051% 11 0.055% 
TSX 0.0041% 0.068% 17 0.072% 
TSX-V 0.0050% 0.031% 6 0.036% 
 
 
 Aggarwal and Wu’s finding can be reconciled with the results presented in this 
chapter by considering the difference in detection rates for large and small exchanges.  
The multiplier reported in Table 3.5 (the number of manipulation instances that 
remain undetected or not prosecuted for every prosecuted instance) is considerably 
smaller for AMEX and TSX-V relative to the corresponding larger exchanges.  It 
ranges from six for the TSX-V to 635 for the NYSE.  So, while it may be true that 
there are more prosecuted manipulation cases in the smaller exchanges (the basis for 
Aggarwal and Wu’s conclusion that manipulation occurs more frequently on illiquid 
exchanges), the results from this chapter suggest that this is because the proportion of 
manipulation detected on small exchanges is considerably higher.  The underlying 
rate of manipulation is in fact, on average, greater on the larger exchanges. 
 Further, the results in Table 3.5 suggest a difference in the detection rates 
across the two countries.  Detection rates for the Canadian exchanges are several 
times greater than for the US exchanges.  Considering that the budget per stock of the 
SEC is considerably larger than that of the OSC, this result suggests that either the 
OSC is more efficient in detecting and prosecuting closing price manipulation, or the 
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OSC’s enforcement effort, in comparison to the SEC, is more focussed at closing 
price manipulation relative to other misconduct.29  
 The results indicate that manipulation is much more pervasive on the NYSE 
than any of the other exchanges.  Further analysis validates the robustness of this 
result.  Throughout the sample period trading on the Canadian exchanges took place 
with decimal pricing, whereas the US exchanges switched from fractional to decimal 
pricing within the sample.30  The change to decimal pricing affected spreads and 
liquidity, which in turn affect manipulation and detection.  To ensure that the 
differences in manipulation rates are not caused by effects from the pre-decimalisation 
period I re-estimate the models and rates using only the post-decimalisation portion of 
data.  In doing so, I remove 32 instances of closing price manipulation from the 
NYSE and AMEX.  The results suggest that the previous finding, that the NYSE has 
the highest rate of manipulation, continues to hold.  However, the frequency of 
closing price manipulation on the NYSE and AMEX in the post-decimalisation period 
is lower than in the pre-decimalisation period.  More precisely, the estimated rates of 
manipulation on the NYSE and AMEX in the post-decimalisation period are 1.52% 
and 0.023% respectively, compared to 2.06% and 0.051% for the full sample.  There 
is no significant change for the Canadian exchanges in the later time period. 
 To further test the robustness of this result I add country interactions with key 
explanatory variables, add dummy variables for the pre-decimalisation period, and 
examine estimates of the manipulation rate through time.  The results suggest that the 
rate of manipulation on the NYSE has declined through time and on average during 
the sample period is higher than the manipulation rates of the other exchanges. 
                                                 
29 The same does not apply for other types of violation.  Bhattacharya (2006) reports that the SEC 
prosecutes 10 times more cases per firm for all securities laws violations than the OSC prosecutes. 
30 All Canadian stock exchanges switched from fractional to decimal trading systems on 15 April 1996, 
whereas the NYSE and AMEX began phasing in decimal trading systems from 28 August 2000 and 
completely switched to decimal trading on 29 January 2001. 
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 As a final note, variable coefficients and estimates of the underlying rates of 
manipulation and detection should be interpreted cautiously.  The estimates are 
obtained from statistical techniques that rely on certain statistical assumptions.  The 
most important assumptions, as discussed in Feinstein (1989, 1990, 1991), are those 
required to identify manipulation from detection. 
 
3.5.3 Robustness tests 
 This subsection examines the robustness of the results to several factors, 
among the most important of which is the assumed distribution of the disturbance 
term.  In the initial implementation, the disturbance terms, ,  and , are 
assumed to be drawn from independent standard logistic distributions with probability 
density function 
i1 i2 i3
 21)( 
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 e
e
f .  To test the sensitivity of the results to this 
assumption I re-estimate the models using four alternative disturbance term 
distributions.  The alternative distributions are modifications of the standard logistic 
distribution with fatter tails, thinner tails, a right skew and a left skew.31   
 Table 3.6 reports the model estimates under the alternative disturbance term 
distributions.  The marginal effects of the independent variables are very similar under 
the different disturbance term distributions.  Overall this suggests that the results are 
not overly sensitive to the assumed disturbance term distribution.   
                                                 
31 The fat and thin tailed distributions are equal mixtures of a standard logistic distribution and a 
logistic distribution with larger or smaller scale parameter respectively.  Their probability density 
functions are given by    2/
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s=0.5 for the thin tailed distribution.  The right and left skew distributions are generalised logistic 
distributions with probability density   )1(1)( 
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  and b=3 for the right skew distribution and 
b=0.5 for the left skew distribution. 
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Table 3.6 
Robustness tests 
This table reports the coefficients of Model 1 (the three-equation modified DCE model) estimated 
under alternative disturbance term distributions.  Fat tails and Thin tails are equal mixtures of a 
standard logistic distribution and a logistic distribution with larger or smaller scale parameter, 
respectively.  Right skew and Left skew are generalised logistic distributions with the skew parameter 
chosen to produce right and left skew distributions, respectively.  M( ) is the probability of 
manipulation, D( ) is the conditional probability of direct detection and I( ) is the conditional 
probability of indirect detection.  Variables are defined in Table 3.1.  Numbers not in parentheses are 
the coefficient estimates.  Numbers in parentheses are the marginal effects (partial derivatives of the 
dependent probability with respect to the explanatory variables, reported as a percentage of the 
estimated dependent probability).  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and 
***, respectively. 
 Fat tails Thin tails 
Variable M( ) D( ) I( ) M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Constant -1.41 -21.7*** -333*** -0.66 -11.1*** -151 
Regulator budget -4.64*** 2.73*** 71.8*** -2.43*** 1.43*** 33.1 
 (-2.32) (1.36) (34.9) (-2.42) (1.42) (32.0) 
Institutional -0.65***   -0.33***   
 (-0.32)   (-0.33)   
Index stock -1.61***   -0.82***   
 (-0.80)   (-0.82)   
Market capital 1.50***   0.76***   
 (0.75)   (0.76)   
Turnover (2) 0.53**   0.29***   
 (0.27)   (0.29)   
Month-end 2.98***   1.50***   
 (1.49)   (1.50)   
Quarter-end 4.32***   2.20***   
 (2.16)   (2.20)   
Volatility -1.73***   -0.77***   
 (-0.86)   (-0.76)   
Abnormal return (AR)  1.60***   0.82***  
  (0.80)   (0.82)  
Reversal (RV)  0.50***   0.26***  
  (0.25)   (0.26)  
Abnormal volume (AV)  1.69***   0.85***  
  (0.84)   (0.85)  
AR time series   0.66   -0.39 
   (0.32)   (-0.38) 
RV time series   57.7***   21.1*** 
   (28.1)   (20.4) 
AV time series   -6.79***   -0.78 
   (-3.31)   (-0.75) 
Exchange dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No No No No 
Observations 1,249,932 1,249,932 
Log likelihood -2,537 -2,538 
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Table 3.6 (continued) 
 Right skew Left skew 
Variable M( ) D( ) I( ) M( ) D( ) I( ) 
Constant -0.69*** -3.80*** -70.6*** -4.18* -22.3*** -335** 
Regulator budget -0.89*** 0.61*** 16.7*** -4.05*** 2.36*** 72.1* 
 (-2.34) (1.47) (45.2) (-2.01) (1.18) (35.1) 
Institutional -0.16***   -0.68***   
 (-0.42)   (-0.34)   
Index stock -0.31***   -1.66***   
 (-0.83)   (-0.82)   
Market capital 0.30***   1.57***   
 (0.80)   (0.78)   
Turnover (2) 0.06   0.53**   
 (0.15)   (0.26)   
Month-end 0.61***   3.10***   
 (1.61)   (1.54)   
Quarter-end 0.75***   4.16***   
 (1.98)   (2.06)   
Volatility -0.16***   -1.79***   
 (-0.43)   (-0.89)   
Abnormal return (AR)  0.34***   1.62***  
  (0.81)   (0.80)  
Reversal (RV)  0.09***   0.49***  
  (0.22)   (0.25)  
Abnormal volume (AV)  0.50***   1.72***  
  (1.19)   (0.86)  
AR time series   0.80   0.30 
   (2.17)   (0.15) 
RV time series   13.5***   57.8** 
   (36.6)   (28.1) 
AV time series   -1.30***   -6.85*** 
   (-3.52)   (-3.33) 
Exchange dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No No No No 
Observations 1,249,932 1,249,932 
Log likelihood -2,606 -2,542 
 
 
 I also examine the robustness of the results to changes in the sample 
composition, the time period from which the sample is drawn, different model 
specifications and alternative variable definitions.  To test the sensitivity to the 
particular sample and time period I split the data into two sub-samples, first by time 
(earliest half of the data and latest half of the data) and then randomly, and estimate 
the model separately on each sub-sample.  I also re-estimate the model using only 
post-decimalisation data.  I test alternative model specifications by including the 
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variables from Table 3.1 that are left out of the reported models.  I examine the 
sensitivity of the results to the way the variables are measured by replacing variables 
with their alternative definitions given in Table 3.1.  The main results hold in each of 
these robustness tests and therefore I do not report these results. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 Using methods that explicitly take into consideration that detected and 
prosecuted market manipulation is a non-random subset of all manipulation, this 
chapter examines the determinants of manipulation and its detection.  Stocks with 
high levels of information asymmetry and mid to low levels of liquidity are most 
likely to be manipulated.  The probability of manipulation is higher on month-end and 
quarter-end days suggesting fund managers account for a significant proportion of 
manipulation.  Stock price volatility deters manipulation by attracting the attention of 
regulators.  Larger government regulatory budgets increase the rate of prosecution and 
significantly deter manipulation.  These insights help understand the underpinnings of 
closing price manipulation and have important implications for efficiently utilising 
scarce regulatory resources. 
 The results indicate that only a small fraction of manipulation is detected and 
prosecuted.  For each instance of prosecuted closing price manipulation there are 
approximately 280 to 310 instances of manipulation that remain undetected or not 
prosecuted and this rate differs substantially across exchanges.  Overall, manipulation 
is more common on larger exchanges but is detected at a significantly higher rate on 
small exchanges.  The Canadian regulator is more efficient at prosecuting closing 
price manipulation than the US regulator. 
 The findings of this chapter highlight the pervasiveness of manipulation 
relative to the number of prosecuted cases suggesting manipulation is a serious issue 
for exchanges and regulators.  The amount of manipulation can be reduced by 
allocating additional resources to regulation.  The results suggest that a 1% increase in 
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government regulatory budgets would decrease the amount of closing price 
manipulation by 3.3% and increase in the rate of prosecution by 2.9%. 
 The pervasiveness of closing price manipulation suggests increased 
surveillance and enforcement effort may be warranted.  However, the regulatory 
response needs to also consider the amount of harm or benefits manipulation causes to 
market quality, particularly liquidity and price accuracy (Kyle and Viswanathan, 
2008).  These issues are examined in the following two chapters.     
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Chapter 4 
Trading characteristics around closing 
price manipulation cases 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter analyses the effect of closing price manipulation on prices and 
various trading characteristics.  This is important for two reasons.  First, 
understanding the effects of manipulation on markets is necessary to evaluate the 
benefits or harm caused by manipulators.  The pervasiveness of undetected 
manipulation documented in the previous chapter is concerning from the perspective 
of economic efficiency if manipulation is detrimental to markets.  Second, identifying 
manipulation requires an understanding of how it affects prices and trading 
characteristics.  Therefore, the findings of this chapter are used in constructing a 
manipulation index in Chapter 6.     
 This chapter analyses a manually constructed sample of 184 instances of 
closing price manipulation from US and Canadian stock exchanges.32  The analysis 
controls for selection bias that could result from the non-random occurrence of 
manipulation and detection.   
 This chapter finds strong evidence of large increases in day-end returns, return 
reversals, trading activity and bid-ask spreads in the presence of manipulation.  
Manipulation causes abnormal day-end returns of between 1.4% and 1.9% - 
approximately six times larger than their usual levels.  Most of these abnormal returns 
                                                 
32 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSX) and TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V).   
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are reversed by the following morning.  Trading frequencies more than triple and 
spreads increase by between 0.11% and 0.63% in the presence of manipulation.   
 As pointed out in Chapter 2, there is a longstanding and unresolved debate 
about what constitutes market manipulation and how it should be defined (see, for 
example, Fischel and Ross, (1991) and Kyle and Viswanathan (2008)).  In examining 
prosecuted manipulation cases, this chapter simply adopts the US and Canadian 
regulators’ definition.  A similar approach is taken by Aggarwal and Wu (2006).  The 
main advantage of this approach is that it provides the most direct evidence of the 
effects of a sample of manipulation.  A downside of this approach is that the sample 
reflects the characteristics of detection and prosecution as well as manipulation.  The 
analysis is mindful of this and takes measures to minimise the influence of the 
detection characteristics. 
 Three caveats are worth noting about the results.  First, the sample of 
prosecuted manipulation cases is not a random sample of manipulation and 
consequently the empirical results should be viewed as the characteristics of 
prosecuted manipulation.  Second, despite the systematic method used in identifying 
prosecuted manipulation cases the sample is small due to the fact that few cases of 
manipulation are prosecuted.  Third, this chapter only examines manipulation that is 
intended to increase prices because the sample of prosecutions does not contain any 
cases in which prices are manipulated down.  
 
4.2 Related literature 
 While early empirical studies do not link manipulation with various closing 
price abnormalities,33 a small number of later studies attribute seasonal closing price 
patterns and day-end anomalies, at least in part, to manipulation.  Carhart et al. (2002) 
find that in US equities markets price inflation is localised in the last half hour before 
                                                 
33 See Keim (1983), Ariel (1987) and Ritter (1988) on seasonal patterns and Wood et al. (1985) and 
Harris (1989) on intraday anomalies. 
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the close and that it is more intense on quarter-end days.  They attribute this 
phenomenon to manipulation by fund managers.  Similarly, Hillion and Suominen 
(2004) find on the Paris Bourse that significant rises in volatility, volume and bid-ask 
spreads occurs mainly in the last minute of trading and they attribute this to 
manipulation.  This chapter extends these findings by isolating the impact of closing 
price manipulation from unrelated day-end phenomena and seasonal effects by using 
actual manipulation cases and the method of difference-in-differences.   
 Empirical research using manipulation cases is scarce.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
small number of studies examining corners34, squeezes35, the stock pools of the 
1920s36 and longer period manipulation schemes commonly referred to as ‘pump-and-
dump’ manipulation.  In a pump-and-dump scheme the manipulator attracts liquidity 
to a stock while inflating its price so that he can profit from selling the stock at the 
inflated price.  Closing price manipulation is far more mechanical.  The manipulator 
seeks only to create a short-term liquidity imbalance, in many instances just a matter 
of minutes, and is prepared to accept a loss on the manipulative trades.  Whereas 
pump-and-dump manipulators profit directly from the manipulated stock by buying 
low and selling high, closing price manipulators typically profit outside the 
manipulated market, for example, greater remuneration for a fund manager, greater 
payoff from a derivatives position or a more profitable takeover.   
 Aggarwal and Wu (2006) analyse pump-and-dump manipulation cases 
obtained from The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation releases.  
They find that in their sample of prosecution cases stocks generally experience a price 
increase during the manipulation period, a subsequent decrease during the post-
manipulation period and increased volatility.  Their sample of cases is more 
concentrated in illiquid stocks and most of the manipulation is conducted by informed 
                                                 
34 See Allen et al. (2006). 
35 See Merrick et al. (2005), Jegadeesh (1993) and Jordan and Jordan (1996). 
36 Although these stock pools are the main reason for the current anti-manipulation laws in the USA, 
Mahoney (1999) and Jiang et al. (2005) find little evidence of price manipulation. 
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insiders such as management, substantial shareholders, market-makers or brokers.  
This chapter is similar to Aggarwal and Wu (2006) in that it analyses prosecuted 
manipulation cases but differs in that it examines a substantially different form of 
market manipulation. 
 
4.3 Predicted effects of manipulation 
 Based on litigation releases and discussions with exchange surveillance 
personnel and regulators, in this section I describe the typical approaches taken by 
closing price manipulators and predict how manipulation affects trading 
characteristics.  Although manipulators may attempt to push a stock’s price in either 
direction, I limit this discussion to upward closing price manipulation.  As there are 
no cases involving price decreases in the examined litigation releases it is not possible 
to empirically examine this type of manipulation using prosecution cases. 
 The manipulator’s intent is to inflate the closing price.  Therefore, as long as 
manipulators are successful at least some of the time day-end returns should on 
average be positive in the presence of manipulation.  This is consistent with Carhart et 
al. (2002) who find that equity price inflation is localised in the last half hour before 
the close, attributing this to manipulation.  Similarly, Hillion and Suominen (2004) 
use manipulation to explain the finding that changing the closing price mechanism on 
the Paris Bourse eliminated abnormal day-end returns.    
 Most investors view price impact as an undesirable side-effect of making large 
trades relative to the liquidity in the market because it increases the cost of trading.  
For a manipulator, the opposite is true and therefore closing price manipulators often 
submit large buy orders just before the close.37  This consumes depth on the ask side 
of the order book by executing a number of limit orders, thus raising the ask price and 
widening the spread.  This prediction is consistent with Hillion and Suominen (2004) 
                                                 
37 For a typical example, see SEC v. Schultz Investment Advisors and Scott Schultz  
(http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8650.pdf). 
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who argue that manipulation is the cause of the significant rise in the spread during 
the last minutes of trading on the Paris Bourse.  Given overnight for new orders to 
enter the market and resolve the liquidity imbalance, prices should revert towards 
their original levels the following morning as demonstrated by Carhart et al. (2002).   
 Manipulators trade to influence closing prices and in doing so can also induce 
trading by speculators and arbitrageurs.  For example, price increases caused by the 
manipulator may induce buying by momentum traders or selling by sophisticated 
investors and arbitrageurs that recognise the opportunity to profitably counteract the 
manipulator.  Indeed, the latter is the mechanism by which manipulators increase 
liquidity in a microstructure model by Hanson and Oprea (2009).  Therefore, trading 
activity is expected to increase in the presence of manipulation; the extent of which is 
likely to depend on the liquidity of the stock, the regulatory environment, the 
manipulator’s incentives and amount of available funds.  Hillion and Suominen 
(2004) argue that manipulation is the cause of the rise in volatility and volume in the 
last minutes of trading on the Paris Bourse.   
 The effect of manipulation on the size of trades is less obvious as it depends 
on the aggressiveness of a manipulator.  In its least aggressive form, manipulation can 
simply involve making one small trade to close the stock at the ask quote.  If this is 
the manipulator’s intent, the trade size chosen by the manipulator is likely to be 
smaller than the average trade size, thereby decreasing the average size of trades in 
the last part of the day relative to trades during the day.  Non-aggressive manipulation 
is more likely to occur in thinly traded stocks that have wide spreads or when a 
manipulator intends to influence closing prices over many days because making large 
trades over many days is costly.   
 Aggressive manipulators make many large trades to consume ask-side depth 
and increase the price beyond the ask quote.  Such manipulation increases the relative 
trade size at the end of the day.  Aggressive manipulation is more likely to occur in 
liquid stocks and when the manipulator has a lot of resources and incentive, such as a 
fund manager on the last day of a reporting period.  Therefore, the effect of 
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manipulation on the size of trades is expected to depend on the factors that influence 
the aggressiveness of a manipulator and the nature of stocks being manipulated.  For 
this reason, the analysis in this chapter is conducted separately for high turnover 
stocks, low turnover stocks, stocks manipulated on several consecutive days and 
stocks manipulated as separate occurrences on month-end days. 
 In summary, closing price manipulation is expected to increase day-end 
returns, spreads, return reversals and trading activity.  Manipulation’s effect on trade 
size is expected to depend on the aggressiveness of a manipulator and the nature of 
stocks being manipulated.   
 
4.4 Data 
 This chapter uses the manually collected sample of closing price manipulation 
cases, which is described in Chapter 3.  I obtain intra-day trade and quote data from a 
Reuters database maintained by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-
Pacific (SIRCA).  I filter these data to remove erroneous entries and stock-days that do 
not contain at least one trade and one quote.   
 During most of the sample period the Canadian exchanges, TSX and TSX-V, 
have simple closing mechanisms.  Trade occurs continuously until 4:00pm at which 
time the market closes and the closing price is the price of the last trade.38  There is no 
facility to allow trading at the closing price, nor do the designated market makers have 
discretion in setting the closing price, other than by adjusting their quotes.   
                                                 
38 Subsequently the TSX introduced an automated closing call auction in 2004.  In a comment during 
the consultation process prior to adopting the closing call auction, the TSX highlight the inadequacies 
of the “last sale” method and potential for manipulation: “the current ‘last sale’ methodology for 
determining closing prices … is often arbitrarily based on the market participant with the ‘fastest 
fingers’ who is able to successfully place an order in the final few seconds before the close” (The TSX 
Notice of Amendments and Commission Approval, July 25, 2003).  Hillion and Suominen (2004), 
among others, demonstrate that a closing call auction reduces price manipulation.   
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 In contrast, the closing mechanisms on the NYSE and AMEX are more 
complicated.  They allow orders to be specified for execution at the closing price and 
the specialists intervene in setting closing prices.  Although the NYSE and AMEX 
closing procedures are sometimes described as auctions, they bear little resemblance 
to any other auction procedure (Hasbrouck, 2007), particularly automated closing call 
auctions, such as the ones currently used at Euronext Paris and the London Stock 
Exchange, for example.  On the NYSE and AMEX, traders can enter market-on-close 
(MOC) and limit-on-close (LOC) orders to be executed at the closing price.  In each 
stock, the specialist determines the buy or sell on-close order imbalance and may 
publish the imbalance, in which case MOC and LOC orders can only be entered on 
the other side of the imbalance.39  At 4:00pm no more orders are accepted and the 
specialist pairs off on-close orders at a single price (the closing price) and supplies 
additional liquidity to execute any remaining on-close order imbalance.   
 In order to describe the characteristics of the manipulated stock sample I 
compare manipulated stocks to all other stocks on the same exchange.  Table 4.1 
reports medians of variables in a two-month period prior to each manipulation, for the 
manipulated stocks and all other stocks on the corresponding exchange during the 
same time period. 
                                                 
39 MOC and LOC orders of any kind can be entered until 3:40pm, after which time these orders cannot 
be cancelled.  If there is a large imbalance, the specialist, at his/her discretion, may publish an 
imbalance announcement between 3:00pm and 3:40pm.  At 3:40pm the specialist must publish 
imbalances of 50,000 shares or more (25,000 on the AMEX).  If there is no imbalance, traders cannot 
place further MOC or LOC orders, however, if there is an imbalance, traders may place MOC and LOC 
orders that decrease the imbalance.  If an imbalance is published at 3:40pm, the specialist must update 
this information at 3:50pm.  See Bacidore and Lipson (2001) for details.  
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Table 4.1 
Characteristics of manipulated stocks compared to all other stocks on the same market 
Rows (I) report the median values for manipulated stocks in a two-month period ending one month prior to the 
manipulation date.  Similarly, rows (II) report medians for non-manipulated stocks over the same two-month 
periods.  Differences are calculated by subtracting (II) from (I).  Significance at the 5% and 1% levels is 
indicated by * and **, respectively, using Wilcoxon z-tests.  n is the number of two-month periods used in 
calculating the medians.  For manipulated stocks this is equal to the number of instances of manipulation (not 
necessarily the number of stocks because some stocks are manipulated more than once) and for non-manipulated 
stocks is equal to the number of instances of manipulation multiplied by the number of non-manipulated stocks 
on the market.  Mean daily spread is calculated as the average of the bid-ask spreads at every trade and quote 
revision during the day.  AMEX is the American Stock Exchange, NYSE is the New York Stock Exchange, TSX 
is the Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX-V is the TSX Venture Exchange.   
Market  n 
Closing 
Price ($) 
Trades   
Per Day 
Mean Trade 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Daily 
Traded 
Value 
x$1000 
Mean 
Trade 
Size 
x$100 
Mean 
Daily 
Spread (%)
Manipulated stocks (I) 29 10.25 10 1.45 70.5 61.8 2.4 
Non-manip. stocks (II) 11,629 7.38 5 0.76 30.1 55.5 2.7 
AMEX 
Difference (I-II)  2.88** 5** 0.69** 40.4** 6.3** -0.3** 
Manipulated stocks (I) 31 18.39 19 2.87 266.1 132.6 0.7 
Non-manip. stocks (II) 106,299 19.38 80 12.25 1055.5 131.4 0.5 
NYSE  
Difference (I-II)  -0.98 -61** -9.37** -789.3** 1.3 0.3** 
Manipulated stocks (I) 90 3.95 8 1.23 74.5 86.1 2.8 
Non-manip. stocks (II) 105,380 4.83 11 1.69 61.7 55.6 2.7 
TSX 
Difference (I-II)  -0.88** -3** -0.46** 12.8* 30.5** 0.1* 
Manipulated stocks (I) 34 1.40 6 0.88 14.5 24.3 3.6 
Non-manip. stocks (II) 18,520 0.35 5 0.77 9.5 18.3 6.6 
TSX-V  
Difference (I-II)  1.05** 1 0.12 5.0* 6.0 -3.0** 
 
 
 The manipulated stocks on the larger of the two exchanges in each country, 
the NYSE and the TSX, tend to be less liquid than the exchange median.  Manipulated 
stocks on these exchanges trade fewer times per day and have larger spreads than the 
market median.  On the other hand, the manipulated stocks on the AMEX and the 
TSX-V tend to be more liquid than the exchange median as indicated by the smaller 
spread, more trades per day and higher daily traded value.  Overall, this suggests that 
the manipulated stocks on different exchanges within the same country are more alike 
in their level of liquidity than non-manipulated stocks and the stocks preferred by 
manipulators are at neither end of the liquidity spectrum.  This result is consistent 
with the fact that on one hand, very liquid stocks are difficult to manipulate and on the 
other, the potential gains from manipulating the closing prices of illiquid stocks are 
small. 
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 These results contrast with Aggarwal and Wu (2006) who find that pump-and-
dump manipulation is concentrated in illiquid stocks.  The differences in these two 
sets of results are explained by the differences between the two types of 
manipulation.  Because pump-and-dump manipulators profit directly from their 
trading, manipulating illiquid stocks can be profitable.  However, closing price 
manipulators typically profit outside the manipulated market from contracts based on 
closing prices and such contracts are less prevalent or less valuable in illiquid stocks.  
For example, illiquid stocks represent a small proportion of fund manager portfolios 
and broker trading for institutional clients and are less likely to have options trading 
on them.   
 
4.5 Effects on trading characteristics 
 This section reports the effects of closing price manipulation on five trading 
characteristics using two different methods: difference-in-differences and matched 
stocks.   
 
4.5.1 Measurement of trading characteristics 
 I estimate manipulation’s effect on returns, return reversals, trade frequencies, 
spreads and trade sizes.  Appendix C contains formulae for these variables.  Return is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the closing price divided by the bid-ask 
midpoint at a specified time (defined later) before the close.  Return reversal is the 
return from the closing price to the midpoint the following morning at 11am, allowing 
time from the open for price discovery to occur and temporary volatility to disappear.  
Trade frequency, a proxy for trading activity, is calculated as the average number of 
trades per hour in the last part of the day.  Spread is measured at the close 
proportional to the bid-ask midpoint.  Trade size is the average dollar volume of 
trades at the end of the day relative to the average dollar volume of trades during the 
day.   
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 The substantial variation in the timing of closing price manipulation presents a 
challenge in both its characterisation and detection.  If the day-end interval in which 
the effect of manipulation is measured is too wide the measures are diluted with non-
manipulative trading activity, but if the interval is too narrow some of the 
manipulator’s effect is missed.40  Highly liquid stocks are likely to be manipulated 
shortly before the close because in such stocks it is costly to sustain the liquidity 
imbalance that causes the inflated price.  The effects of manipulation can be 
adequately measured in a short real-time interval prior to the close, such as the last 20 
minutes of trading.  On the other hand, a thinly traded stock can be manipulated with 
a single trade considerably earlier in the day.  A short real-time interval would fail to 
capture the manipulator’s trades.  Here, the use of a transaction-time interval is more 
effective, for example, the last two trades of the day.   
 To handle different levels of liquidity I use several real-time and transaction-
time intervals and select the interval in which manipulation is most likely to occur.  
The real-time intervals are the last 15, 20, 30, 60 and 90 minutes prior to the close and 
the transaction-time intervals are from the last, the second last, third last and fourth 
last trades before the close.  For each stock-day, I calculate variables for the smallest 
real-time interval containing at least one trade41 and the transaction-time interval that 
has the largest value of return from the bid-ask midpoint to the closing price.  The 
real-time interval is as small as possible to avoid diluting the effects of the 
manipulator’s trades with non-manipulative trading activity.  The transaction-time 
interval is likely to contain the manipulator’s trades, if manipulation is present, with 
the least amount of non-manipulative trading.  This is because the manipulator’s 
trades are expected to have greater price impact, on average, than other trades.  For 
each variable I take the maximum of its values in the real-time and transaction-time 
                                                 
40 To illustrate this, consider a stock that usually trades at a rate of one trade every five minutes and has 
one additional trade made by a manipulator just before the close.  The increase in trade frequency in the 
last 10 minutes is 50%, but in the last 30 minutes it is only 17%. 
41 If a stock has no trades in the 90 minute interval, then the variables are measured from the last trade.   
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intervals to obtain a single measure that can be applied across stocks of different 
levels of liquidity.42   
 To illustrate how this method of combining multiple intervals works, consider 
two instances of manipulation from the sample, which involve stocks of different 
levels of liquidity.  Figure 4.1 plots the best quotes and trade prices for the last hour of 
trading.   
 In the first example (Panel A), the manipulated stock is relatively illiquid.  The 
manipulator makes only one trade approximately one hour before the close, setting the 
closing price at the ask quote (up approximately 5% from the last trade price).  In this 
example, the day-end variables are calculated from the transaction-time window 
corresponding to the last trade.  Many of the real-time windows (e.g., the last 30 
minutes before the close) fail to capture the manipulator’s trade and therefore 
incorrectly measure the effects of manipulation.  Although the 90 minute real-time 
window contains the manipulator’s trade it provides a less accurate measure of the 
effects of manipulation because it contains half an hour of non-manipulative trading 
before manipulation begins.  In even less liquid stocks manipulators can place the 
closing trade hours before the close, in which case none of the real-time intervals 
correctly measure the effects of manipulation. 
 In the second example (Panel B), the manipulated stock is more liquid.  The 
manipulator makes seven trades in the last 20 minutes of trading (trades made in close 
succession may appear in Figure 4.1 as a single trade due to overlapping symbols), 
increasing the price from $19.875 to $20.50 (3.1%).  In this example, the day-end 
variables are calculated from the real-time window corresponding to the last 15 
minutes before the close.  This window contains most of the manipulator’s trades and 
captures most of the manipulator’s effects on trading characteristics.  On the other 
hand, due to the relatively large number of trades in this example, the transaction-time 
intervals miss a significant part of the manipulation’s effects. 
                                                 
42 The upward bias in individual values caused by the use of the maximum operator is removed through 
differencing in both the difference-in-differences and matched stock methodologies.     
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Panel A: Helix BioPharma Corporation on 21 March 2000 
 
Manipulator’s trade 
Panel B: Southern Union Company on 22October 1999 
 
Manipulator’s trades 
Figure 4.1 Day-end trading in two instances of closing price manipulation 
This figure plots the best quotes and trades during the last hour of trading for two instances of closing 
price manipulation.  The close of trading is approximately 16:00. 
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4.5.2 Difference-in-differences estimates 
 I estimate the effects of manipulation on trading characteristics using 
difference-in-differences estimation and differences in matched stocks.  These 
methods control for selection bias, which can arise from manipulators choosing: (i) 
stocks that systematically differ from other stocks in observable or unobservable 
characteristics (e.g., liquidity); or (ii) days that differ systematically from other days, 
for example, month-end days.  These methods also control for differences in detection 
rates across groups of stocks and types of days.  The difference-in-differences 
estimator can provide a more robust selection-controlled estimate of the effects of a 
treatment than the commonly used Heckman selection estimators and instrumental 
variables estimators when longitudinal data are available (Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2000). 
 The difference-in-differences estimator first computes changes in day-end 
variables on manipulation days relative to other trading days for each stock and then 
compares the differences of manipulated stocks to those of non-manipulated stocks.  
This is expressed in the following equation, 
   0it0itMitMitDD YYYY 0101  ,    (4.1) 
where, for the ith manipulation,  and  are the values of a day-end variable for 
the manipulated stock and corresponding non-manipulated stocks (all other stocks on 
the same exchange) respectively, time period t1 is the day of the manipulation and t0 is 
a period of 42 trading days (approximately two months) ending one month prior to the 
date of the manipulation.   
M
iY
0
iY
 The first term,  MitMit YY 01  , the before-after estimator for manipulated stocks, 
indicates how much larger the values of the day-end variables are on the day of 
manipulation relative to the two-month benchmark in the same stock.43  This term 
                                                 
43 The length of this benchmark is somewhat arbitrary.  There is a trade-off between not being 
responsive to changes in market characteristics through time if the benchmark is too long, and not 
being representative of normal inter-day variation if the benchmark is too short.  The benchmark is 
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removes the effects of stock-specific characteristics thereby overcoming possible bias 
from manipulators selecting non-random stocks.   
 The second term,  0it0it YY 01  , is the before-after estimator for non-
manipulated stocks on the same exchange and day as the ith manipulation.  Subtracting 
this from the first term removes market-wide trends on the manipulation day and 
overcomes possible bias from manipulators choosing non-random days, such as 
month-end days.    
 Table 4.2 reports median difference-in-differences estimates.  Using medians 
avoids the results being overly affected by the detection process, which is influenced 
by extreme observations as discussed later.44  I analyse stocks by their level of 
turnover because liquidity is likely to affect the impact of manipulation.  I also 
analyse different types of closing price manipulation separately.  Using the litigation 
releases, I divide the sample of cases into those in which manipulation takes place 
over consecutive (or approximately consecutive) days and those in which 
manipulation is in separate occurrences on month-end days.45  The manipulator in 
each of these types has different incentives, different resources and is likely to target 
stocks with different characteristics.  Also, manipulation over several days may have 
different effects on the return reversal variable because its calculation involves the 
following day’s price. 
                                                                                                                                            
lagged by one month so that any abnormal trading or other forms of market misconduct prior to the 
manipulation reported in a litigation release is excluded. 
44 Implementation with medians is used in Meyer et al. (1995), for example, and discussed more 
formally as a special case of quantile difference-in-differences in Athey and Imbens (2006).   
45 An example of the first type of manipulation is influencing the price of a seasoned equity issue that is 
based on the average closing price over a certain period.  An example of the second type is a fund 
manager manipulating closing prices at the end of a reporting period.   
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Table 4.2 
Effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics using difference-in-differences 
Panel E reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of manipulation, 
)]}([)]({[ 00
0101 distdists
M
ditd
M
itiDD YmedYmedYmedYmed   
Panels A to D report components of the difference-in-differences estimator as follows: Panel A, 
; Panel B, ; Panel C, ; Panel D, 
; where index i represents the instances of manipulation, index s 
represents the non-manipulated stocks on the same exchange as manipulation i, index d represents the 
days in the pre-manipulation periods, subscript t0 represents the pre-manipulation period of 42 trading 
days ending one month prior to manipulation i, subscript t1 represents the day of manipulation i, 
superscript M represents the stock involved in manipulation i and 0 represents a non-manipulated stock 
traded on the same exchange as M, Y represents the day-end variables defined in Appendix C and medx 
is the median operator applied across index x.  High turnover stocks are defined as having more than 
ten trades per day on average in the pre-manipulation period and vice versa.  Consecutive refers to 
stocks that are manipulated over several consecutive days, Month-end refers to non-consecutive 
occurrences of manipulation on month-end days and n is the number of stock-days used in the 
calculation.  In Panels C, D and E significance at the 5% and 1% levels is indicated by * and **, 
respectively, using non-parametric sign tests. 
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Panel Group n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
ALL 184  2.60 1.71 12.00 3.27 -5.0 
Consecutive 124  2.94 2.12 12.17 3.36 -31.3 
Month-end 60  2.20 1.10 12.00 2.26 37.8 
High turnover 113  2.16 1.38 16.06 2.53 -13.3 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulated days
Low turnover 71  3.58 2.10 10.12 3.91 0.0 
 
ALL 7,728  1.25 0.00 5.63 2.76 -10.2 
Consecutive 5,208  1.25 -0.25 5.63 2.76 -10.5 
Month-end 2,520  0.33 0.00 1.67 2.36 0.0 
High turnover 4,746  1.25 -0.15 5.63 2.42 -18.3 
B: Manipulated 
stocks prior to 
manipulation 
Low turnover 2,982  1.06 0.00 1.61 3.00 -5.0 
 
ALL 7,912  1.42** 1.71** 7.77** 0.39** 5.8 
Consecutive 5,332  1.35** 2.16** 7.77** 0.56** -17.1 
Month-end 2,580  1.76** 1.07** 8.68** 0.14 44.5** 
High turnover 4,859  0.97** 1.11** 7.69** 0.51** 17.2 
C: Before-after 
estimator for 
manipulated 
stocks 
Low turnover 3,053  2.23** 2.10** 7.85** 0.37 0.0 
 
ALL 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.0 
Consecutive 4,193,920 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.0 
Month-end 1,760,936 0.04 -0.40** 1.12** -0.01 3.8* 
High turnover 4,095,032 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04* 0.0 
D: Before-after 
estimator for 
non-
manipulated 
stocks Low turnover 1,859,824 0.01 -0.06 0.47* -0.04** 0.0 
 
ALL 5,962,768 1.46** 1.85** 7.90** 0.36** 0.0 
Consecutive 4,199,252 1.37** 1.96** 8.02** 0.63** -15.8 
Month-end 1,763,516 1.62** 1.65** 7.60** 0.11 15.5 
High turnover 4,099,891 1.05** 1.33** 8.07** 0.37* 4.7 
E: Median 
difference-in-
differences 
estimator 
Low turnover 1,862,877 2.24** 2.29** 7.57** 0.34 -0.1 
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 The before-after estimates reported in Panel C indicate highly statistically 
significant and economically meaningful increases in each of the day-end variables 
for manipulated stocks on the day of manipulation relative to their trading activity 
prior to manipulation.  The before-after estimates for stocks that are not manipulated 
(Panel D) are all near zero suggesting there are no strong market-wide trends on the 
manipulation days that can explain the significant increases for manipulated stocks.  
This is confirmed by Panel E which indicates that manipulation causes a significant 
increase in returns, reversals, trade frequencies and spreads after controlling for stock- 
and time-specific effects.  
 Low turnover stocks experience a much larger increase in day-end returns in 
the presence of manipulation compared to high turnover stocks (2.24% and 1.05% 
respectively).  Low turnover stocks are likely to have less depth in the order book and 
hence a large trade will have more substantial price impact.  Additionally, the 
manipulator of a low turnover stock has to compete with fewer trades for control over 
the price and therefore is more likely to be successful in making the last trade of the 
day.  Consistent with this result, low turnover stocks also exhibit the largest return 
reversals from the closing price to the following morning.   
 A 15.5% increase in the size of month-end trades is attributable to 
manipulation after controlling for the tendency for trades to be larger on month-end 
days.  Combined with a proportionally larger increase in day-end trade frequency, this 
suggests that month-end manipulators spend more per closing price manipulation than 
consecutive day manipulators.  The difference may be because fund managers have 
access to greater amounts of capital or because they have stronger incentives to 
manipulate.  Aggressive closing price manipulation increases the probability of 
detection.  The manipulators willing to bear this risk are likely to be those for whom 
manipulation is most profitable.   
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4.5.3 Matched stock estimates 
 Abnormal trading activity in a stock’s prior trading benchmark, particularly in 
manipulated stocks, can lead to problems in inference using difference-in-differences.  
To ensure the results are robust with respect to this potential problem I examine the 
effect of manipulation using an alternative method of matched stocks.  Abnormal 
trading in a stock’s prior trading benchmark could occur if the stock was manipulated 
before the first instance of manipulation reported in the litigation documents.  This 
could also occur if particular abnormal trading characteristics cause manipulation. 
 I match each manipulated stock to another stock from the same exchange in a 
manner similar to Huang and Stoll (1996).46  Matched stocks must meet the price 
criterion in Equation 4.2 and are selected as those with the smallest scores of the loss 
function in Equation 4.3. 
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 In Equations 4.2 and 4.3 the superscripts M and 0 refer to manipulated and 
non-manipulated stocks (all other stocks on the corresponding exchange), 
respectively.  The xj are two liquidity related stock characteristics: daily traded dollar 
volume and mean daily spread.  Both price and the two stock characteristics are 
calculated over a two month period ending one month prior to the manipulation.  The 
price criterion eliminates matching candidates for which price levels are extremely far 
apart and the loss function ensures matched stocks have similar liquidity.47 
                                                 
46 As a robustness test I also use one-to-twenty matching and find similar results. 
47 The median differences in the manipulated and matched stocks’ closing prices, trades per day, daily 
traded dollar volume and mean daily spread are all less than 8% suggesting the matching is relatively 
precise.   
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 Table 4.3 compares the manipulated and matched stocks on manipulation 
days.  The estimated effects of manipulation (Panel C) support the previous 
conclusions.  Estimates of abnormal returns increase from 1.46% using difference-in-
differences to 1.90% using matched stocks and estimates of return reversals increase 
from 1.85% to 2.09%.  The matched stock results support the previous finding that 
low turnover stocks experience larger abnormal day-end returns and reversals.  
Abnormal day-end trade size for month-end manipulations is significantly positive 
(12.0%), whereas manipulation on consecutive days is estimated to decrease the 
average size of trades by 20.5%.   
 
 
Table 4.3 
Effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics using matched stocks 
Medians of day-end variables for manipulated stocks on manipulation days (Panel A), matched stocks 
on manipulation days (Panel B), and differences between manipulated stocks and matched stocks on 
manipulation days (Panel C).  High turnover stocks are defined as having more than ten trades per day 
on average in the benchmark period (42 trading days lagged one month) and vice versa.  Consecutive 
refers to stocks that are manipulated over several consecutive days, Month-end refers to non-
consecutive occurrences of manipulation on month-end days and n is the number of stock-days.  The 
variables are defined in Appendix C.  In Panel C significance at the 5% and 1% levels is indicated by * 
and **, respectively, using non-parametric sign tests. 
Panel Group n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
ALL 184 2.60 1.71 12.00 3.27 -5.0 
Consecutive 124 2.94 2.12 12.17 3.36 -31.3 
Month-end 60 2.20 1.10 12.00 2.26 37.8 
High turnover 113 2.16 1.38 16.06 2.53 -13.3 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulation 
days (I) 
Low turnover 71 3.58 2.10 10.12 3.91 0.0 
 
ALL 184 0.32 0.00 3.52 2.20 0.0 
Consecutive 124 0.37 0.00 3.01 2.52 -2.9 
Month-end 60 0.31 -0.27 4.44 1.62 15.1 
High turnover 113 0.31 -0.29 4.00 1.79 0.5 
B: Matched 
stocks on 
manipulation 
days (II) 
Low turnover 71 0.56 0.00 2.00 3.08 -5.0 
 
ALL 184 1.90** 2.09** 7.24** 0.36** -11.5 
Consecutive 124 2.01** 2.45** 7.61** 0.35* -20.5* 
Month-end 60 1.63** 1.42** 3.50** 0.39* 12.0* 
High turnover 113 1.32** 1.44** 7.34** 0.37** -25.3 
C: Cross-
sectional 
differences  
(I-II) 
Low turnover 71 3.04** 2.82** 6.56** 0.30 0.6 
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4.5.4 Discussion and robustness tests 
 The estimation of median effects rather than means in both analyses is 
important to ensure the results are not overly affected by the detection process.  
Details of the mechanisms that regulators use to detect manipulation are kept 
confidential to make it more difficult for manipulators to work around the 
mechanisms and avoid detection (Cumming and Johan, 2008).  However, it is known 
that surveillance systems are largely automated and based on patterns of abnormal 
trading characteristics such as price movements.  Discussions with regulators suggest 
that price and volume are among the most common variables in surveillance systems 
and that trade size and spreads are not commonly used.   
 Each of the eight manipulation cases in the sample contain on average 23 
instances of closing price manipulation.  It is likely that only the most abnormal price 
movements would have triggered alerts in automated market surveillance systems.  
Investigation of trading records around these events would have revealed other 
instances of manipulation, attempted manipulation or conspiring manipulators that did 
not trigger automated alerts.  The instances that trigger alerts, being relatively few in 
number but having large abnormal characteristics, are likely to influence mean 
estimates but have a minimal effect on medians.  Consequently, median estimates are 
less affected by the detection process and more accurately reflect the characteristics of 
all manipulation: detected and undetected.     
 I perform a number of robustness tests.  The full set of results are in Appendix 
D.  First, I estimate the difference-in-differences and matched stock differences with 
means instead of medians.48  The results are similar to estimation with medians, but 
tend to be slightly larger.  I replicate the difference-in-differences analysis with a 
                                                 
48 As Harris (2005) points out, the mean difference-in-differences model can be estimated using the 
panel regression model: where 
ittiitDit DY   0 D  is the impact estimator,  is an 
indicator for a manipulated stock-day and the
itD
  are the panel data terms that pick up stock- and time-
specific effects.  Estimating this model with double clustered standard errors as suggested by 
Thompson (2009) produces similar results to those reported in Table 4.2. 
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randomly chosen single day from the prior trading benchmark (rather than 42 days) 
and find similar point estimates and levels of statistical significance.  I conduct the 
difference-in-differences analysis separately for each legal manipulation case.  
Although there are differences in magnitudes, the overall effects of manipulation in 
individual cases are qualitatively consistent with the main conclusions of this chapter.  
Specifically, in each case manipulation causes abnormal returns, reversals and 
abnormal trading frequency, most cases lead to wider spreads, and the effects of 
manipulation on trade size are mixed.  I examine the influence of the way the day-end 
variables are calculated by estimating the effects of manipulation in each real-time 
and transaction-time window separately (not using a maximum operator).  The 
findings that manipulation increases returns, reversals, trade frequency and spreads 
are robust to measuring the variables over different intervals. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 This chapter quantifies the effects of closing price manipulation on the trading 
characteristics of stocks on US and Canadian stock exchanges.  Unlike previous 
studies, this analysis isolates the effect of closing price manipulation from unrelated 
day-end and seasonal effects.  This chapter uses methods that control for selection 
bias that can result from the non-random occurrence of manipulation.  The use of two 
methods in conjunction with generally consistent findings allows greater confidence 
in the estimated effects of manipulation.   
 This chapter’s findings are important in evaluating the benefits or harm caused 
by manipulators.  In that regard, one of the key findings is that closing price 
manipulation has a significantly detrimental effect on price accuracy.  Manipulation 
causes abnormal day-end returns of between 1.4% and 1.9% - approximately six times 
larger than their usual levels.  Most of these abnormal returns are reversed by the 
following morning.  Although the price distortions generally exist only for a short 
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period of time before the close, their effects are of great consequence because of the 
widespread use of closing prices and the frequency with which they are manipulated.   
 The results also indicate that trading frequencies more than triple and spreads 
increase by between 0.11% and 0.63% in the presence of manipulation.  Illiquid 
stocks that have wide spreads can be manipulated with a single small trade that closes 
the stock at the bid or ask quote (depending on the manipulator’s intended direction).  
For a liquid stock, this approach would have little effect on the price.  Therefore, 
liquid stocks are commonly manipulated with several large trades.  Fund managers 
have strong incentives to manipulate and they typically use large trades in 
manipulation.  When manipulating a stock over several days manipulators tend to use 
smaller trades.   
 By enhancing our understanding of how closing price manipulation affects 
trading characteristics, this chapter sheds light on how manipulation can be identified 
in markets.  These findings are used in constructing a manipulation index in Chapter 
6.  The next chapter complements these findings by analysing the broader effects of 
manipulation, such as the effects on overall market liquidity.  
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Chapter 5 
The effects of closing price manipulation 
on market quality 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Two fundamentally important aspects of financial market quality are pricing 
accuracy and liquidity.  Pricing accuracy, the precision with which market prices 
reflect the underlying value of an asset, determines the informativeness of prices and 
their ability to encourage efficient resource allocation.49  Liquidity allows efficient 
transfer of risk.  The presence of traders with incentives to manipulate prices is a 
feature of markets that may limit their informational and transactional efficiency.   
 The purpose of this chapter is to identify how closing price manipulation 
affects pricing accuracy and liquidity, in order to evaluate manipulation’s effects on 
economic efficiency and social welfare.  In their discussion of how to define illegal 
market manipulation, Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) argue that forms of manipulation 
should only be illegal if they are detrimental to both pricing accuracy and liquidity.  
Their argument is based on the premise that if a manipulator distorts pricing accuracy 
but brings about greater liquidity, or vice versa, depending on the relative social value 
of these two externalities, it may be economically efficient to allow such forms of 
manipulation.   
 The small body of existing evidence on the effects of manipulation is mixed 
and inconclusive, largely due to the difficulties in empirically studying manipulation.  
                                                 
49 Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) point out that “pricing accuracy” does not mean the same thing as 
“market efficiency”.   
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There is little doubt that manipulators are able to influence prices.50  However, it is 
not clear how consistently and to what extent manipulators distort prices.  Rational 
expectations theory predicts that if market participants are able to recognise 
manipulation they should profitably counteract it, thereby offsetting any price 
distortion.  This intuition is central to the microstructure model in Hanson and Oprea 
(2009) where manipulation causes prices to be more accurate due to increased 
liquidity from rational profit seeking investors. 
 Further evidence of manipulation attempts that do not impair pricing accuracy 
are found in experimental and field studies.  In an experimental market involving 
asset trading via an electronic limit order book, Hanson et al. (2006) find no evidence 
that manipulators are able to distort prices.  In a field experiment involving attempts 
to manipulate horse racing odds, Camerer (1998) reports that manipulation failed to 
distort prices. 
 On the second important aspect of market quality, liquidity, the evidence is 
more scarce, but similarly inconclusive.  Hanson and Oprea (2009) report that in their 
microstructure model the possibility of manipulation increases liquidity due to 
rational traders’ attempts to profitably counteract manipulation.  In contrast, other 
studies argue that manipulation reduces participation in markets resulting in lower 
liquidity, higher trading costs and higher costs of capital (e.g., Prichard (2003)). 
 A further issue is how regulation affects manipulators’ strategies, pricing 
accuracy and liquidity.  In an inter-jurisdiction study, Cumming and Johan (2008) find 
that more detailed market manipulation rules increase trading activity through 
enhanced investor confidence.  Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find in a sample of 
103 countries that the enforcement of laws governing financial conduct, rather than 
                                                 
50 There are many examples in the litigation releases of the US and Canadian regulators (see 
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtm and  
www.osc.gov.on.ca/Enforcement/Proceedings/ep_index.jsp), direct empirical evidence in Aggarwal 
and Wu (2006) and Chapter 4 of this thesis, indirect empirical evidence in Carhart et al. (2002), Hillion 
and Suominen (2004), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Ni et al. (2005) and evidence from theoretical 
analyses in Allen and Gale (1992) and Kumar and Seppi (1992).   
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simply their presence, affects markets in a positive way.  Little is known about how 
manipulation strategies change in response to regulation.   
 Empirical examination of these issues is difficult.  In order to provide direct 
evidence a researcher must be able to observe manipulation.  In practice, regulators 
only observe the non-random subset of manipulation that they detect.  Researchers, 
due to the opaqueness of regulation, are generally only able to observe the fraction of 
detected manipulation that gets prosecuted.  As documented in Chapter 3, this is a 
small non-random proportion of manipulation.  The nature of this partial observability 
problem is such that conventional approaches to overcoming endogeneity or sample 
selection issues, such as Heckman two-stage procedures or instrumental variables, can 
not be applied to correct the bias.  Further, key variables such as true asset values, 
incentives and information sets, as well as important counterfactuals such as 
manipulation free markets, are generally not observable.  In order to control 
incentives and information, observe true asset values and counterfactual manipulation 
free markets, and to avoid the significant partial observability or endogeneity biases, 
this chapter studies closing price manipulation in an experimental market.   
 The results indicate that manipulators, given incentives similar to many actual 
manipulation cases, decrease price accuracy (ex-post) and liquidity (ex-post and ex-
ante).  The mere possibility of manipulation alters market participants’ behaviour 
causing reduced liquidity.  This chapter finds some evidence that ordinary traders 
attempt to profitably counteract manipulation, but their effect is not strong enough to 
prevent the harm caused by manipulation.  Finally, this chapter provides examples of 
the strategies employed by manipulators, illustrates how these strategies change in the 
presence of regulatory scrutiny and assesses the ability of market participants to 
identify manipulation. 
 Hanson et al. (2006) conduct the first laboratory work on price manipulation in 
asset markets.  Their main result is that manipulators are unable to distort price 
accuracy throughout trading sessions because other traders counteract the actions of 
the manipulator.   
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 This chapter extends Hanson et al. (2006) in several important ways.  First, it 
considers not only pricing accuracy, but also the effect of manipulation on liquidity – 
the second externality that must be understood to draw conclusions about 
manipulation’s social harm or benefit.  Second, by making the presence of 
manipulators uncertain, the experimental market used in this chapter creates a more 
realistic setting and allows analysis of how the possibility of manipulation alters 
trading characteristics (ex-ante effects).  Third, this chapter examines how regulation 
affects manipulators’ strategies and other traders’ reactions.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, this chapter examines a different form of manipulation - closing 
price manipulation - by giving manipulators incentive to realise high closing prices as 
opposed to high prices throughout a trading session.  The results indicate that this last 
difference is critical in determining how manipulation affects markets.   
 Manipulation of closing prices differs from manipulation of prices within a 
trading period in several important ways.  Closing price manipulation is arguably 
more mechanical in nature and consequently easier to carry out because the 
manipulator needs only to sustain a liquidity imbalance for a short time period just 
prior to the close.  A typical example involves aggressive buying or selling in the final 
moments of trading.  In contrast, trading to maintain an artificially inflated or deflated 
price for a longer period of time is more costly.  Consequently, manipulators of 
intraday prices typically use different strategies such as rumours, wash sales and 
attempts to corner the market. 
 
5.2 Experiment design and procedure 
 The experiment design consists of three treatments: a control with no 
manipulators, a treatment to examine the ex-ante and ex-post effects of manipulation 
and a treatment to examine the effects of regulation.  In all treatments 12 subjects 
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trade shares of a common asset in an electronic continuous double auction market.51  
Each experimental session consists of 16 trading periods of 200 seconds each, under 
one of the treatments.   
 Treatment 1 replicates a variation of a classic design developed by Plott and 
Sunder (1988) to study information aggregation, and is similar to the control treatment 
used by Hanson et al. (2006).  The fundamental value of the asset, V, is unknown to 
individual subjects during the course of trading and is revealed at the end of each 
period.  However, it is made common knowledge among subjects that  
with an equal probability of each value occurring.  At the start of each trading period 
subjects are endowed with four shares of the common asset, 200 experimental 
currency units (ECU) and a clue about V.  The clue is knowledge of one of the three 
possible values that V will certainly not take in that period.  For example, if , 
half the traders (chosen at random) are told  and the other half are told .  
Although no individual knows the true fundamental value, V, in aggregate subjects 
have enough information to determine V.   
 80,40,20V
40V
20V80V
 At the end of each period the shares owned by participants are converted to 
cash at their fundamental value, V, and, together with any remaining cash, added to 
the traders’ payoff pools.  The traders’ payoff pools determine how much they are 
paid for participating in the experiment as explained later. Traders’ endowments are 
reset to the original amount of four shares and 200 ECU at the beginning of each 
period. 
 Treatment 2 introduces the possibility of manipulation by giving some 
subjects incentives to manipulate the closing price.  In a randomly selected half of the 
trading periods, a trader drawn at random is informed that they will assume the role of 
manipulator for that period.  The remaining traders, from the beginning of the 
                                                 
51 Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) examine the effect of the number of traders in a similar experimental 
market and find that 12 traders is a suitable number for competition among traders to drive the market 
to perform as predicted by a rational expectations model.  Hanson et al. (2006) also use 12 traders in 
their experimental markets.  
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experimental session, are aware that manipulators will be chosen at random in some 
periods, but they do not know which periods or traders. 
 Manipulators receive the same initial endowment as other traders (including 
the clue about V) but different payoffs.  A manipulator’s payoff at the end of a trading 
period is 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) + 250, where Pclosing and Pmedian are the closing price (the 
last traded price) and median price, respectively.  This payoff provides incentive for 
manipulators to try and increase the last trade price irrespective of V.  The median 
price is chosen as the reference point for calculating manipulation profits because it is 
difficult to manipulate (as demonstrated by Hanson et al. (2006)) and is consistent 
with many real examples in which manipulation profits are a function of closing 
prices relative to prevailing intraday market prices.  Unlike several other forms of 
market manipulation, closing price manipulators often profit from sources external to 
the market, for example, from overstated fund performance.  This is simulated by the 
payoff provided to manipulators.  Periods with a manipulator allow the ex-post effects 
of manipulation to be analysed, and periods without a manipulator provide evidence 
on the ex-ante effects of manipulation (the effect of possible manipulation). 
 At the end of each period ordinary traders submit guesses as to whether or not 
a manipulator was present in the market.  Correct (incorrect) guesses earn (cost) the 
subject 50 ECU.  Manipulators guess how many of the other 11 traders will have 
guessed that a manipulator was present and also earn (lose) 50 ECU for correct 
(incorrect) guesses.  The purpose of the guesses in this treatment is to examine the 
accuracy with which market participants are able to identify manipulation, and to 
gauge the manipulators’ perceptions of how easily market participants can identify 
manipulation. 
 Treatment 3 simulates possible manipulation with a regulator by introducing a 
penalty for manipulators that are ‘detected’ by the other traders.  In each period a 
randomly selected trader assumes the role of manipulator.  Manipulators start with the 
same endowment as other traders (including the clue about V) and choose whether or 
not to trade, given knowledge of the following payoffs.  A manipulator that chooses to 
 92
trade is ‘detected’ if eight or more of the other 11 traders (approximately three 
quarters) guess that the manipulator traded, and evades ‘detection’ otherwise.52  
Undetected manipulators receive a manipulation profit of 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) and 
detected manipulators receive a detection penalty of negative the manipulation profit.  
In addition to the manipulation profit or detection penalty (which is zero if the 
manipulator does not trade) manipulators also receive 250 ECU to make their average 
payoffs close to those of the ordinary traders.  This payoff structure and the choice 
offered to the manipulator allow the effects of regulation on manipulation to be 
analysed. 
 At the end of each period, ordinary traders submit guesses as to whether or not 
the manipulator traded.  Traders are paid for correct guesses and penalised for 
incorrect guesses as in Treatment 2.  The guesses determine if a manipulator that 
chooses to trade is ‘detected’.  As explained in more detail below, traders, in making 
their guesses about manipulation, are able to observe similar information to what 
regulators use in market surveillance, for example, trader IDs, orders, trade prices and 
volumes, both graphically and in tabulated form.    At the end of each period, the 
manipulator guesses how many of the other 11 traders will have guessed that the 
manipulator traded.  Table 5.1 contains a summary of the payoffs from trading and 
guessing in each of the treatments.    
                                                 
52 The choice of three quarters of guesses as the threshold at which ‘detection’ occurs is somewhat 
arbitrary.  However, the chosen threshold results in behaviour consistent with real markets.  For 
example, some would-be manipulators choose not to manipulate because of the risk of being caught, 
yet others manipulate despite the risk of being caught.   
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Table 5.1 
Summary of end of period trader payoffs by treatment 
This table summarises the payoffs earned by manipulators and ordinary traders (all other traders) at the end 
of each trading period.  N and C are the number of shares and amount of cash, respectively, owned at the 
end of the period.   is the payoff of each share at the end of a period.  Pclosing and Pmedian are 
the last and median trade prices, respectively, in a trading period.  In Treatment 3 manipulation (defined as a 
manipulator choosing to trade) is ‘detected’ if at least eight of the other 11 traders guess that the 
manipulator traded and ‘not detected’ otherwise.  Ordinary traders guess whether or not a manipulator was 
present and manipulators guess how many of the ordinary traders will guess that a manipulator was present.  
All amounts are denominated in experimental currency units.    
 80,40,20V 
Treatment Trader type Trading payoff  Guessing payoff  
1 Ordinary NV + C  
    
Ordinary NV + C +50 if correct, -50 if incorrect 2 Manipulator 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) + 250 +50 if correct, -50 if incorrect 
    
Ordinary NV + C +50 if correct, -50 if incorrect 
3 
 Manipulator 
15(Pclosing - Pmed
-15(Pclosing - Pmed
if not detected 
if detected 
if no trade } +50 if correct,-50 if incorrect  
 
 
 Subjects trade using computer terminals running a trading simulator (Rotman 
Interactive Trader) that allows them to place market and limit orders.53  Subjects, on 
their terminals, are able to see the full order book, a list and chart of trade prices and 
volumes and a countdown of the time remaining to the end of the period.  Conversion 
between stocks and cash occurs instantaneously after a trade and there are no 
brokerage costs, short selling or margin buying.  The prohibition of short selling and 
margin buying simply constrains the buying and selling power of the traders 
(including the manipulator) to the supply of stocks and cash set by the initial 
endowments.54  To avoid biasing the prices up or down, the initial endowments of 
                                                 
53 A screenshot of the trading interface is in Appendix E. 
54 Allowing short selling and margin buying for an equal amount of shares is expected to increase 
buying and selling power equally and not affect the experimental outcomes significantly.  Allowing 
one but not the other would distort the balance between buying and selling power, making 
manipulation either easier or more difficult.  For example, allowing short selling but not margin buying 
would make manipulation more difficult as ordinary traders would have more selling power to 
counteract manipulation. 
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stock and cash are set such that buying and selling power are on average 
approximately equal.  Subjects are not allowed to communicate with one another and 
are aware of the payoffs that each type of participant faces.  The asset values, V, clues 
and the manipulator allocations are randomly drawn prior to the study and the 
ordering kept the same for each session, as detailed in Table 5.2.55  The instructions 
provided to subjects consist of a core set common to all treatments, with additional 
instructions added for Treatments 2 and 3.56   
 Eight sessions are conducted; two sessions in Treatments 1 and 3 and four 
sessions in Treatment 2.  Twice as many sessions are run in Treatment 2 than the 
other two treatments because Treatment 2 contains two sub-treatments (periods that 
have a manipulator and periods that do not).  With 16 trading periods in each 
experimental session there are 32 trading periods in Treatment 1, Treatment 3 and 
each of the sub-treatments of Treatment 2.  I collect data on all trades and orders 
including prices, volumes, trade/order direction, trade initiator, trader IDs and 
timestamps, as well as snapshots of the full order book at five-second intervals.  Each 
session takes approximately two hours and subjects receive an average payment of 
$30.57  Subjects are not allowed to participate in more than one session so in total 96 
subjects are recruited. The subjects are undergraduate and graduate students from the 
Faculty of Economics and Business at the University of Sydney.  
 
55 In Treatment 2 the periods in which a manipulator is present are drawn at random subject to the 
conditions that for each of the asset values and each half of the experimental session (periods 1-8 and 
9-16) there are an equal number of periods with and without a manipulator.  This condition allows a 
more equal comparison of the sub-treatments (manipulator and no manipulator) in Treatment 2. 
56 The instructions are in Appendix E. 
57 At the end of an experimental session subjects are ranked in descending order by their total payoff 
pools.  The subject with the highest payoff receives $45, the second and third ranked subjects receive 
$40 each, the next two receive $35 each and so on down to subjects ranked 10 and 11 who receive $20 
each and the lowest ranked subject who receives $15.  This payout method, which is similar to the 
method used by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), ensures that average payoffs are equal across the three 
treatments and guarantees that the subjects receive at least $15. 
 
 
Table 5.2 
Asset values, clues and manipulator allocations 
V is the payoff in experimental currency for each share of the asset at the end of a trading period.  The clue given to each subject is knowledge of one of the three possible 
values that V will certainly not take in that period.  For example, Subject 1 in Period 1 is told 20V .  For each period in the three treatments Panel B describes which subject, 
if any, is assigned the role of manipulator (given a different payoff schedule as described in Table 5.1). 
Panel A: Asset values and clues 
 Practice Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10 Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 Period 15 Period 16 
V 40 40 20 80 80 40 20 40 80 20 80 40 20 20 40 80 20 
Subject 1 clue 20 20 80 40 20 80 40 20 20 80 40 80 40 80 20 40 80 
Subject 2 clue 80 80 40 20 40 80 80 20 40 80 20 80 80 40 80 20 40 
Subject 3 clue 20 80 80 40 40 80 40 80 20 40 40 20 40 80 80 20 80 
Subject 4 clue 80 20 80 20 20 80 80 80 40 40 20 20 80 40 20 40 40 
Subject 5 clue 80 20 40 40 20 80 40 80 20 80 20 20 80 40 20 40 80 
Subject 6 clue 80 80 40 20 40 20 80 20 40 40 20 80 40 80 80 20 40 
Subject 7 clue 20 20 80 20 20 20 80 20 40 40 40 80 40 40 80 20 80 
Subject 8 clue 80 80 80 20 40 20 80 80 20 40 40 80 40 80 80 40 40 
Subject 9 clue 20 80 40 40 20 80 40 20 40 40 40 20 40 80 20 20 80 
Subject 10 clue 20 80 40 40 20 20 40 80 20 80 40 20 80 40 20 40 40 
Subject 11 clue 20 20 40 40 40 20 40 80 20 80 20 20 80 80 20 20 80 
Subject 12 clue 80 20 80 20 40 20 80 20 40 80 20 80 80 40 80 40 40 
                  
Panel B: Manipulator allocations 
Treatment Practice Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10 Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 Period 15 Period 16 
1 None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None 
2 None None Subject 5 Subject 2 None Subject 7 None None Subject 4 Subject 1 None Subject 6 None None Subject 8 None Subject 3 
3 None Subject 10 Subject 4 Subject 7 Subject 9 Subject 1 Subject 11 Subject 2 Subject 6 Subject 8 Subject 3 Subject 12 Subject 5 Subject 1 Subject 3 Subject 2 Subject 4 
                  
 
 
5.3 Analysis 
 As a starting point, I replicate part of the analysis in Hanson et al. (2006) to 
examine the effect of manipulation on closing price accuracy.  I then extend this 
analysis to examine intra-period effects and apply it to liquidity variables.  Next, I 
characterise the trading strategies used by manipulators with and without a regulator 
and examine how manipulation affects the behaviour of ordinary traders.  Finally, I 
assess the ability of market participants to identify manipulation and conduct some 
robustness tests.  Throughout most of the analysis Treatment 2 is split into its two 
sub-treatments, 2a and 2b, according to whether or not a manipulator is present.  This 
chapter refers to Treatments 1, 2a, 2b and 3 as the ‘control’ treatment, ‘possible 
manipulation’, ‘manipulation’, and ‘possible manipulation with a regulator’, 
respectively. 
 
5.3.1 Effects on price accuracy  
 This analysis of the effect of manipulation on price accuracy begins by 
replicating tests conducted by Hanson et al. (2006).  Figure 5.1 plots the prices of the 
last trade in each period (equivalent to the closing price in many stock exchanges), the 
averages of these prices by treatment, and the fundamental asset value, V, in each 
period.  Similar to Hanson et al. (2006), prices are attracted towards V in each period 
but display ‘stickiness’ to a value around 40.  From Figure 5.1 it appears price 
convergence (the degree to which market prices track V) is stronger in this experiment 
than in that of Hanson et al. (2006).   
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Figure 5.1 End of period prices by period 
This figure plots the prices of the last trade in each period of each experimental session (the various 
shaped and coloured points) as well as the average of these prices in each period by treatment (lines).  
The solid black line indicates the fundamental asset value in each period.  
 
 
 I quantify the price convergence properties and test for the effect of 
manipulation on the ability of prices to track V using the following linear mixed 
effects models (replicating Hanson et al. (2006), but with two additional treatments): 
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Priceij is the average of the last three trade prices in period j of session i.58  Possibleij, 
manipulationij and regulatori are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the 
trading period is under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3 respectively.  Vj is the fundamental asset 
value in period j.  Parameters i  and β1i to β7i are random effects for session i.  All 
random effects and the error term, εij, are assumed to be distributed independently and 
normally with a mean of zero.  Consequently, this model allows composite errors to 
be heteroscedastic and correlated between trading periods within an experimental 
session, but assumes sessions are independent of one another.  If prices were to 
converge perfectly to V,   (in Equation 5.1) would be zero and β4 would be one.  If 
manipulation had no effect on prices or price accuracy β1, β2, β3, β5, β6, and β7 would 
be zero. 
 Table 5.3 reports the estimated model coefficients.59  Price convergence is not 
perfect; in Equation 5.1,   (25.84) is significantly larger than zero and β2 (0.36) is 
just over a third of its value under perfect convergence.  However, price convergence 
is better than in the experimental markets of Hanson et al. (2006) where the 
equivalents of   and β4 are estimated as 48.58 and 0.2, respectively.  A few design 
modifications may explain the difference.  In the experimental market used in this 
chapter:  as opposed to ; the instructions are more 
explicit in explaining how to profit when market prices are away from V; the initial 
endowment makes buying and selling power more equal on average; the trading 
interface provides information on executed trades as well as current limit orders; and 
the subjects are drawn from a different university. 
 80,40V ,20  100,40,0V 
                                                 
58 For robustness I replace the average of the last three prices (used by Hanson et al. (2006)) with the 
last trade price and find similar results. 
59 All models are estimated using Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML). 
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Table 5.3 
Effect of manipulation on end of period price accuracy 
This table reports estimates from a linear mixed effects model with random intercepts and random 
slopes.  Price and Squared error are the dependent variables.  Price is the average of the last three 
trade prices in a trading period.  Squared error is the square of the difference between Price and the 
fundamental asset value.  Possible, Manipulation and Regulator are indicator variables that take the 
value of 1 if the trading period is under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.   is the 
fundamental asset value.  n is the number of observations.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 80,40,20V 
Covariate Price Squared error 
Intercept 25.84*** 374.43***
 (7.49) (3.23)
Possible -0.27 -106.50
 (-0.06) (-0.68)
Manipulation 20.01** 296.91
 (2.17) (0.89)
Regulator -1.50 -81.53
 (-0.31) (-0.50)
V 0.36***
 (3.98)
Manipulation x V -0.33*
 (-1.93)
Possible x V 0.14
 (1.21)
Regulator x V 0.05
 (0.43)
n 128 128
 
 
 In contrast to Hanson et al. (2006), Table 5.3 suggests that closing price 
manipulation has a large and detrimental ex-post effect on prices and their accuracy.  
Estimates from the first mixed effects model suggest that end of period prices in the 
presence of a closing price manipulator (Treatment 2b) are on average approximately 
20 ECU higher than when there is no manipulator.  This, in the second model, 
translates to a large increase in squared price error (a large decrease in price accuracy) 
in the presence of a manipulator.  The increase in squared price error attributable to 
manipulation (297 ECU2) is very large relative to the underlying level (374 ECU2).60   
                                                 
60 In this model, which replicates Hanson et al. (2006), although the increase in price error due to 
manipulation is large it is not statistically significant.  This may be due to low statistical power in the 
test given that it only utilises one observation per trading period.  In the more detailed analysis that 
follows, the increase in error due to manipulation is statistically significant. 
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 The results reported in Table 5.3 indicate that possible manipulation, i.e., 
when there is no manipulator but traders are under the belief that there may be a 
manipulator, does not have a significant effect on prices or their accuracy.  This 
suggests that closing price manipulation does not have a significant ex-ante effect on 
prices, but does have significant detrimental ex-post effects.  This is consistent with 
the main theoretical prediction in Hanson and Oprea (2009).   
 Table 5.3 also indicates that possible manipulation in the presence of a 
regulator (when potential manipulators face a penalty if detected) does not have a 
significant effect on prices.  This could be because the risk of incurring a penalty 
deters manipulation, or simply that manipulators distort prices less to avoid detection.  
As shown in the following subsections, both effects are at play.  
 I extend the replicating analysis to examine the effects of manipulation on 
price accuracy in more detail.  Given that the manipulation incentive in this chapter is 
focused at the end of a trading period rather than throughout, I also analyse price 
accuracy within a trading period.  Figure 5.2 plots the average absolute price error 
(the absolute of the difference between trade price and fundamental asset value) for 
each treatment in ten-second intervals within a trading period.  Average price error 
decreases through the course of a trading period as a result of price discovery.  The 
experimental market gradually incorporates information into the price – a feature 
consistent with behaviour observed on equity markets and existing literature.  Price 
error appears to increase sharply in the last 20 seconds of the trading period in the 
presence of manipulation (Treatment 2b), but does not increase in any of the other 
treatments.   
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Figure 5.2 Average absolute pricing errors within a trading period 
This figure plots the average (by treatment) of the absolute pricing error at the end of each ten-second 
interval within a trading period.  Absolute pricing error is calculated as the absolute difference between 
the price of the trade immediately prior to the end of a ten-second interval and the fundamental asset 
value.  The horizontal axis measures time (in seconds). 
 
 
 I formally test manipulation’s effects on price accuracy within a trading period 
using a linear mixed effects model: 
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  (5.3) 
Priceijk is the price of the trade immediately prior to the end of the kth ten-second 
interval in period j of session i.  Possibleij, manipulationij and regulatori are indicator 
variables that take the value of 1 if the trading period is under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, 
respectively.  V20j and V80j are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if  
and , respectively.  Periodj is the trading period number within the 
20V
80V
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experimental session, which takes values from 1 to 16.  Intervalk is the number of the 
ten-second interval within a trading period, which takes values from 0 to 19.  Lastk is 
an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for the last interval of the trading 
period.   Parameters i  and β1i to β12i are random effects for session i and ij  is a 
random effect for period j of session i.  All random effects and the error term, εijk, are 
assumed to be distributed independently and normally with a mean of zero.  
Consequently, this model allows composite errors to be heteroscedastic and correlated 
between trading periods within an experimental session and between intervals within 
a trading period, but assumes sessions are independent of one another.61   
 Table 5.4 reports the estimated model coefficients.  Manipulation (Treatment 
2b) causes prices to be less accurate on average throughout a trading period (by 4.82 
ECU) and even less accurate in the last ten seconds of the trading period (an increase 
of 5.49, or total of 10.3 ECU).  The magnitude of this effect is economically 
meaningful.  The end-of-period increase in absolute trade price error that is 
attributable to manipulation is, as a percentage of V, between 13% and 52% (for 
 and , respectively).  The other treatments do not appear to have a 
significant effect on price accuracy, consistent with the previous analysis.  The 
coefficients of  and  suggest price accuracy improves (at a 
decreasing rate) through the course of a trading period, consistent with the pattern in 
Figure 5.2.  Price accuracy also tends to improve through the course of an 
experimental session as participants learn to aggregate information more accurately.  
Prices are significantly less accurate for  and  than , consistent 
with the previously observed ‘stickiness’ of prices to a value around 40.   
80V 20V
interval k
2
kinterval
V 20 80V 40V
                                                 
61 A covariance structure that allows the correlations between intervals within a period to decline with 
time-separation (e.g., a first-order autoregressive process) may seem more appropriate than constant 
correlation if random price shocks take several intervals to dissipate.  However, if price shocks are 
random, because the data are from repeated measures the effects of gradual adjustment to price shocks 
will average out leaving the estimates unbiased.   
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Table 5.4 
Effect of manipulation on price accuracy within a trading period 
This table reports estimates from a linear mixed effects model with random intercepts and random 
slopes.  The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the price of the last trade and the 
fundamental asset value at the end of each ten-second interval within a trading period.  Possible, 
Manipulation and Regulator are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the trading period is 
under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.  V20 and V80 are indicator variables that take the value of 1 
if the fundamental asset value in that trading period is 20 or 80, respectively, and Period is the trading 
period number within the experimental session, which takes values from 1 to 16.  Interval is the 
number of the ten-second interval within a trading period, which takes values from 0 to 19.  Last is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for the last interval of the trading period.  n is the number 
of observations.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
Covariate Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 9.58*** 4.43
Possible 1.81 0.81
Manipulation 4.82** 2.03
Regulator 0.97 0.41
V20 14.6*** 8.95
V80 20.6*** 9.48
Period -0.29** -2.00
Interval -0.89*** -5.23
Interval2 0.03*** 3.50
Last -0.21 -0.13
Last x Possible -1.83 -0.81
Last x Manipulation 5.49 1.56
Last x Regulator -0.39 -0.16
n 2,560 2,560
 
 
 The finding that closing price manipulation has a large and detrimental effect 
on prices and their accuracy is not contradictory to Hanson et al. (2006), but rather, 
complimentary.  Given the similarity in the experiment designs used in this chapter 
and in Hanson et al. (2006), the findings of the two studies together demonstrate that 
the manipulators’ incentives, defined by the payoff structure, are critical in 
determining the effect of manipulation on prices.  Manipulators in my experimental 
market have less market power because one manipulator trades against 11 other 
traders, compared to six manipulators trading against six other traders in Hanson et al. 
(2006).  However, of critical importance is that the manipulator in my experimental 
market is concerned about influencing only the last trade price, not prices throughout 
the entire period (as in Hanson et al. (2006)) and for this reason the manipulators are 
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detrimental to price accuracy.  The difference highlighted by the comparison of 
manipulator incentives is of particular concern given the many real examples of 
market participants with incentives to realise high closing prices and the numerous 
important uses of closing prices. 
 
5.3.2 Effects on liquidity 
 The previous subsection suggests that closing price manipulation has a 
significant detrimental ex-post effect on price accuracy.  In order to evaluate closing 
price manipulation’s overall social harm I now examine its effects on the second 
important market externality, liquidity.  I use three alternative measures of liquidity: 
bid-ask spread, depth and volume.   
 Figure 5.3 plots the evolution of the liquidity variables through the course of a 
trading period.  The patterns exhibited by these variables are generally consistent with 
behaviour observed in equity markets (see, for example, Cai et al. (2004)) and other 
experimental markets (see, for example, Bloomfield et al. (2005)).  Bid-ask spreads 
decline through the trading period but increase at the end of the period, depth tends to 
increase through the trading period at a decreasing rate and volume increases sharply 
at the end of the trading period.  The most apparent difference between the treatments 
is that spreads (depth) tend to be smaller (greater) in the control treatment than in the 
other treatments.  
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Panel A: Bid-ask spread 
 
Panel B: Depth 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Evolution of liquidity variables 
This figure plots average bid-ask spread (difference between the best bid and best ask as a percentage 
of the bid-ask midpoint), depth (total number of shares demanded or offered within 20% either side of 
the bid-ask midpoint) and volume (number of shares traded in each ten-second interval) within a 
trading period for each of the treatments.  The horizontal axis measures time (in seconds).  
 
 
 106
Panel C: Volume 
 
         
 
Figure 5.3 (continued) 
 
 
 I formally test manipulation’s effects on liquidity with a linear mixed effects 
model, similar to the models used to examine price accuracy: 
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 (5.4) 
Yij represents the liquidity variable in period j of session i.  Bid-ask spreads and depth 
values are averaged across the ten-second intervals within a period, similar to a time-
weighted average.  Volume is measured as the total number of shares traded in the 
period.  Possibleij, manipulationij and regulatori are indicator variables that take the 
value of 1 if the trading period is under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.  V20j and 
V80j are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if  and , 
respectively.  Periodj is the trading period number within the experimental session, 
which takes values from 1 to 16.  Random effects parameters 
20V
i
80V
  and β1i to β6i, as well 
as the error term, εij, are assumed to be distributed independently and normally with a 
mean of zero.  Consequently, this model allows composite errors to be heteroscedastic 
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and correlated between trading periods within an experimental session, but assumes 
sessions are independent of one another. 
 Table 5.5 reports the estimated model coefficients.  Bid-ask spreads are 
approximately eight to ten percent wider in Treatment 2 relative to the control 
treatment regardless of whether a manipulator is actually present or not.  Similarly, 
spreads are approximately nine percent wider when manipulation is possible in the 
presence of a regulator (Treatment 3) than in the control treatment.  These effects are 
statistically significant at the 5% level and meaningful relative to the grand mean 
spread of approximately 20% corresponding to the control treatment.  Spreads are also 
wider for  and  than , and tend to decrease through the course of 
an experimental session.  These results are consistent with notion that spreads are 
wider when there is greater uncertainty about V and that manipulation, or even the 
mere possibility of manipulation, causes greater uncertainty.     
20V 80V 40V
 Fundamental values 20V  and  cause greater uncertainty than  
due to the nature of the clues provided to traders.  An obvious initial strategy for 
traders with the clue  is to buy the asset at prices below 40 knowing that either 
 or .  Similarly, for the clue an obvious initial strategy is to sell 
the asset at prices above 40.  Consequently, when and the set of clues is 
 there tends to be no shortage of buyers at prices up to 40 and sellers 
at prices down to 40, so prices converge quickly and accurately with little uncertainty.  
As a secondary strategy, after having inferred the clues of other traders by observing 
order flow, a trader may choose to post limit orders above and below V, thereby acting 
as a market maker and earning the spread for supplying liquidity.   
80V
V
40V
20V

40V
 ,20V
80V
80
80
40V
V
 In contrast, when , only the traders with the clue  have an 
obvious initial strategy – to buy at prices up to 40.  The other half, with the clue 
, only know with certainty that either  or  and therefore have to 
infer which of these possibilities is true by observing other traders’ order flow.  
Consequently, states  and  induce greater uncertainty and cause traders 
to set wider spreads.   
80V
20 V
20V
40V 20V 80V
V 80
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Table 5.5 
Effect of manipulation on liquidity 
This table reports estimates from a linear mixed effects model with random intercepts and random 
slopes.  Bid-ask spread, Depth and Volume are the dependent variables.  Bid-ask spread is the 
difference between the best ask and best bid prices divided by the bid-ask midpoint (average of the best 
bid and best ask) expressed as a percentage and averaged across the ten-second intervals within a 
trading period.  Depth is the total number of shares demanded or offered within 20% either side of the 
bid-ask midpoint averaged across the ten-second intervals within a trading period.  Volume is the 
number of shares traded in a trading period.  Possible, Manipulation and Regulator are indicator 
variables that take the value of 1 if the trading period is under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.  V20 
and V80 are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the fundamental asset value in that trading 
period is 20 or 80, respectively, and Period is the period number within the experimental session, 
which takes values from 1 to 16.  n is the number of observations.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Covariate Bid-ask spread Depth Volume 
Intercept 20.43*** 16.21*** 31.36*** 
 (5.11) (7.72) (7.41)
Possible 8.48** -5.19** -12.25** 
 (2.23) (-2.26) (-2.45) 
Manipulation 10.41** -5.33** -3.84
 (2.46) (-2.22) (-0.74) 
Regulator 9.34** -3.82 -5.53
 (2.41) (-1.51) (-0.51) 
V20 19.51*** -7.70*** 9.15*** 
 (5.68) (-6.22) (3.31)
V80 14.81*** -5.69*** 12.67*** 
 (4.41) (-4.33) (4.26)
Period -1.38*** 0.35*** 0.19
 (-4.57) (3.18) (0.48)
n 128 128 128
 
 
 The presence of manipulators that have no regard for the fundamental asset 
value, V, increases the probability of observing a false signal in order flow, and 
therefore increases the chance of incorrectly inferring V.  As a result, price uncertainty 
is greater and traders set wider spreads.   
 Consistent with the effects on spreads, depth is reduced by manipulation and 
the mere possibility of manipulation.  Depth (the number of shares offered or 
demanded in the limit order book within 20% of the bid-ask midpoint) is reduced by 
approximately five shares in Treatment 2 relative to the control treatment regardless 
of whether a manipulator is actually present or not.  The reduction in depth is 
approximately four shares when manipulation is possible in the presence of a 
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regulator (Treatment 3).  These effects are meaningful relative to the grand mean 
depth of approximately 16 shares, corresponding to the control treatment. 
 Volume is significantly lower when manipulation is possible (Treatment 2a) 
relative to the control treatment, suggesting that the possibility of manipulation 
creates a greater reluctance to trade.  This effect may stem from the fact that, all else 
being equal, manipulation and the possibility of manipulation increase spreads and 
therefore increase trading costs.  This explanation is supported by the finding of 
Barclay et al. (1998) that wider spreads lead to reduced volume.  The effect on trading 
volume is not as strong when manipulation actually occurs (Treatments 2b and 3) 
because the manipulators, in trading to manipulate prices, offset the reduced trading 
levels of other market participants. 
 The results in this subsection on spreads, depth and volumes suggest that 
manipulation, and even the mere possibility of manipulation, has a significant 
detrimental effect on market liquidity.   
 
5.3.3 Manipulation strategy 
 This subsection focuses on the trading strategies employed by closing price 
manipulators.  I characterise manipulators’ use of different order types and the timing 
of their trades in the presence and absence of a regulator.  To do this, I classify orders 
into four categories of aggressiveness: market orders (and marketable limit orders, 
i.e., limit orders that cause immediate execution) that execute all of the depth at the 
best quote and at least some of the depth at the next best quote; market orders that 
execute at the best quote; limit orders that are at least part filled; and limit orders that 
are not at all filled. 
 Figure 5.4 reports a breakdown of order types submitted by manipulators and 
other traders in each treatment.  Panel A compares the orders used by manipulators to 
those used by other traders in the absence of a regulator (Treatment 2b).  Panel B 
makes the same comparison, but in the presence of a regulator (Treatment 3).   
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Panel A    Panel B    Panel C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Order types used by manipulators and ordinary traders 
This figure shows the average number of various types of order, per trader, per trading period.  Panel A 
compares the orders of non-manipulators (Ordinary) with those of manipulators (Manipulator) in 
Treatment 2b (manipulation without a regulator).  Panel B compares the orders of non-manipulators 
with those of manipulators in Treatment 3 (possible manipulation with a regulator).  Panel C compares 
the orders of non-manipulators in Treatments 1 and 2a (control and possible manipulation).  MARKET 
multiple price and MARKET single price are orders that execute instantaneously (either market orders 
or marketable limit orders) at more than one price level (cause price impact), and only one price level, 
respectively.  LIMIT filled and LIMIT not filled are limit orders that are at least part filled, and not at all 
filled, respectively.  For Treatment 3 only the trading periods in which the manipulator chose to trade 
are included to allow comparison between manipulators and other traders.     
 
 
 The most striking difference in the use of different order types is the large 
number of very aggressive buy orders used by manipulators in the absence of a 
regulator (1.65 multiple-price market orders per period per manipulator compared to 
0.14 for ordinary traders).  This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level 
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using a paired t-test (t-statistic of 4.87).  In the presence of a regulator, manipulators 
tend to use considerably less aggressive orders.  It appears that manipulators in such 
circumstances use more of the second most aggressive order type (1.40 single-price 
market orders per period per manipulator compared to 0.88 for ordinary traders), 
although the difference is not statistically significant.   
 Figure 5.5 illustrates the timing of buy and sell trades initiated by 
manipulators.  In the absence of a regulator, manipulators tend to sell stock around the 
middle of a trading period to increase their buying power and then buy heavily in the 
last ten seconds of trading.  In the presence of a regulator, however, the buying 
activity of manipulators is less intense and peaks earlier.  Buying activity is highest in 
the second to last ten-second interval, as opposed to the last interval, and involves less 
than a quarter of the amount of trades that a manipulator uses when there is no 
regulator.   
 To test the differences in trading times between manipulators and ordinary 
traders I calculate a measure of how late in the trading period most trading takes place 
- the volume weighted average trade time (VWATT) measured in seconds from the 
start of the trading period.  Paired t-tests comparing the VWATT of manipulators’ buy 
and sell volume with that of ordinary traders confirm that manipulators in both 
Treatments 2 and 3 tend to buy later than ordinary traders (significant at the 5% 
level).  There is no significant difference in the timing of sell orders for manipulators 
compared to ordinary traders.  
 The results reported in this subsection suggest that in the experimental setting 
used in this chapter the introduction of a regulator, i.e., imposing a penalty on 
detected manipulators, is successful in reducing the intensity of manipulation.  This 
helps explain why price accuracy is not significantly harmed by a manipulator 
accompanied by a regulator.   
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Panel A: Buys 
 
Panel B: Sells 
 
          
 
Figure 5.5 Manipulator buying and selling activity within a trading period 
This figure plots the average number (by treatment) of buys (Panel A) and sells (Panel B) initiated by 
the manipulator in each ten-second interval within a trading period. The horizontal axis measures time 
(in seconds).  For Treatment 3 only the trading periods in which the manipulator chose to trade are 
included to allow comparison across the two treatments.     
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 However, there is a second factor at play here.  The penalty imposed on 
detected manipulation in Treatment 3 also reduces the frequency of manipulation.  
Twenty-two percent of the subjects given the opportunity to manipulate the market in 
Treatment 3 choose not to manipulate.  This fraction roughly corresponds to the 
perceived detection probability.  Twenty-four percent of manipulators in Treatment 2 
(no regulator) guess that at least eight out of the other 11 traders would guess that a 
manipulator was present (the equivalent of being detected in Treatment 3).  The 
perceived detection probability in Treatment 3 is likely to be somewhat less than 24% 
because manipulators choose to act in a more subtle manner than in Treatment 2.  Of 
the 78% that do attempt manipulation in Treatment 3, 40% are detected and receive a 
penalty and 60% avoid detection.  Therefore, the actual detection probability given 
the decision to manipulate (40%) is higher than the perceived probability of detection 
(less than 24%).   
 To conclude, in this chapter’s experimental market the imposition of a penalty 
on detected manipulators helps restore price accuracy, both by deterring manipulation 
and by reducing the intensity of the remaining manipulation.  The ability of regulation 
to reduce the harm caused by manipulation is likely to depend on the credibility of the 
regulator, the size of the penalty and the probability of being caught.  I have only 
simulated a specific instance of these parameters, which could be viewed as that of a 
successful regulator.  
 
5.3.4 Effects on ordinary traders’ behaviour 
 The previous results indicate that ordinary traders set wider spreads in the 
presence of manipulators in a reaction to increased price uncertainty.  This subsection 
examines how manipulators affect other traders’ order submission strategies and tests 
specific predictions about trader reactions to manipulation.  Figure 5.4 Panel C 
compares the order types submitted by ordinary traders under the control treatment 
and possible manipulation (Treatment 2a).  There are no obvious differences in the 
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aggressiveness of orders, and none of the paired t-tests by order type indicate any 
significant differences in order submission strategy between the two treatments.    
 Hanson and Oprea (2009) report that in their microstructure model the 
possibility of manipulation increases liquidity due to the desire of rational traders to 
profitably counteract manipulation attempts.  In the context of closing price 
manipulation, a rational trader might increase depth on the ask side of the limit order 
book to profit from a manipulator’s aggressive buying at prices above fundamental 
value.   
 To test whether ordinary traders attempt to profit from manipulation I use the 
mixed effects model in Equation 5.3 replacing the dependant variable with depth at 
the best ask price and an alternative measure, the average depth at the best three ask 
prices.  If ordinary traders increase depth on the ask side throughout the trading period 
to try and profit from manipulation we should observe a significant positive 
coefficient on possibleij.  If ordinary traders increase depth on the ask side at the end 
of the trading period we should observe a positive coefficient on lastk x possibleij.   
 Estimating the mixed effects model with depth at the best ask as the dependent 
variable I find that possible manipulation causes an increase in depth of 1.44 shares at 
the best ask price in the last ten-second interval of a trading period.  This increase is 
meaningful compared to the grand mean,  , of 2.71 shares and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  However, there is no evidence of an increase in depth at 
the ask throughout a trading period, nor does this effect hold for average depth at the 
best three ask quotes.  Therefore, there is some evidence of ordinary traders 
attempting to profitably counteract manipulation by offering more shares at the best 
ask.  These traders believe the manipulator, if present, is likely to trade in the last ten-
second interval.  However, the effect of this behaviour is not strong enough to prevent 
manipulators from distorting prices, nor is it strong enough to restore the bid-ask 
spread and depth to the levels in the control treatment. 
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5.3.5 Ability of market participants to recognise manipulation  
 This final part of the analysis assesses the accuracy with which market 
participants are able to identify manipulation by observing the limit order book, a 
real-time list of trades, and a chart of trade prices and volumes.  The ability for market 
participants to identify manipulation is important in facilitating trading strategies that 
exploit manipulators and help restore price accuracy.  It is also important for the 
efficient functioning of the allocative role of prices because if market participants are 
unable to recognise when prices have been distorted, biased signals will be used in 
resource allocation.   
 Table 5.6 reports two-way frequencies of the guesses submitted by ordinary 
traders to the question of whether or not a manipulator was present in the market, as 
well as the percentage of correct guesses.  I test the null hypothesis that the 
percentages of correct guesses are equal to 50%, i.e., guessing ability is only as good 
as chance.  Despite having found that manipulation has a substantial impact on prices, 
surprisingly, market participants have poor ability in identifying manipulation.  In 
Treatment 2, overall only 53.2% of guesses are correct, only marginally better than 
chance.  When a manipulator is present, market participants correctly identify this 
with an accuracy of 49.0% - no better than chance.  In Treatment 3, the accuracy of 
guesses is higher: 59.8% overall and 64.9% when manipulation takes place. 
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Table 5.6 
Ability of traders to identify manipulation 
Two-way frequency tables of state (whether a manipulator was present in the market or not) and 
traders’ guesses of whether a manipulator was present or not.  % Correct is the percentage of correct 
guesses.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively, for 
two-sided binomial proportion tests with the null hypothesis that % Correct equals 0.5, i.e., the 
accuracy of guesses is not different from chance. 
Panel A: Without regulator (Treatment 2) 
 Guess   
State No manipulator Manipulator Total % Correct 
No manipulator 214 161 375 57.1***
Manipulator 175 168 343 49.0 
Total 389 329 718  
% Correct 55.0** 51.1  53.2* 
Panel B: With regulator (Treatment 3) 
 Guess   
State No manipulator Manipulator Total % Correct 
No manipulator 30 42 72 41.7 
Manipulator 92 169 261 64.8***
Total 122 211 333  
% Correct 24.6*** 80.1***  59.8***
 
 
 The difference in guessing accuracy between Treatments 2 and 3 is partly 
explained by the difference in perceived prior probabilities of manipulation.  In 
Treatment 2, a manipulator, with no reason not to manipulate, is selected in a 
randomly chosen 50% of trading periods.  However, participants are not aware of the 
proportion of periods with a manipulator.  On the other hand, in every period of 
Treatment 3, a manipulator is given the choice of whether to manipulate or not.  
Because participants are aware of all payoffs that are relevant to deciding whether or 
not to manipulate, arguably, participants are better able to estimate the prior 
probability of manipulation and therefore guess more accurately whether or not a 
manipulator was present.  The generally poor accuracy with which market participants 
identify manipulation is concerning because, among other things, it limits the ability 
for market participants to profitably counteract manipulation and attenuate its 
detrimental effects.   
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5.3.6 Robustness tests 
 I test the robustness of the results to using alternative measures of price 
accuracy and liquidity, disregarding the first four trading periods in each session to 
allow participants learning time, and simplification of the mixed effects regression 
models to random intercept models by dropping the random slopes.  The main results 
are robust to these tests. 
 
5.4 Discussion and conclusions 
 Understanding how trading strategies commonly labelled as ‘manipulation’ 
affect price accuracy and market liquidity is critical in determining whether such 
strategies are harmful to markets and should be illegal (Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008).  
However, the limited evidence that exists regarding the effects of manipulation on 
markets is mixed and inconclusive.  This is largely because of the significant variation 
in manipulation strategies, the general lack of data on manipulation and the inability 
to observe key variables such as true asset values, and counterfactuals such as 
manipulation free markets.  By studying manipulation in an experimental market this 
chapter overcomes these limitations and provides important insights into the effects of 
a particular and common form of manipulation – manipulation of the closing price.   
 The first key result arises from contrasting the particular incentives given to 
manipulators in this chapter’s experimental market with those in the closely related 
study by Hanson et al. (2006).  The results indicate that the manipulators’ incentives 
are critical in determining the harm caused by a particular type of manipulation.  
Consequently, different types of manipulation should be considered separately in 
formulating policy decisions or in conducting academic research.    
 The second key finding is that closing price manipulation harms both price 
accuracy and liquidity.  In fact, even the mere possibility of manipulation decreases 
liquidity and increases trading costs by increasing price uncertainty.  Therefore, in 
line with the argument put forward by Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), closing price 
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manipulation undermines economic efficiency, creates social harm and should be 
prohibited.  These findings about closing price manipulation are particularly 
concerning given the many examples of market participants with incentives to 
manipulate closing prices and the numerous important uses of closing prices.   
 The third important result is that price accuracy can be restored by imposing a 
credible mechanism that monitors the market and issues penalties to detected 
manipulators.  However, the restoration of liquidity through the imposition of 
penalties for manipulation is more difficult.  The decrease in price accuracy caused by 
manipulation is largely an ex-post effect resulting directly from the manipulators’ 
actions, whereas the decrease in liquidity is an ex-ante effect caused by ordinary 
traders’ reactions to the perceived probability of manipulation.  While regulation may 
have an immediate impact on the behaviour of manipulators and therefore help restore 
price accuracy, changing the behaviour of ordinary traders to restore liquidity requires 
that market participants believe regulation will eliminate manipulation.  This was not 
the case in the experimental markets; regulation restored price accuracy but not 
liquidity.  This finding is consistent with Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who report 
that the perception of credibility gained by a regulator through the enforcement of 
laws governing financial conduct, rather than simply their presence, affects markets in 
a positive way. 
 The last significant contribution of this chapter is in characterising a typical 
closing price manipulation strategy and the reactions of ordinary traders.  
Manipulators of a stock with a reasonable level of liquidity, in the absence of a 
credible regulator, submit many highly aggressive buy orders in the last seconds of 
trading.  In the presence of a regulator, manipulators trade less aggressively and 
earlier in a trading period, trading off some of the benefits they stand to gain from 
manipulation against the probability of being caught.   
 The results suggest that some ordinary traders attempt to profit from 
manipulators by offering more shares for sale shortly before the close when they 
perceive manipulation to be likely.  Such a strategy, motivated by self-interest, offers 
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hope to markets for attenuating the detrimental effects of manipulation and 
minimising the need for regulatory intervention.   
 However, in order for ordinary traders to successfully counter manipulation, 
they must be capable of identifying manipulation.  In this chapter’s experimental 
market, despite the fact that manipulators have a substantial impact on prices, market 
participants have great difficulty in identifying manipulation.  This result suggests the 
need for regulatory intervention, as opposed to leaving markets to their own devices, 
particularly in light of the finding that closing price manipulation imposes a social 
cost.  Further, this also suggests that regulators need more advanced monitoring 
mechanisms than human judgment in order to detect a meaningful fraction of 
manipulation.  The next chapter constructs an index of manipulation and a closely 
related detection tool that can be used by regulators to improve the accuracy of their 
market surveillance systems. 
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Chapter 6 
Detecting and measuring closing price 
manipulation 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapters find that only a small fraction of closing price 
manipulation is detected and prosecuted by regulators and closing price manipulation 
harms both price accuracy and liquidity.  Therefore, reducing the prevalence of 
closing price manipulation is likely to enhance market integrity and economic 
efficiency.  One way in which this can be achieved is by improving the accuracy of 
detection methods.   
 Another issue highlighted by this thesis is that although closing price 
manipulation is common, our understanding of it is limited because of the scarcity of 
data and opaqueness of regulatory authorities.  In a large number of markets, cases of 
prosecuted closing price manipulation either do not exist or are not publicly available, 
thus making it impossible to directly study closing price manipulation.  These two 
issues suggest the need for improved methods to detect and measure closing price 
manipulation. 
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  The first is to develop an index of 
closing price manipulation that can be used to study manipulation in markets and time 
periods in which prosecution data are not readily available.  The second purpose is to 
extend the index to produce a closing price manipulation detection tool that can be 
used by regulators to improve the accuracy of automated market surveillance systems.   
 The reason for constructing separate tools for research and for market 
surveillance comes down to data requirements.  The index, intended mainly as a tool 
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for research, is constructed so that it can be calculated using only readily available 
trade and quote data.  This maximises the number of markets and time periods in 
which the index can be calculated.  On the other hand, regulators are likely to have 
access to more detailed information within the markets they regulate.  Some of this 
additional information can be used to more accurately detect manipulation.  
Therefore, using the index as base, this chapter constructs a more detailed 
manipulation detection tool by incorporating the findings of Chapter 3 about factors 
that drive manipulation. 
 Given that closing price manipulation is generally not observable, the 
manipulation index is useful in empirical research similar to the way in which the 
Easley et al. (1996) probability of informed trading (PIN) is commonly used to proxy 
for informed trading, or the Huang and Stoll (1997) adverse selection component of 
the spread is used to measure information asymmetry.  To illustrate this point, a 
simple application of the index would be to analyse the effect of a regulatory change 
on the level of manipulation by examining index values around the change.  The index 
can also be used to examine how the nature of manipulation varies across market 
structures, firm characteristics and through time.  The ability to use this index in such 
a manner, which is confirmed by analysing out-of-market and out-of-time 
classification characteristics, is largely due to the index’s explicit controls for market 
trends, stock-specific characteristics and variance of the underlying variables.   
 The manipulation detection tool incorporates into the index the underlying 
probability of manipulation based on factors that influence the decision to manipulate, 
such as information asymmetry, market capitalisation, regulatory budget and so on.  It 
can be used by regulators in their surveillance systems to aid in the identification of 
possible manipulation for further investigation, or in enforcement as statistical 
evidence of manipulation.   
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6.2 Data 
 This chapter uses the manually collected sample of closing price manipulation 
cases, which is described in Chapter 3.  I obtain intra-day trade and quote data, expiry 
dates for listed options, and index composition data from a Reuters database 
maintained by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  
From this database I also obtain trade and quote data on all of the stocks in each of the 
four markets.  I filter these data to remove erroneous entries and stock-days that do 
not contain at least one trade and one quote.  The remaining data are from Thomson’s 
Datastream and the websites of the regulators. 
 
6.3 Closing price manipulation index 
 The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that returns, spreads, trading frequencies 
and return reversals can be used to distinguish manipulated closing prices from those 
occurring in normal trading.  Therefore, I base the index on standardised measures of 
the abnormality of these variables and use logistic regression to obtain weights.  I 
analyse the classification characteristics of the index out of market and out of time 
and perform robustness tests. 
 
6.3.1 Components  
 To make use of the index across different stocks, markets and time, changes in 
market conditions and cross-sectional differences in the central tendency and 
dispersion of variables such as trade frequency, return and spread must not cause 
systematic differences in the value of the index.  For example, the fact that trading 
frequency tends to increase through time must not in itself cause higher index values 
in later time periods.  Similarly, the fact that large price changes occur more 
frequently in illiquid stocks due to their wider spreads, lower depth and higher risk, 
must not cause the index to suggest on this basis that illiquid stocks are more 
frequently manipulated.  As a final example, particular days are associated with more 
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intensive trading activity by speculators, arbitrageurs, and hedgers, for example, 
options expiry days, month-end days and macroeconomic announcement days.  This 
additional trading activity, which is unrelated to manipulation, must not in itself 
influence the index’s estimate of the manipulation rate on these days.     
 The difference-in-differences estimator used in Chapter 4 eliminates 
differences in central tendency, thus allowing the identification of abnormal variable 
values while controlling for stock- and time-specific effects.  However, in 
constructing the index it is necessary to account for differences in the dispersion of 
the variable distributions.  If dispersion is neglected, volatile stocks (and therefore 
volatile markets and time periods) for example, would more frequently cause large 
absolute values of the difference-in-differences estimators and therefore result in more 
manipulation alerts than in stable stocks, regardless of the underlying manipulation 
rates.  Therefore, I modify the difference-in-differences estimator by standardising the 
differences between a stock-day and that stock’s prior trading.  The standardisation 
makes use of sign statistics (from non-parametric sign tests).  The sign statistics 
combine each set of differences into a single standardised measure of the day-end 
variable’s abnormality (in the positive direction) relative to that stock’s prior 
trading.62   
 Taken together, the differencing in time, differencing in cross-section and 
standardisation of the differences using a nonparametric statistic insulates the index 
from changing market conditions and cross-sectional differences in the levels and 
dispersion of variables.  A disadvantage of this approach is that although manipulation 
may cluster in time and by exchange, the index cannot detect the full extent of this 
clustering. 
 The sign statistics for the day-end variables used in Chapter 4 (i=return, 
reversal, frequency, spread) are defined as, 
                                                 
62 In unreported results I substitute the sign statistics for non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank statistics 
and robust parametric winsorised means.  I find that the index using the sign statistics is superior in 
classification accuracy.     
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 2
  nnSi     (6.1) 
where  and  are the number of positive and negative differences respectively.  
The period of prior trading is the same as in Chapter 4 (42 trading days ending one 
month before the examined day).  This allows the index to detect closing prices 
manipulated over several consecutive days.  For each variable there are 42 differences 
and the sign statistics are standardised to the range -21 to +21.  A score of -21 
indicates the value of the underlying variable is the lowest reading in the 42 day 
benchmark and +21 indicates a value higher than each reading in the benchmark.  
Based on the findings of Chapter 4, the sign statistics of differences corresponding to 
day-end returns, spreads, trading frequencies and return reversals will be significantly 
positive for manipulated stock-days whereas they will be on average zero for non-
manipulated days.   
n n
 Differencing the sign statistic for a particular stock from the cross-sectional 
median sign statistic that day removes market trends and produces the following 
modified difference-in-differences estimator, the difference-in-signs, 
)( sisi
sign
i SmedS      (6.2) 
where is the sign statistic for variable i on a particular stock-day and   is 
the median sign statistic for all other stocks, s, on the same exchange and day.   
iS )( sis Smed
 The way return and reversal are defined, the index measures the probability of 
upward price manipulation – the only form of manipulation in the sample of 
prosecutions.  It is straightforward to modify the index to also account for downward 
price manipulation.  However, without cases of downward manipulation for 
calibration, this modification would require the assumptions that downward 
manipulation is similar to upward manipulation in trade characteristics (except for the 
direction of price movements) and is equally common.     
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6.3.2 Functional form and coefficients 
 The functional form of the index is obtained from the following logit model 
used to estimate weights for the index components, 
 



sign
spread
sign
frequency
sign
reversal
sign
returnP
P
43211
ln    (6.3) 
where 


 P
P
1
ln  is the log-odds of the probability of manipulation, P, and the  are 
the difference-in-signs estimators defined in Equation 6.2.  An attractive feature of the 
logit model is that it accommodates non-linearity between the probability of 
manipulation and the explanatory variables.  For example, an increase in abnormal 
return from 8% to 9% can have less of an effect on the probability of manipulation 
than an increase from 1% to 2%.   
sign
i
 I estimate the coefficients of this model on the sample of manipulated and 
non-manipulated stock-days.  The non-manipulated stock-days (n = 241,828) are 
obtained by taking, for each manipulated stock-day (n = 184), all other stocks on the 
corresponding exchange on that day.  Consequently, the non-manipulated stock-days 
are an accurate match of the manipulated stock-days by market and time.   
 Table 6.1 reports the results of the regression.  All coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and the signs are consistent with expectations.  
That is, abnormally positive day-end returns, trade frequencies, spreads and return 
reversals increase the probability that a closing price has been manipulated.  The 
largest marginal contribution to maximising the log-likelihood (and predicting 
manipulation) is from the difference-in-signs statistic corresponding to frequency, 
followed by reversal, return and then spread.  This means that returns and reversals, 
the main criteria for alerting regulators to manipulation, are not the sole factors (or 
even the best two factors) in predicting manipulation from trading characteristics.  In 
subsection 6.3.4 I examine the differences between the US and Canada in how the 
factors contribute to predicting manipulation.  
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Table 6.1 
Index coefficients from logistic regression 
This table reports coefficient estimates from binary logistic regression of manipulated (n=184) and non-
manipulated stock-days (n=241,828) using the regression model: 
 



sign
spread
sign
frequency
sign
reversal
sign
returnP
P
43211
ln  
where 


 P
P
1
ln  is the log-odds of the probability of manipulation and  are the difference-in-signs 
estimators defined as:    
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i
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sign
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where  is the median sign statistic for all other stocks, s, on the corresponding exchange.  The 
sign statistics are standardised differences between the stock-day being examined and each of the 
stock-days in a 42 trading day period lagged one month, and are scaled by a factor of 100. 
)( sis Smed
Variable Estimate p-value 
Constant -7.49 < 0.0001 
sign
return  4.22 < 0.0001 
sign
reversal  3.58 < 0.0001 
sign
frequency  8.46 < 0.0001 
 1.83 0.002 signspread
 
 
 The manipulation index is obtained from the regression model by setting the 
index equal to the probability of manipulation.  Rearranging the regression equation 
and inserting the coefficient estimates produces the following calibrated index, 
)8.15.86.32.45.7(1
1
sign
spread
sign
frequency
sign
reversal
sign
returne
Imanip 
  (6.4) 
 If the index were calibrated on a random sample of manipulation cases it 
would be an unbiased measure of the probability of manipulation (including detected 
and undetected manipulation).  However, I calibrate the index on a sample of 
prosecuted manipulation cases and consequently the index, , which varies 
between zero and one, represents the probability of a prosecuted closing price 
manipulation.
manipI
63  The index can be expected to flag prosecuted manipulation as well as 
                                                 
63 If the population rate of manipulation differs from the proportion of manipulation to non-
manipulation cases used in the regression the constant must be adjusted to obtain unbiased probabilities 
(Joanes, 1993).  However, this is not required when the index is used as a classifier using a 
classification threshold chosen to obtain the desired type I to type II error trade-off.  This also does not 
affect the analysis of classification characteristics in the following subsection because I use a method 
that is independent of prior probabilities.  
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a proportion of undetected manipulation which is most similar in characteristics to the 
prosecuted sample.   
 
6.3.3 Issues in using the index 
 A threshold value of  can be chosen to classify stock-days as 
manipulated depending on the desired trade-off between type I and type II errors 
(false positives and false negatives).  Stock-specific late-day news is likely to create 
abnormal day-end trading activity that can resemble manipulation and therefore lead 
to false positive classifications.  In an academic application of the index, this 
component of the error can be minimised by combining the index with a news 
database and disregarding manipulation classifications that coincide with late-day 
news. 
manipI
 End-of-day program trading by participants such as leveraged ETFs is likely to 
increase volume and volatility at the end of the day (Cheng and Madhavan, 2009).  
The increase in volatility is equivalent to adding noise to the data in which the index 
looks for evidence of manipulation.  If the behaviour of manipulators does not change 
in response to the additional volatility, then effectively the signal-to-noise ratio is 
reduced by the end-of-day program trading, making manipulation more difficult to 
detect.   
 However, the index is relatively well equipped to deal with end-of-day 
phenomena without causing excessive false alerts.  This is achieved by the 
differencing in the 42 day own-stock benchmark and the differencing in cross-section.  
To illustrate this, consider the following examples.  If the presence of leveraged ETFs 
on average increases the volume of trading at the close by say 50%, then not only will 
any particular stock-day on average have 50% greater volume at the close but so too 
will each stock-day in the 42 day prior trading benchmark.  Therefore, the difference 
of a stock-day’s day-end volume and the median day-end volume in the 42 day prior 
trading benchmark will eliminate the overall effect of leveraged ETFs on day-end 
volume.   
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 A similar argument holds for volatility.  If the day-end price of any specific 
stock-day is more volatile, then large positive or large negative day-end returns will 
occur more often, not only in a specific stock-day, but also in the 42 day prior trading 
benchmark.  In high volatility, for a particular day-end return to give an abnormal 
reading, it must be abnormal relative to 42 highly volatile day-end returns.  
Consequently, high volatility does not cause more false alerts than low volatility 
simply as a result of volatility. 
 The cross-sectional differences help insulate the index from phenomena that 
have market-wide effects, such as end-of-day trading by leveraged ETFs, 
macroeconomic news, quarter-end days and so on.  The following example illustrates 
this.  Leveraged ETFs rebalance in the same direction as the market movement that 
day (Cheng and Madhavan, 2009).  Consider a day in which due to some exogenous 
reason, the market increases substantially during the day, and the increase is the 
largest single day increase in the past three months.  Leveraged ETFs would be 
expected to buy heavily at the end of the day across multiple stocks, causing abnormal 
day-end volume and abnormal positive day-end returns in many stocks.  The day-end 
returns and volumes are likely to be abnormal relative to the prior trading 42 day 
benchmarks of many stocks, however, when differenced in cross-section, the market 
wide abnormal characteristics are eliminated and only stocks with abnormal trading 
relative to the overall market would be flagged as abnormal. 
 As well as its use as a dichotomous classifier of manipulation, the index also 
measures the intensity of manipulation’s adverse effects on the market.  The index is 
increasing in the abnormality of day-end returns, trade frequencies, return reversals 
and spreads.  Abnormal day-end return and return reversals measure the extent to 
which a price has been driven away from its natural level and hence the magnitude of 
errors when decisions are based on closing prices.  Increased trade frequency is an 
indication of the proportion of trades made by the manipulator and the uncertainty 
induced by the manipulator’s actions.  Finally, increased spread is an adverse effect 
because it increases trading costs.   
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6.3.4 Validation and robustness testing 
 I analyse the classification characteristics of the index on markets and in time 
periods not used in its estimation.  The purpose of this is twofold.  First, this assesses 
the practical applicability of the index.  Application of the index to cross-market 
studies or to predicting manipulation on a daily basis forward in time from the 
calibration data requires good out-of-market and out-of-time accuracy, respectively.  
Second, this analysis tests whether model overfitting is at play. 
 I divide the sample of manipulated and non-manipulated stock-days into their 
four markets and into two time periods – earliest and latest – each period containing 
half of the manipulation instances.  For each market I calculate manipulation 
probabilities predicted by the index, with the index parameters estimated using the 
other three markets.  Similarly, for the two time periods I calculate manipulation 
probabilities for the later time period using the index estimated on the earlier time 
period and vice versa.  To perform leave-one-out cross-validation I in turn leave out 
one instance of manipulation (and the corresponding non-manipulation stock-days), 
fit the index to the rest of the data and calculate the manipulation probabilities for the 
left out data.  Figure 6.1 plots the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves 
generated by all three cross-validation techniques.     
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Figure 6.1 Out of sample classification characteristics of the manipulation index 
This figure plots the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves of the manipulation index for 
leave-one-out cross-validation, out-of-time cross-validation and out-of-sample cross-validation.  
Leave-one-out cross-validation is performed by in turn leaving out one instance of manipulation and 
the corresponding non-manipulation stock-days, fitting the index to the rest of the data and calculating 
the manipulation probabilities for the left out data.  Out-of-time cross-validation is performed by 
dividing the manipulation instances and the corresponding non-manipulated stock-days into two time 
periods (earliest half and latest half), fitting the index on one of the time periods, calculating the 
manipulation probabilities for the other time period, and repeating this process for the other time 
period.  Similarly, in out-of-market cross-validation the index is fitted on three markets, the 
manipulation probabilities are calculated for the fourth market, and this process is repeated for each of 
the markets.  Sensitivity is the true positive rate and 1-specificity is the false positive rate. 
 
 
 The ROC curve is a performance measure independent of prior probabilities 
and classification thresholds.64  It describes the trade-off between the proportion of 
true positives (sensitivity) and the proportion of false positives (one minus the 
specificity).  In the context of the manipulation index, the ROC curve describes the 
proportion of stock-days from the non-manipulation sample that will be classified as 
manipulated in order to correctly classify a certain proportion of the prosecuted 
manipulation instances.  ROC curve analysis is more general than count based 
                                                 
64 For a more detailed description of ROC curves applied in a financial modelling context see Tang and 
Chi (2005) and Stein (2005). 
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measures because it examines classification accuracy under all possible classification 
thresholds as opposed to a specific threshold.  The area under the ROC curve 
(AUROC) represents the probability of correct prediction and is a robust measure by 
which to compare the performance of a classifier across different samples.65   
 Due to the presence of undetected and not prosecuted manipulation, the data 
do not allow the absolute accuracy of the index to be estimated, only the relative 
accuracy across different samples.  This is because when the index detects 
manipulation that has not been prosecuted it is penalised because the data record those 
observations as not manipulated.  Unless undetected manipulation can be observed 
independently of the index classifications, one minus specificity (the usual measure of 
false positives) is in fact a measure of false positives and correctly flagged 
manipulation that has not been prosecuted.  Therefore, this analysis estimates the 
lower bound of the index’s classification accuracy.  The underestimation of the true 
accuracy is greater the larger the fraction of not prosecuted manipulation. 
 The ROC curves under all three cross-validation regimes are significantly 
above the ascending diagonal line that represents a classifier only as good as chance.  
Consistent with this, the AUROC reported in Table 6.2 are well above 0.5 indicating 
that even the lower bound accuracy in predicting manipulation out of market and out 
of time is considerably better than chance.  The 95% confidence intervals for the 
AUROC of the three cross-validation techniques overlap and the point estimates differ 
by less than 4%.  This is strong evidence that the index is robust to different markets 
and time periods and can, with a relatively high level of accuracy, predict 
manipulation in markets and time periods not used in its estimation.   
 The classification accuracy of the index is also very similar across the two 
countries.  The AUROC is 0.819 in the US and 0.826 in Canada, and the difference is 
not statistically significant.  This suggests that it is not significantly easier to detect 
manipulation in one country or the other using the index.   
                                                 
65 The AUROC is equivalent to the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon two independent sample non-parametric 
test statistic (Hanley and McNeil, 1982).   
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Table 6.2 
Comparison of the manipulation index classification performance out of time and out of market 
AUROC is the area under the ROC curves in Figure 6.1.  Leave-one-out cross-validation is performed 
by in turn leaving out one instance of manipulation and the corresponding non-manipulation stock-
days, fitting the index to the rest of the data, and calculating the manipulation probabilities for the left 
out data.  Out-of-time cross-validation is performed by dividing the manipulation instances and the 
corresponding non-manipulated stock-days into two time periods (earliest half and latest half), fitting 
the index on one of the time periods, calculating the manipulation probabilities for the other time 
period, and repeating this process swapping the time periods.  Similarly, in out-of-market cross-
validation the index is fitted on three markets, the manipulation probabilities are calculated for the 
fourth market, and this process is repeated for each of the markets.  The p-values are for a non-
parametric test of the null hypothesis that the area is equal to 0.5. 
95% Confidence interval for the area 
Cross-validation 
technique AUROC p-value Lower bound Upper bound 
Leave-one-out 0.825 < 0.0001 0.797 0.853 
Out-of-time 0.806 < 0.0001 0.777 0.835 
Out-of-market 0.800 < 0.0001 0.770 0.830 
 
 
 I compare the US and Canadian stock exchanges in the contribution made by 
each of the four factors (return, reversal, frequency and spread) to predicting 
manipulation.  I do this by constructing the index with and without each of the four 
factors and measuring the change in model log-likelihood and classification accuracy.  
The order of contribution for the four factors is the same using log-likelihood and 
classification accuracy and therefore Table 6.3 reports only the results using 
classification accuracy.   
 In the US stock exchanges the factors ordered from greatest to least in their 
contribution to classification accuracy are frequency, return, reversal and spread.  In 
the Canadian stock exchanges the order is frequency, reversal, return and spread.  
This suggests that despite the differences in the way closing prices are set in the US 
and Canadian exchanges, the contributions of the factors that predict manipulation are 
relatively consistent.   
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Table 6.3 
Marginal contribution of predictor variables to index classification accuracy 
This table reports the marginal contribution of the predictor variables (difference-in-signs 
corresponding to return, reversal, frequency and spread) to the classification accuracy of the index.  
Classification accuracy is measured by the area under the ROC curve in leave-one-out cross-validation 
(AUROC).  The marginal contribution of a predictor variable to the AUROC is calculated as the 
difference in the AUROC for the index constructed without the predictor variable and the index with 
the predictor variable.  The numbers in parentheses indicate the rankings of the variables in their 
marginal contributions. 
Country n signreturn  signreversal  signfrequency  signspread  
All 241,828 0.020 (2) 0.014 (3) 0.082 (1) 0.003 (4) 
US 117,928 0.024 (2) 0.006 (3) 0.138 (1) 0.003 (4) 
Canada 123,900 0.017 (3) 0.018 (2) 0.059 (1) 0.002 (4) 
 
 
 I compare day-end trading characteristics between stock-days flagged by the 
index as likely manipulation (top 2% quantile of index probabilities) and the sample 
of prosecuted manipulations.  The threshold for forming the probable manipulation 
sample is somewhat arbitrary, but is chosen to be similar to the underlying rate of 
manipulation estimated in Chapter 3.   
 The plots in Figure 6.2 illustrate that the shape and magnitude of the day-end 
price run-ups are quite similar for the stock-days with high index scores (Panel B) and 
the prosecution cases (Panel A) suggesting the index is effective in identifying stock-
days which look like prosecuted manipulation.  Both proxies for manipulation have a 
median price run-up of just over 2% by the close and a significant price reversal the 
following morning.  These plots also shed insight on the timing of manipulation.  In 
the median instance most of the price distortion occurs with the last trade.  Performing 
the same analysis in real-time indicates that almost all of the price run-up occurs in 
the five minutes before the close. 
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Panel A: Prosecuted manipulation v no prosecuted manipulation 
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Panel B: High index probability of manipulation v low index probability 
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Figure 6.2 Day-end trade-by-trade returns 
This figure plots the median returns on trades at the end of the day for manipulated and not 
manipulated stocks using two alternative proxies for manipulation.  In Panel A the manipulation proxy 
is the sample of prosecuted manipulation instances, and in Panel B the proxy is the top 2% quantile of 
stock-days by manipulation index score.  Returns, R, are computed as the logarithm of the ratio of trade 
prices.  Trade number 0 corresponds to the last trade of the day, -1 corresponds to the second to last 
and so on.  Trade number 1 corresponds to the last traded price at 11am the following morning.  
Cumulative returns, cumR, are computed by summing the returns on trades -5 to the current trade.        
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 The sample composed of the highest 2% of index scores contains a mix of 
prosecuted manipulation, undetected or not prosecuted manipulation, and stock-days 
not involving manipulation (false positives).  This analysis does not suggest that 2% 
of stock-days are manipulated.  The 2% threshold can be interpreted as an upper 
bound on the rate of manipulation for similar reasons to why the ROC analysis 
estimates a lower bound on the classification accuracy. 
 As an additional robustness test, I examine the stability of the index 
coefficients through time.  I estimate the index multiple times on half the sample 
rolled forward chronologically in each re-estimation.  The coefficients remain 
relatively stable through time. 66  This supports the usefulness of the index in making 
forward predictions when estimated using past data.   
 
6.4 An instrument for detecting closing price manipulation 
 Most market surveillance systems are automated (Harris, 2002; Clayton et al., 
2006) and rely on real-time computer systems that alert surveillance staff of unusual 
trading activity (Cumming and Johan, 2008).  Discussions with regulators suggest that 
‘alerts’ are often based on prices or volumes and are triggered when changes in these 
variables exceed predetermined thresholds.  The findings of Chapter 5 suggest that 
even in a relatively simple laboratory experiment in which the parameters and 
information structure are common knowledge, participants have great difficulty in 
identifying manipulation based on price and volume movements.  Considering also 
                                                 
66 In each iteration, the coefficients maintain the same order in their magnitudes (frequency, return, 
reversal, spread) and remain within a +/- 50% band from their full sample values.  Given that the 
sample spans several years and eight manipulation prosecution cases, much of the variation in the 
absolute values of the coefficients can be explained by changes in the intensity of manipulation through 
time or across cases as cases enter or exit the rolling sample used in this test.  Therefore, the order of 
the coefficients is the better indicator of whether the nature of manipulation changes through time and 
whether the approach to detecting manipulation needs to be regularly updated.   
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that only a small fraction of manipulation is detected and prosecuted, this suggests 
more accurate market surveillance systems would enhance market integrity.   
 So far, this thesis has produced two different measures of the probability of 
closing price manipulation.  The first is based on the detection controlled estimation 
(DCE) model (Chapter 3, Equations 3.17 and 3.18).  The second is the manipulation 
index constructed in the previous section using only trade and quote data.  This 
section compares the strengths and weaknesses of both measures and describes how 
the two can be combined to produce a detection tool suitable for regulatory 
applications.   
 
6.4.1 Comparison of manipulation metrics 
 The main strength of the DCE model (in Chapter 3) is its ability to estimate 
the probability of manipulation based on stock-, time- and market-specific 
characteristics such as liquidity, information asymmetry, index constituency, month-
end days, level of regulatory budget and so on.  These factors clearly affect the 
probability of manipulation and therefore should be considered when trying to detect 
manipulation.  The DCE model estimates the influence of each factor on the 
probability of manipulation.  Combining these estimates with observed values of the 
factors gives an estimate of the probability of manipulation. 
 The main weakness of this model as a detection tool is that it only considers 
factors affecting the decision to manipulate not the effects or ‘footprint’ left behind by 
manipulation.  In that sense it does not utilise all of the information that is available.  
Most of the factors that affect the decision to manipulate are measured at a relatively 
aggregated level and consequently the predictions are most useful at similar levels of 
aggregation.  For example, useful predictions from this model are that manipulation is 
more likely on quarter-end days and in stocks of low to mid levels of liquidity.   
 The second metric, the closing price manipulation index, has higher resolution, 
i.e., it is constructed specifically to estimate probabilities at the stock-day level.  
Unlike the DCE model, which is based on relatively aggregated stock-, time- and 
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market-specific characteristics, the index is based on day-end trading characteristics 
(returns, price reversals, trade frequency and spreads).  Not only is the resolution of 
these variables higher but also they measure a different aspect of manipulation – the 
effects or ‘footprint’ left behind by manipulation rather than factors affecting the 
decision to manipulate.   
 A weakness of the index as a predictor of manipulation is that it ignores the 
factors that affect the decision to manipulate, such as index constituency, regulatory 
budget and so on.  This is done so that the index can be used in the large number of 
markets in which detailed information is not available.  The index starts with the prior 
that manipulation is equally likely in all stock-days and then identifies stock-days that 
have abnormal day-end trading characteristics similar to prosecuted instances of 
manipulation.  Abnormality is measured relative to a stock’s past trading and the 
prevailing market-wide conditions to minimise the number of false positives due to 
volatility or macroeconomic news announcements, for example. 
 Overall the DCE model is best suited for identifying long-term changes in 
levels of manipulation, periods of increased likelihood of manipulation and stocks 
with characteristics that make them susceptible to manipulation.  The index is best 
suited to identifying stock-days with abnormal day-end trading characteristics similar 
to actual manipulation cases.   
 
6.4.2 Combined detection tool 
 In a regulatory application, in which the availability of data and ability to 
process it is not a significant constraint, the two metrics can be combined.  The 
combined detection tool first estimates the likelihood of manipulation from the factors 
that affect the decision to manipulate and then, taking into consideration this 
likelihood, estimates the probability of manipulation by comparing the day-end 
trading characteristics to the typical ‘footprint’ left behind by manipulation.  The 
combined detection tool overcomes the weaknesses of each of the individual metrics 
by utilising what is known about both the drivers and the ‘footprint’ of manipulation. 
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 Following Joanes (1993) the combined detection tool is defined as, 
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where  is the value of the manipulation index defined in Equation 6.4,  ( ) 
is the number of closing prices with (without) detected and prosecuted manipulation 
used in estimating the index, and 
manipI Mn 0n
M  is the DCE conditional probability of 
manipulation given by Equation 3.17 (or Equation 3.18 if using the two-equation 
model). 
 An estimate of the probability of manipulation is more useful than a binary 
alert because higher manipulation probabilities have a lower rate of misclassification.  
Therefore, a market regulator would first investigate instances with the highest 
probability of manipulation and continue to investigate lower probability instances as 
far as their resources allow.  Stock-specific late-day news is likely to create abnormal 
day-end trading activity that can resemble manipulation and therefore lead to false 
positive classifications.  In a regulatory application this is relatively easily managed 
by checking for late-day news when examining manipulation alerts. 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 The previous chapters find that a large proportion of closing price 
manipulation remains undetected or not prosecuted and closing price manipulation 
harms economic efficiency.  In a large number of markets, prosecuted closing price 
manipulation cases either do not exist or are not publicly available, thus making it 
impossible to directly study closing price manipulation.  This chapter addresses both 
of these issues by constructing an index of closing price manipulation that can be used 
to study manipulation where prosecution data are not readily available, and then 
extending the index to provide a detection tool that can be used by regulators to 
improve the accuracy of market surveillance systems. 
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 The index can be used to identify probable instances of manipulation across 
markets and through time.  This capability is largely due to the controls incorporated 
into the index for market trends, stock-specific characteristics, and variance of the 
underlying variables.  The index creates opportunities for research on issues such as 
how the nature of manipulation varies across market structures, regulatory 
environments, firm characteristics, and through time.  Such insights would allow more 
efficient use of regulatory and surveillance resources. 
 The trading characteristics, in order of their contribution to correctly 
classifying manipulation (from greatest to least), are frequency, reversal, return and 
spread.  Despite the differences in the way closing prices are set in the US and 
Canadian exchanges the order of these factors is similar across the two countries.  The 
index classification accuracy is also similar across the countries suggesting it is not 
significantly easier to detect manipulation in one country or the other using the index.  
The shape and magnitude of day-end price run-ups for closing prices with high index 
values and the prosecution cases suggest the index is effective in identifying stock-
days which look like prosecuted manipulation.  The results also suggest that in the 
median instance of closing price manipulation, most of the price distortion occurs 
with the last trade, within five minutes of the close. 
 The combined manipulation detection tool constructed in this chapter utilises 
what is known about both the drivers of manipulation, and the ‘footprint’ in trading 
characteristics left behind by manipulators.  In a regulatory application a market 
regulator could rank suspected manipulation cases based on the probability of 
manipulation and investigate cases from the highest probability downwards as far as 
resources allow.  This approach minimises false positives.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
 
 This chapter summarises the conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis 
about: (i) why closing prices are manipulated; (ii) how closing prices are manipulated; 
(iii) how often closing prices are manipulated; (iv) what makes closing price 
manipulation and detection more likely; (v) how closing price manipulation affects 
markets; and (vi) the implications of closing price manipulation for economic 
efficiency and policy.  This chapter ends with suggestions for future research. 
 
7.1 Why are closing prices manipulated? 
 The existing literature and anecdotal evidence suggest a number of reasons 
why closing prices are manipulated: (i) to overstate a fund’s performance at the end of 
a reporting period; (ii) to profit from a derivatives position, particularly on expiry of 
the derivatives contract; (iii) to influence the price of a seasoned equity issue; (iv) to 
affect a takeover price; (v) to influence the perceived execution ability of a broker that 
is benchmarked against closing prices; (vi) to maintain a stock’s listing on an 
exchange with minimum price requirements; (vii) to avoid margin calls; and (viii) to 
influence an index rebalancing.   
 The prosecuted closing price manipulation cases used in this thesis provide 
evidence that (i), (iii), (iv) and (vii) have motivated closing price manipulation on US 
and Canadian stock exchanges.  The sample of prosecution cases also contains 
manipulation with more general motivations such as the intent to create a misleading 
appearance of strength and stability in the price of a stock.  The empirical analysis in 
this thesis suggests manipulation by fund managers on month-end and quarter-end 
days is among the most common reasons for closing price manipulation. 
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 Manipulation can either increase or decrease closing prices.  The sample of 
closing price manipulation cases suggests manipulation that increases prices is more 
common.   
 
7.2 How are closing prices manipulated? 
 Typically, closing price manipulation is conducted by aggressively buying or 
selling stock at the end of a trading day.  A manipulation strategy can be characterised 
by the timing and aggressiveness of the manipulator’s trades. 
 The timing of a manipulator’s trades depends on the liquidity of the 
manipulated stock and the strength of regulatory enforcement.  Highly liquid stocks 
tend to be manipulated in the final minutes or seconds before the close because it is 
costly to sustain the liquidity imbalance that causes the inflated price.  Thinly traded 
stocks, on the other hand, can be manipulated earlier in the day and still have the price 
distortion carry through to the close.  In the median instance of prosecuted closing 
price manipulation, most of the price inflation occurs with the last trade of the day, 
within five minutes of the close.  In a simulated stock market with 200-second periods 
of continuous trading, closing price manipulators trade most actively in the last ten 
seconds.  The possibility of incurring penalties from regulatory enforcement causes 
manipulators to trade earlier in the day, making closing price manipulation more 
difficult to detect. 
 The aggressiveness of manipulation (number and size of trades) depends on 
factors such as the stock’s liquidity, the magnitude of the manipulation incentive, the 
number of times the manipulator intends to manipulate closing prices, and the strength 
of regulatory enforcement.  Illiquid stocks that have wide spreads can be manipulated 
with a single small trade that closes the stock at the bid or ask quote (depending on the 
manipulator’s intended direction).  For a liquid stock, this approach would have little 
effect on the price.  Therefore, liquid stocks are commonly manipulated with several 
large trades.  Fund managers have strong incentives to manipulate and they typically 
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use large trades in manipulation.  When manipulating a stock over several days 
manipulators tend to use smaller trades.  Regulatory enforcement causes manipulators 
to use less aggressive order types to conceal their manipulation.  
 
7.3 How often are closing prices manipulated? 
 Using an empirical model that takes into consideration the incomplete and 
non-random detection and prosecution of manipulation, this thesis estimates that on 
US and Canadian stock exchanges approximately 1.1% of closing prices are 
manipulated (during the period 1997-2008).  For every prosecuted closing price 
manipulation there are approximately 300 instances of closing price manipulation that 
remain undetected or not prosecuted.  Closing price manipulation is more prevalent on 
larger exchanges than smaller ones, but detected at a higher rate on small exchanges. 
 
7.4 What makes closing price manipulation and detection more 
likely? 
 The likelihood of closing price manipulation is greater in: (i) jurisdictions with 
smaller regulatory budgets because the probability of detection is lower; (ii) stocks 
with higher information asymmetry because market participants find it more difficult 
to distinguish between informed trading and manipulation; (iii) stocks with mid to low 
levels of liquidity because very illiquid stocks do not have large incentives for 
manipulation and highly liquid stocks are difficult to manipulate; (iv) month-end days 
due to manipulation by fund managers; and (v) stocks with lower volatility because 
volatility draws the attention of the regulator. 
 Manipulation is more likely to be detected and prosecuted when regulatory 
budgets are larger because more cases can be investigated and prepared for 
prosecution.  Manipulation is also more likely to be detected and prosecuted when it 
causes abnormal trading characteristics because such manipulation is more likely to 
trigger alerts in automated surveillance systems.  Evidence from a laboratory 
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experiment reinforces the finding that regulation deters some would-be manipulators 
and makes remaining manipulation less aggressive. 
 
7.5 How does closing price manipulation affect markets? 
 Using a sample of prosecution cases, this thesis finds that closing price 
manipulation is associated with large day-end returns, subsequent return reversals, 
increased day-end spreads and increased day-end trading activity.  Manipulation is 
associated with abnormal day-end returns of between 1.4% and 1.9% - approximately 
six times larger than their usual levels, most of which is reversed by the following 
morning.  Price distortions are larger in less liquid stocks.  Trading frequencies more 
than triple and spreads increase by between 0.11% and 0.63% in the presence of 
manipulation.   
 At the broader level of market quality, this thesis provides evidence that 
closing price manipulation decreases both price accuracy and liquidity.  In fact, even 
the mere possibility of manipulation decreases liquidity and increases trading costs 
because uncertainty is greater. 
 
7.6 Implications for economic efficiency and policy 
 This thesis finds that the manipulators’ incentives are critical in determining 
the harm caused by a particular type of manipulation.  Consequently, different types 
of manipulation should be considered separately in formulating policy decisions.    
 Closing price manipulation is significantly more prevalent than the number of 
prosecution cases would suggest.  Further, it harms both pricing accuracy and 
liquidity and therefore, following the argument of Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), 
closing price manipulation undermines economic efficiency, creates social harm and 
should be prohibited.  These findings are particularly concerning given the many 
examples of market participants with incentives to manipulate closing prices and the 
numerous important uses of closing prices.  Therefore, reducing the prevalence of 
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closing price manipulation is likely to enhance market integrity and economic 
efficiency. 
 The findings of this thesis and the review of literature suggest four ways to 
reduce the prevalence of closing price manipulation: (i) increase regulatory budgets; 
(ii) improve the accuracy of detection methods; (iii) take measures to aid the ability 
for market participants to identify manipulation; and (iv) implement closing 
mechanisms that are difficult to manipulate.  Each of these is discussed below 
drawing on the findings of this thesis. 
 This thesis finds that by deterring some would-be manipulators and making 
remaining manipulation less aggressive, credible regulation helps reduce the harm 
manipulators cause to price accuracy.  However, restoring the liquidity that is lost due 
to manipulation is more difficult because it requires that market participants believe 
regulation will reduce manipulation.  This conclusion is consistent with Bhattacharya 
and Daouk (2002) who find that the perception of credibility gained by a regulator 
through the enforcement of laws governing financial conduct, rather than simply their 
presence, affects markets in a positive way.  The empirical models used in this thesis 
estimate that in the US and Canada, a 1% increase in government regulatory budgets 
would decrease the amount of closing price manipulation by 3.3% and increase in the 
rate of prosecution by 2.9%.  The benefits from the estimated reduction in 
manipulation need to be weighed against the costs of regulation.  
 This thesis develops an index of closing price manipulation and a tool for the 
detection of manipulation, which can be used by regulators in automated surveillance 
systems.  These tools can be used to increase the accuracy with which manipulation is 
detected.  A higher rate of detection is likely to deter manipulation.  
 This thesis finds some evidence that ordinary traders attempt to profit from 
manipulators by offering more shares for sale shortly before the close when they 
perceive manipulation to be likely.  Such a strategy, motivated by self-interest, offers 
hope to markets for attenuating the detrimental effects of manipulation and reducing 
the need for regulatory intervention.  However, this requires market participants to be 
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capable of identifying manipulation.  In the laboratory experiment used in this thesis, 
despite the fact that manipulators have a substantial impact on prices, market 
participants have great difficulty in identifying manipulation.  Therefore, measures 
that improve the ability for market participants to identify manipulation are likely to 
enhance the ability for markets to self-attenuate the detrimental effects of 
manipulation.  This might be achieved, for example, by increasing market 
transparency or introducing a system to alert market participants to potential 
manipulation.  Further research on how markets can be structured to improve the 
ability for market participants to identify manipulation would be valuable. 
 Finally, closing mechanisms can be designed to make closing price 
manipulation more difficult.  For example, closing call auctions, which are becoming 
increasingly popular among exchanges, reduce the price distortions caused by 
manipulation (Hillion and Suominen 2004; Comerton-Forde and Rydge, 2006).  
Closing call auctions have relatively few disadvantages. 
 Based on the discussion above, the recommended methods of reducing closing 
price manipulation are implementing closing mechanisms that are difficult to 
manipulate, such as closing call auctions, and improving the accuracy of market 
surveillance systems using the detection tools developed in Chapter 6.  Both of these 
approaches have relatively few downsides.  Increased regulatory budgets would 
reduce the frequency of manipulation, but the benefits need to be weighed against the 
costs of regulation.  Future research should examine how markets can be structured to 
improve the ability for market participants to identify manipulation.  These actions 
should enhance market integrity and economic efficiency. 
 
7.7 Avenues for future research 
 Many instances of closing price manipulation are not detected or not 
prosecuted.  Future research might attempt to disentangle detection from prosecution, 
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thereby enhancing our understanding of which of these processes plays the larger role 
in allowing manipulation to occur without penalty.   
 The manipulation index developed in this thesis can be used to examine how 
the nature of manipulation varies across market structures, firm characteristics and 
through time.  It can also be used to study the effects of events, such as regulatory 
changes, on manipulation.   
 As suggested in the previous section, further research on how markets can be 
structured to improve the ability for market participants to identify manipulation 
would be valuable.  Finally, future research might apply some of the methods used in 
this thesis, such as detection controlled estimation, index construction, and laboratory 
experiments, to other types of manipulation. 
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Appendix A 
Alternative detection controlled 
estimation models 
 
 
A.1 Two-equation model of manipulation and detection 
 Using the same notation as for the three-equation model and omitting much of 
the explanation the two-equation model of manipulation and detection is as follows.   
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A.2 Three-equation model of manipulation and detection with 
expectations simultaneity  
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Appendix B 
Details of prosecution cases 
 
 
 This appendix describes each of closing price manipulation cases used in the 
empirical analysis.  The purpose of this is to illustrate the circumstances surrounding 
each case of closing price manipulation, the incentives of the manipulators as well as 
to provide some examples of how regulators detect and prosecute closing price 
manipulation. 
 Table A.1 provides a summary of the manipulators, motivations and outcomes 
involved in each case.  A discussion of each case follows. 
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Table A.1 
Summary of manipulation cases 
 
Case  Exchange Date range Manipulator(s) Motivation Outcomes 
Competitive 
Technologies Inc. 
et al 
AMEX Jul. 1998 - 
Jun. 2001 
Several brokers, 
former brokers and 
company CEO. 
Increase value of personal 
stock position, avoid 
margin calls. 
Conviction by a 
federal jury and 
settlements. 
 
RT Capital 
Management Inc.  
et al. 
TSX Oct. 1998 -
Mar. 1999 
Several fund managers. Inflate reported 
performance for fund to 
collect more management 
fees and managers to get 
greater remuneration. 
 
Settlement, fines 
and suspensions.
Spear, Leeds &  
Kellogg / Baron 
Capital Inc. et al. 
NYSE Oct. 1999 -
Nov. 1999 
A substantial 
shareholder. 
Affect the takeover price 
for a company acquisition 
for personal profit. 
 
Settlement and 
fines. 
John Andrew Scott  
et al. 
TSX Feb. 2000 - 
Jul. 2000 
Investment advisor, 
company insiders and 
substantial 
shareholders. 
Affect the price protection 
level of private placements 
of equity. 
Settlements, 
fines and 
suspensions. 
Douglas Christie TSX Feb. 2001 - 
Jun. 2001 
A trader in a small 
trading firm. 
Increase personal 
remuneration, which was 
paid by the firm based on 
market value of the trading 
account. 
 
Settlement and 
fines. 
Schultz Investment 
Advisors Inc.  
NYSE Jun. 2002 - 
Dec. 2003 
A fund manager. Inflate reported 
performance to collect 
more management fees. 
Settlement, fines 
and suspension.
Research Capital 
Corporation 
TSX-V Nov. 2003 -
Dec. 2003 
An investment advisor 
on behalf of private 
clients. 
Create misleading 
appearance of strength and 
stability in the market for 
the company’s shares. 
  
Settlements, 
fines and 
suspensions. 
Luc St Pierre TSX-V Oct. 2004 - 
Sep 2005 
An investment advisor 
on behalf of private 
clients including a 
company director. 
Create misleading 
appearance of trading in the 
company’s shares. 
 
Conviction by a 
Disciplinary 
Panel, fines and 
suspension.  
 
 
Case 1: Competitive Technologies Inc. et al.  
 The US SEC alleges that several brokers, former brokers and the CEO of 
Competitive Technologies Inc. (CTT) created a false or misleading appearance in the 
market for CTT stock and artificially raised CTT’s stock price using a prolonged 
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multi-faceted manipulation scheme.67  The manipulation scheme was carried out 
between July 1998 and June 2001 with the main incentive for most of the 
manipulators being profit from inflated prices and avoidance of margin calls.  Most of 
the seven brokers and former brokers that were involved in the manipulation scheme, 
their families and/or their clients had substantial positions in CTT stock.  In addition, 
one of the defendants held the title of interim CEO of CTT at the start of the 
manipulation period and believed that increasing the price of CTT stock would help 
him to be named permanent CEO.       
 The ringleader of the manipulation scheme was a broker named Chauncey 
Steele.  In thousands of telephone calls Steele discussed with the other brokers and 
former brokers the timing, sequence and quantity of manipulative trades and directed 
the CEO of CTT to make trades that further the manipulation scheme using CTT’s 
stock repurchase plan.  Although other trade-based manipulation techniques were 
involved, such as matched trades, the principal focus of the manipulation scheme was 
closing price manipulation.  More than 40% of the manipulators’ purchases of CTT 
were made within the last hour before the market close and more than 20% were made 
in the last half hour.  During the manipulation period Steele telephoned his customers 
urging them buy CTT.  Steele also placed buy orders without obtaining his customers’ 
consent.  Steele often divided his customers’ orders into several late-day purchases in 
a single customer’s account, for example, on one occasion he placed four buy orders 
in the last 15 minutes of trading for one client.    
 The outcomes of this case are different for the eight defendants and include 
conviction by a federal jury and various settlements.  Defendants McPike and 
Kocherhans have been ordered to pay civil penalties of $60,000 and $50,000 
respectively, Steele ordered to pay disgorgement of $47,439 and a civil penalty of 
$110,000, plus prejudgment interest, Steel barred from association with any broker, 
dealer or investment adviser Glushko ordered to pay $10,000 disgorgement plus 
                                                 
67 SEC v. Competitive Technologies, Inc et al. Civil Action No. 304 CV 1331 JCH (District of 
Connecticut).  See http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18827.pdf. 
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$8,308 pretrial interest (which was waived based on Gushko’s financial condition) 
and Glushko barred from association with any broker or dealer. 
 
Case 2: RT Capital Management Inc. et al. 
 The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) alleges that RT Capital 
Management Inc. (RT Capital), a managed investment company with approximately 
$34 billion under management, intentionally engaged in 53 instances of closing price 
manipulation between October 1998 and March 1999 in 26 different Canadian equity 
securities.68  The manipulation was conducted by several fund managers on month-
end days with the intention of inflating reported performance for the fund to collect 
more management fees and managers to earn greater remuneration. 
 Most of the closing price manipulations were ordered by Peter Larkin, a 
director of RT Capital and the senior portfolio manager in the Canadian Equities 
section to whom the six other portfolio managers in that section report.  Larkin 
instructed two of RT Capital’s “order executioners” or Senior Equity Traders to 
conduct the manipulative trades.  The remaining closing price manipulations were 
ordered by Gary Baker, RT Capital’s Canadian Equity Small Capitalization Fund’s 
sole manager.   
 RT Capital determined the value of the Canadian Equity component of any 
given portfolio by multiplying the number of shares in a particular security by the 
closing price for each security in the portfolio.  Larkin’s and Baker’s closing price 
manipulations resulted in a total increase in the RT Capital Canadian Equities 
component of approximately $30,186,168 and $8,376,110 respectively.  RT Capital 
benchmarked its equity portfolio performance to the TSE300 index and the managers 
were expected to match or better the index.  RT Capital Management charged 
management fees based on a percentage of the average value of the client’s assets 
                                                 
68 OSC litigation releases in the matter of RT Capital Management Inc et al.  
(http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Enforcement/Proceedings/SOA/soa_20000629_rtcapitaletal.jsp). 
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under management.  Portfolio managers and trade executioners received a base salary 
and participated in the company’s profit sharing plan by receiving phantom equity and 
annual bonuses based on the profitability of RT Capital. 
 The outcome of this case was a settlement with RT Capital ordered to pay the 
OSC $3,000,000 and the costs of the investigation and hearing (approximately 
$150,000) to be used for the benefit of investors in Ontario as well as being ordered to 
submit an expert review of their trading practices, restate misleading fund values and 
results and configure a telephone recording system for all conversations between fund 
managers and order executioners.  The individuals involved in the manipulation were 
ordered to pay the OSC $8,000 each, had their registrations suspended for periods of 
between one month and life, were suspended from trading and barred from holding 
the title of director or officer of any market participant for varying periods of time up 
to life.   
 
Case 3: Spear, Leeds & Kellogg/ Baron Capital Inc. et al. 
 The US SEC alleges that Baron Capital Inc. manipulated the closing prices of 
stock in Southern Union Company (SUG) by placing buy orders at or near the close of 
the market.69  This manipulation was conducted during a period when the closing 
price of SUG determined the consideration paid by SUG in a pending corporate 
acquisition.   
 Baron Capital, during the period of closing price manipulations, was a broker-
dealer for several affiliated investment advisory firms that had approximately $8.6 
billion under management.  SUG and Pennsylvania Enterprises (PNT) entered into a 
merger agreement whereby SUG would acquire PNT for a combination of cash and 
stock determined by the average closing price of SUG over a 10-day period starting 
                                                 
69 SEC Administrative Proceeding file number 3-11189 
 (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48199.htm) and SEC Administrative Proceeding file number 
3-11096 (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-47751.htm). 
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on 19 October 1999.  The higher the closing price of SUG during this period, the less 
cash SUG would pay for the acquisition.  As of 15 October 1999, the client accounts 
managed by the Baron affiliates owned more than 10% of the shares in SUG.   
 The CEO of Baron Capital instructed Baron Capital’s traders to place the 
manipulative buy orders.  During the five trading days from 20 October the largest 
single purchases of SUG by Baron occurred at 15:59 or 16:00, when the NYSE 
closes.  Baron Capital made the closing trade on seven of the 10 days in the pricing 
period and accounted for approximately 78% of the volume in that period.  Baron 
Capital traded an average of 70,230 shares in SUG per day during the pricing period 
whereas their daily average in the two weeks preceding the pricing period was 19,530. 
 The SEC, in their litigation documents, use recorded telephone conversations 
between the CEO of Baron Capital, Baron’s traders and Spear, Leeds & Kellogg 
(SLK) trading clerks to clearly demonstrate that the CEO of Baron Capital placed 
orders with the intent of closing price manipulation.70  These recorded telephone 
conversations also demonstrated that two of Baron Capital’s traders were knowingly 
partaking in the manipulation and that SLK order clerks executed Baron’s orders 
without regard for the lowest or best price available.  Consequently SLK also had 
legal action taken against them by the SEC for failing to reasonably supervise 
employees that aided and abetted closing price manipulation.  
 The outcome of this case was a settlement with Baron Capital ordered to pay a 
civil penalty of $2,000,000, the CEO of Baron Capital ordered to pay a civil penalty 
of $500,000 and two of Baron Capital’s traders ordered to pay civil penalties of 
$125,000 and $75,000.  SLK also settled and among other requirements was ordered 
to pay civil penalties and fines totalling $450,000. 
                                                 
70 Some examples of recorded conversation provided in the litigation materials include: instructions 
such as “drive the price up a little bit”, “I had trouble yesterday when it didn’t close where I wanted it 
to close so make sure it closes”; questions such as “it’s the closing price that matters, right?”; requests 
such as “give me some more sugar to buy.  Somebody came in through the system with 16,000”; and 
comments such as “making the world believe there’s a rally happening in this stock”. 
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Case 4: John Andrew Scott et al.   
 RS alleges that an investment advisor, John Scott, and his sales assistant, 
Linda Malinowski, knowingly placed trades intended to manipulate the closing prices 
of stock in Helix BioPharma Corp. (HBP).71  The manipulative trades were placed on 
behalf of clients in relation to private placements of HBP shares.  One of the clients 
was in charge of investor relations at HBP and another was the managing director of a 
company that entered into a finder’s fee agreement with HBP for the private 
placements (client D).   
 In January 2000, HBP shareholders passed a resolution allowing HBP to issue, 
in one or more private placements, common shares up to the total number of issued 
and outstanding common shares as at November 1999.  Scott attended the meeting at 
which the resolution was passed.  Around the time of applications made by HBP to 
the TSX for price protection for the private placements Scott and Malinowski 
submitted trades on behalf of clients with the intent of manipulating the closing prices 
of HBP stock.  On 37 trading days in the relevant period orders executed by Scott or 
Malinowski set the closing price on an uptick (a trade at a price higher than the 
previous trade) and most of the orders placed during this period resulted in trades that 
took out the offer and moved it up.  The trades made by client D set the closing price 
on the days that HBP’s initial application for price protection was based upon and on 
the day that the TSX’s extension of price protection was based upon.  It is not made 
clear in the litigation documents exactly how Scott and Malinowski benefited from 
their knowing participation in the manipulation or how their clients benefited besides 
the fact that some of the clients had interests in the private placements and the 
statement that the manipulation increased the value of the shareholdings of the clients. 
 The outcome of this case was settlements for Scott, Malinowski and Matthew 
Linden, the supervisor of Scott and Malinowski, with RS.  Scott was suspended from 
                                                 
71 RS Statement of allegations (OOS 2003-010) 
(http://docs.rs.ca/ArticleFile.asp?Instance=100&ID=F78AB14F67984C7BBE6AC9F512D86445) 
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access to the marketplace for two years and ordered to pay a fine of $150,000, an 
additional fine of $53,757 representing the financial benefit to Scott and costs of 
$35,000.  Malinowski was ordered to pay a fine of $10,000 and re-sit the Conduct and 
Practices Handbook exam to continue to act as a registered representative.  Linden 
was ordered to re-sit the Examination for Branch Managers and pay a fine of $50,000 
and costs of $12,500.     
 
Case 5: Douglas Christie 
 Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS) alleges that Douglas Christie, a trader 
and partner with the small Toronto firm the Independent Trading Group, knowingly 
manipulated the closing prices and bids of stock in computer chip manufacturer, 
Mosaid Technologies Inc (MSD).72  RS alleges Christie did this to benefit his own 
financial position on the basis that his remuneration from Independent Trading Group 
was calculated on the marked-to-market value of his trading account.    
 Christie commenced employment with Independent Trading Group in 1994.  
Independent Trading Group paid Christie 100% of his trading profits after deducting 
trading costs.  In calculating trading profits from the value of Christie’s trading 
account, Independent Trading Group priced long positions at the closing bid.  As an 
example of how Christie’s manipulation affected his remuneration, on 28 February 
2001, Christie’s account was long 20,372 shares of MSD, representing 53% of the 
total value of his trading account.  By manipulating the MSD, Christie reduced his 
unrealised loss on MSD by $14,260 and therefore also increased his remuneration by 
$14,260. 
 The outcome of this case was a settlement for Douglas Christie with RS.  
Christie agreed to pay a fine of $15,000, plus $6,000 in regulatory costs. 
                                                 
72 RS Statement of allegations (OOS 2002-002) 
(http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=8A7BF830C66B451F84F0183C654B006B
&Language=en). 
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 Case 6: Schultz Investment Advisors Inc. 
 The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleges that Scott 
Schultz, President and founder of Schultz Investment, engaged in closing price 
manipulation of four thinly-traded closed-end funds to boost the reported performance 
results of their client’s portfolios.73  Shultz Investments held approximately 90% of 
clients’ assets in the funds which it manipulated.  As a result of the manipulation 
Schultz Investment benefited by collecting more management fees from the 
overstated portfolio performance results.  Schultz Investment, at the time of 
manipulation charges fees based on a percentage of assets under management 
calculated based on the quarterly value of client holdings.   
 The closing price manipulations were conducted on quarter-end days over a 
period of at least 18 months.  They were conducted by placing large buy orders at the 
end of the trading day, often within five minutes of the market close.  The trades used 
to manipulate closing prices often constituted approximately one-third to one-half of 
the day’s trading volume.  As an example, at 3:57pm, three minutes before the market 
close, on the last trading day of the fourth quarter of 2003, Schultz investments placed 
a market buy order on the NYSE for 80,750 shares of BIF.  This order constituted 
76% of the day’s trading volume in BIF.  As a result, the price of BIF rose from $5.90 
prior to the trade to close at $6.30.  In addition to closing price manipulation Schultz 
Investment misrepresented its investment strategies to its clients.  According to the 
calculations contained in the SEC litigation release74 the closing price manipulation 
conducted by Schultz Investment on the last trading day of 2003 caused an increase in 
the value of four of Schultz Investment’s portfolios of $1,322,763 from a value of 
                                                 
73 SEC v. Schultz Investment Advisors and Scott Schultz  
(http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8650.pdf) 
74 SEC v. Schultz Investment Advisors and Scott Schultz  
(http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8650.pdf) 
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$28,863,328 immediately prior to the manipulation.  It is alleged that the overstated 
performance of Schultz Investment as a result of manipulation contributed to 
increased media coverage and significant growth in assets under management.   
 The SEC, in their litigation documents, use recorded telephone conversations 
between Scott Schultz and the employees of a brokerage firm’s trading desk to clearly 
demonstrate that Schultz placed orders with the intent of closing price manipulation.75  
The outcome of this case was a settlement with Schultz Investment ordered to pay 
disgorgement, prejudgment interest and civil penalties totalling $114,534.00. 
 
Case 7: Research Capital Corporation 
 Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS) alleges that Alfred Gregorian, an 
investment advisor at Research Capital Corporation knowingly participated in his 
clients’ use of closing price manipulation of securities in International Wex 
Technologies (WXI).76  The manipulation, which occurred between September 2002 
and January 2004, was ordered by insiders of WXI with the purpose of supporting the 
market in WXI shares by creating a misleading appearance of strength and stability.   
 Insiders at WXI, including the COO and two employees in the investor 
relations/corporate communications department, used accounts of two of Gregorian’s 
clients (identity withheld in litigation documentation) in which they held trading 
authorisations to place the manipulative orders.  The price support strategy involved 
placing buy orders, particularly at the end of the trading day, when the price was 
under pressure.  The vast majority of buy orders were for small volumes and resulted 
in no economic benefit to the clients.  Many purchases were entered at prices 
significantly above the last traded price in the final minutes of a trading session.  
                                                 
75 Some examples of recorded conversation provided in the litigation materials include, “I need the last 
tape… it’s important.  I am at quarter end…the last trade has to show $15.50… the newspaper will 
show $14.98… that costs me a lot of money… I bill on a quarterly basis”. 
76 RS Litigation release (DN 2006-003) 
(http://docs.rs.ca/ArticleFile.asp?Instance=100&ID=6283C3A64E2244BCAB8AE71730EE55E8) 
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There was also a pattern of periodically selling WXI shares in larger volumes, often at 
prices below the purchase price, to provide the necessary cash flow in the clients’ 
accounts to enable further buying of WXI shares.  As a result there is no indication 
that the accounts used for the manipulative trading were intended to be profitable.  At 
least one way in which Gregorian benefited from knowing participation in the 
manipulation scheme was the commissions he earned from the high level of trading 
activity ($19,850 of which Gregorian’s share was 50%).  However, it is not made 
clear in the litigation documents what the incentive of WXI’s insiders was in ordering 
the manipulative trades. 
 The outcome of this case is a settlement between RS and Gregorian whereby 
Gregorian was suspended from access to the marketplace for five years and ordered to 
pay a fine of $55,260. 
 
Case 8: Luc St Pierre 
 Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS) alleges that Luc St Pierre knowingly 
manipulated the closing prices of two TSX Venture Exchange listed stocks: Halo 
Resources Ltd (HLO) and Golden Hope Mines Ltd (GNH).77  St Pierre was an 
investment advisor at Union Securities.  The manipulation occurred between October 
2004 and September 2005.  RS alleges St Pierre did this on behalf of a group of 
clients: a director of GNH, clients associated with the director of GNH and a 
sophisticated investor.  The clients of St Pierre that were involved in the manipulation 
remain anonymous in the litigation documents and the motivation behind the 
manipulation is not clear beyond creating misleading appearance of trading in the 
companies’ shares.   
                                                 
77 RS Statement of allegations (OOS 2007-010) 
(http://docs.iiroc.ca/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=4430E8DA2D8340C98071D0299C0A4B35
&Language=en). 
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 The outcome of this case was conviction of Luc St Pierre by the Market 
Regulation Services Inc. Hearing Panel.  St Pierre was ordered to pay a fine of 
$30,000, plus $70,000 in regulatory costs.  The Panel also suspended St Pierre from 
all marketplaces regulated by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of 
Canada (IIROC) for a period of five years. 
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Appendix C 
Formulae for day-end trading 
characteristics 
 
 
 All variables are calculated in ‘real-time’ and ‘transaction-time’.  The real-
time intervals are defined by x, which takes the values of x = 15, 20, 30, 60, 90 
minutes prior to the close of the market.  The transaction-time intervals are defined by 
y, which takes the values of y = 1, 2, 3 and 4 representing the last trade before the 
close, the second, third and fourth to last trades before the close, respectively.  
 Formulae of day-end variables in real-time and transaction-time are as follows. 
 
i Real-Time Variable,  xiR , Transaction-Time Variable,  yiT ,
Return  
(%) 100ln 



x
close
M
P
 100ln 



y
close
M
P  
Reversal  
(%) 100ln
,1
, 



morningd
closedo
M
P
 100ln
,1
, 



morningd
closedo
M
P
 
Frequency 
(trades per hour) 60


x
nx  60



 yclose tt
y  
Spread 
(%) 100



x
close
M
S  100



y
close
M
S  
Abnormal trade size 
(%) 100


 
daily
dailyx
Value
ValueValue
 100


 
daily
dailyy
Value
ValueValue
 
 
 The other variables are defined as follows: 
closeP  is the closing price; 
xM  is the bid-ask midpoint x minutes before the close; 
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yM  is the bid-ask midpoint just prior to the y
th last trade; 
closedoP ,  is the closing price on the current day; 
morningdM ,1  is the bid-ask midpoint at 11am the following day; 
xn  is the number of trades in the last x minutes before the close; 
closet  is the time of the close; 
yt  is the time of the y
th last trade; 
closeS  is the bid-ask spread at the close equal to the ask price minus the bid price; 
xValue  is the mean value per trade of the trades in the last x minutes before the close; 
dailyValue  is the mean value per trade of all the values traded during the day; and 
yValue  is the mean value per trade of the last y trades before the close. 
 The value of x used in the real-time analysis is the smallest of the intervals 15, 
20, 30, 60 and 90 minutes prior to the close that has at least one trade in the interval.  
If a stock has no trades in the 90 minute interval, then the variables are measured from 
the last trade.  This allows the interval to capture the trades that take place closest to 
the close while making the interval as small as possible so as to not dilute the effects 
of the manipulator’s trades.  The value of y in transaction-time is the value from the 
set {1, 2, 3, 4} that maximises the return from bid-ask midpoint to the close.  Trades 
made by manipulators are likely to have high values of return to the close and 
therefore this interval is likely to capture the manipulator’s trades (if present) with the 
least amount of dilution from non-manipulative trading activity.  The real-time and 
transaction-time variables are combined by taking the maximum of corresponding 
variables in both transaction-time and real-time. 
 Formulae of day-end variables that combine intervals from real-time and 
transaction-time are as follows. 
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 Real-Time Transaction-Time 
 
Combined interval 
variable i=1,2,...5 
corresponding to the 
five previously defined 
variables 
 
 
xi
combined
i RR ,  
  90,60,30,20,15minx
minutes for which there is at 
least one trade in the interval 
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combined
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Day-end variable 
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to the five previously 
defined variables 
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Appendix D 
Selected robustness tests 
 
 
 This appendix reports the results of selected robustness tests from Chapter 4.  
Tables D.1 and D.2 replicate the difference-in-differences and matched stock analysis 
(Tables 4.2 and 4.3) using means instead of medians.  The results using means are 
similar to those using medians.  The mean estimates tend to be larger than the 
medians, consistent with the fact that the few extreme instances of manipulation 
(likely to be those that lead to detection) influence the mean more than the median.  
The means across different groups also tend to be more dispersed and some of the 
mean estimates appear to be influenced by outliers, not only among the prosecuted 
manipulation but also in the other stock-days. 
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Table D.1 
Replication of Table 4.2 with means 
This table replicates Table 4.2 (effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics) estimating 
difference-in-differences with means instead of medians. 
Panel Group n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
ALL 184  3.12 2.63 17.56 3.82 22.4 
Consecutive 124  2.99 1.67 17.75 3.78 -10.0 
Month-end 60  3.40 4.69 17.15 3.90 92.1 
High turnover 113  2.68 1.26 21.05 3.40 18.4 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulated 
days  
Low turnover 71  3.78 4.69 12.33 4.44 28.5 
 
ALL 7,728  1.31 -0.27 6.39 3.06 -0.7 
Consecutive 5,208  1.64 -0.31 7.03 3.21 -5.7 
Month-end 2,520  0.60 -0.18 5.02 2.75 10.1 
High turnover 4,746  1.52 -0.33 8.82 2.57 -3.0 
B: Manipulated 
stocks prior to 
manipulation 
Low turnover 2,982  0.99 -0.17 2.74 3.81 2.7 
 
ALL 7,912  1.81** 2.90** 11.17** 0.75* 23.1 
Consecutive 5,332  1.35** 1.98** 10.72** 0.57* -4.3* 
Month-end 2,580  2.80** 4.86** 12.14** 1.15* 82.0* 
High turnover 4,859  1.16** 1.59** 12.22** 0.83 21.3 
C: Before-after 
estimator for 
manipulated 
stocks 
Low turnover 3,053  2.79** 4.86** 9.59** 0.63 25.8 
 
ALL 5,954,856 0.07 -0.32 2.24* -0.12 8.9** 
Consecutive 4,193,920 0.02 0.18 0.42 -0.17 0.6 
Month-end 1,760,936 0.17 -1.35** 5.99* -0.02 26.0** 
High turnover 4,095,032 0.01 -0.02 2.41 0.09** 11.5 
D: Before-after 
estimator for 
non-
manipulated 
stocks Low turnover 1,859,824 0.15 -0.81 1.96* -0.46** 4.8** 
 
ALL 5,962,768 1.75** 3.26** 8.83** 0.86* 15.4 
Consecutive 4,199,252 1.34** 1.84** 10.08** 0.71** -5.0** 
Month-end 1,763,516 2.63** 6.32** 6.14** 1.19 59.2* 
High turnover 4,099,891 1.15** 1.63** 9.71** 0.71* 11.8 
E: Median 
difference-in-
differences 
estimator 
Low turnover 1,862,877 2.65** 5.71** 7.51** 1.08* 20.8 
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Table D.2 
Replication of Table 4.3 with means 
This table replicates Table 4.3 (effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics) estimating 
matched stock differences with means instead of medians. 
Panel Group n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
ALL 184 3.12 2.63 17.56 3.82 22.4 
Consecutive 124 2.99 1.67 17.75 3.78 -10.0 
Month-end 60 3.40 4.69 17.15 3.90 92.1 
High turnover 113 2.68 1.26 21.05 3.40 18.4 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulation 
days (I) 
Low turnover 71 3.78 4.69 12.33 4.44 28.5 
 
ALL 184 0.72 -1.19 7.19 3.04 19.7 
Consecutive 124 0.56 -0.66 6.60 3.39 16.5 
Month-end 60 1.06 -2.34 8.48 2.30 26.4 
High turnover 113 0.70 -0.44 8.85 2.42 29.7 
B: Matched 
stocks on 
manipulation 
days (II) 
Low turnover 71 0.75 -2.33 4.71 3.97 4.7 
 
ALL 184 2.40** 3.83** 10.37** 0.78** 2.8 
Consecutive 124 2.42** 2.33** 11.15** 0.39* -26.5* 
Month-end 60 2.34** 7.03** 8.68** 1.61** 65.6* 
High turnover 113 1.98** 1.70** 12.20** 0.98** -11.3 
C: Cross-
sectional 
differences  
(I-II) 
Low turnover 71 3.02** 7.01** 7.62** 0.47 23.8 
 
 
 
 As an alternative to the median difference-in-differences analysis, I estimate a 
panel regression with a dummy variable for manipulation.  This is econometrically 
similar to mean difference-in-differences.  I use double clustered Thompson (2009) 
standard errors.  Table D.3 reports the results.    
 176
Table D.3 
Panel regression with manipulation dummy variable 
This table reports the results of the panel regression: 
ittiitDit DY   0  
with each of the trading characteristics (return, reversal, frequency, spread and trade size - defined in 
Appendix C) in turn as the dependent variable (Yit), manipulation dummy variables ( ), stock and 
date fixed effects (
itD
i  and t ) and Thompson (2009) double clustered standard errors.  T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively.  High turnover stocks are defined as having more than ten trades per day on average in the 
benchmark period (42 trading days lagged one month) and vice versa.  Consecutive refers to stocks that 
are manipulated over several consecutive days. Month-end refers to non-consecutive occurrences of 
manipulation on month-end days. 
Group 
Return  
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread  
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
ALL 2.68*** 2.99*** 7.71*** 0.78 -22.96 
 (6.25) (2.61) (2.86) (1.34) (-0.87) 
Consecutive 2.56*** 2.09*** 10.70*** 0.65 -38.29** 
 (4.88) (4.27) (5.65) (0.78) (-2.17) 
Month-end 2.94*** 4.90** 5.83 1.25* 4.37 
 (3.98) (2.09) (0.31) (1.67) (0.09) 
High turnover 2.15*** 1.41** 9.19*** 1.00 -32.11 
 (3.14) (2.50) (4.14) (0.98) (-0.99) 
Low turnover 3.52*** 5.43** 6.83 0.29 -21.84 
 (6.92) (2.13) (1.24) (0.40) (-0.62) 
 
 
 The signs of the coefficients are largely consistent with the median difference-
in-difference estimates, but the estimated magnitudes of the effects tend to be larger.  
The larger magnitude is consistent with the fact that outliers or extreme instances of 
manipulation (such as those that would have triggered alerts in regulator surveillance 
systems) have a larger influence on the coefficients in the panel regression than in an 
analysis of medians.  The levels of statistical significance are similar to those in the 
median difference-in-differences analysis, although they tend to be lower for 
frequency and spreads.  This may be partly due to the presence of outliers.   
 Table D.4 replicates the difference-in-differences analysis with a randomly 
chosen single day from the 42 day benchmark.  The results are similar to those using a 
42 day benchmark, in terms of the point estimates and levels of statistical 
significance.   
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Table D.4 
Replication of Table 4.2 with single day benchmark 
This table replicates Table 4.2 (effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics) but instead 
of using 42 days in the trading history benchmark, one day is selected at random from the 42 day 
benchmark. 
Panel Group n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
ALL 184  2.60 1.71 12.00 3.27 -5.0 
Consecutive 124  2.94 2.12 12.17 3.36 -31.3 
Month-end 60  2.20 1.10 12.00 2.26 37.8 
High turnover 113  2.16 1.38 16.06 2.53 -13.3 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulated 
days  
Low turnover 71  3.58 2.10 10.12 3.91 0.0 
 
ALL 184  0.89 -0.16 3.18 1.80 -11.0 
Consecutive 124  1.07 -0.61 3.18 1.80 -13.3 
Month-end 60  0.24 0.07 1.70 2.42 35.1 
High turnover 113  0.16 -0.61 3.18 1.54 -13.3 
B: Manipulated 
stocks prior to 
manipulation 
Low turnover 71  1.07 0.00 1.00 3.23 0.0 
 
ALL 368  1.68** 1.82** 8.92** 0.60** 0.0 
Consecutive 248  1.41** 2.65** 9.22** 0.90** -15.4 
Month-end 120  2.13** 0.68** 7.75** -0.25 25.3 
High turnover 226  1.54** 1.46** 9.80** 0.49* -3.0 
C: Before-after 
estimator for 
manipulated 
stocks 
Low turnover 142  2.29** 2.03** 8.00** 0.75 0.0 
 
ALL 241,644 0.00 0.00 0.07* 0.00 0.0 
Consecutive 170,186 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.0 
Month-end 71,458 0.01 -0.37** 0.47** 0.00 3.5* 
High turnover 166,173 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03* 0.0 
D: Before-after 
estimator for 
non-
manipulated 
stocks Low turnover 75,471 0.00 -0.16 0.17* -0.07** 0.0 
 
ALL 242,012  1.76** 1.93** 8.48** 0.58** -6.7 
Consecutive 170,434  1.46** 2.57** 9.20** 1.35** -13.3 
Month-end 71,578  2.05** 1.08** 7.47** -0.24 0.0 
High turnover 166,399  1.57** 1.47** 9.76** 0.53* -12.6 
E: Median 
difference-in-
differences 
estimator 
Low turnover 75,613  2.05** 2.05** 7.63** 0.83** 0.0 
 
 
 Table D.5 reports the results of the difference-in-differences analysis 
conducted separately for each manipulation prosecution case.  The results demonstrate 
the variation in the effects of manipulation across cases.  Most of the variation is due 
to differences in the manipulator’s incentives, strategy and targeted stock.  Overall, 
the effects of manipulation in individual cases are consistent with the main 
conclusions of Chapter 4.  In each case manipulation causes abnormal returns, return 
reversals and abnormal trading frequency.  In most cases manipulation leads to wider 
spreads and the effects of manipulation on trade size are mixed.     
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Table D.5 
Replication of Table 4.2 separately for each prosecution case 
This table replicates Table 4.2 (effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics), estimating 
difference-in-differences separately for each manipulation prosecution case (Prosec. case).  The case 
numbers correspond to the cases (in Appendix B) as follows: 1=RT Capital; 2=John Scott; 3=Alfred 
Gregorian; 4=Schultz Investment Advisors; 5=Spear, Leeds & Kellogg; 6=Competitive Technologies; 
7=Luc St Pierre; and 8=Douglas Christie. 
Panel 
Prosec. 
case n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) 
Spread 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
1 39 2.95 1.44 11.23 4.44 5.88 
2 47 4.06 2.70 8.60 4.93 -49.68 
3 14 3.29 2.59 14.00 1.92 -28.76 
4 21 0.47 0.40 18.29 0.45 306.00 
5 10 1.47 1.10 13.97 1.24 126.33 
6 29 1.94 0.83 24.00 2.96 -30.35 
7 20 3.73 2.36 8.31 4.12 -35.79 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulated 
days  
8 4 0.87 0.58 14.62 0.23 -58.62 
 
1 1,638 0.72 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.00 
2 1,974 2.09 -0.46 5.63 2.76 -34.52 
3 588 1.96 0.56 1.61 2.97 -10.45 
4 882 0.22 -0.15 8.00 0.36 7.79 
5 420 0.45 0.15 8.00 1.18 0.00 
6 1,218 1.25 0.59 6.07 2.42 -10.19 
7 840 1.06 -0.25 2.27 3.73 -5.05 
B: Manipulated 
stocks prior to 
manipulation 
8 168 0.16 -0.05 10.96 0.51 -18.51 
 
1 1,677 2.18** 1.37** 10.23** 0.22 5.88 
2 2,021 1.97** 3.17** 2.97** 2.17** -15.16 
3 602 1.33 2.03** 12.39** -1.05 -18.31 
4 903 0.25 0.48 7.06** 0.04 298.21** 
5 430 1.02** 0.94 5.97** 0.06 126.33** 
6 1,247 0.69 0.24 17.93** 0.53 -20.16 
7 860 2.67** 2.61** 6.03** 0.39 -30.74 
C: Before-after 
estimator for 
manipulated 
stocks 
8 172 0.71 0.63 3.66 -0.28 -40.10 
 
1 1,236,438 0.10 -0.46** 0.77 -0.04** 0.13** 
2 1,800,540 -0.01 0.00 -0.28** -0.01 0.00 
3 331,422 -0.09 -0.01 0.48 -0.96* 0.00* 
4 483,546 -0.02 -0.10 3.96** 0.02 192.36** 
5 1,182,006 0.01 -0.24 0.70** 0.05** 2.81 
6 374,976 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07* 0.00 
7 354,480 0.08 0.26* 0.01 -0.60 0.00 
D: Before-after 
estimator for 
non-
manipulated 
stocks 
8 62,580 -0.05 0.06 -0.38 0.06 0.00 
 
1 1,238,115 2.02** 2.29** 8.89** 0.34 5.52 
2 1,802,561 1.83** 3.10** 3.04** 2.21** -10.10 
3 332,024 1.46* 2.11** 12.07** 0.16 -16.44 
4 484,449 0.29* 0.44 5.59** -0.02 84.66* 
5 1,182,436 1.01** 1.08* 4.04 0.01 126.67* 
6 376,223 0.60 0.24 17.64** 0.37* -20.16 
7 355,340 2.30* 2.10** 6.07** 0.63* -30.74* 
E: Median 
difference-in-
differences 
estimator 
8 62,752 0.82 0.82 3.70 -0.08 -39.02 
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  I examine the robustness of the results to the way the day-end variables are 
calculated.  Table D.6 reports estimates of the effects of manipulation in each real-
time and transaction-time window separately (not using a maximum operator). 
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 Table D.6 
Replication of Table 4.2 with alternative day-end windows 
This table replicates Table 4.2 (effects of manipulation on day-end trading characteristics) using each of the 
real- and transaction-time intervals separately.  Combined refers to the variables calculated by combining values 
from the real- and transaction-time intervals as detailed in Appendix C.  Re15, Re30, Re60 and Re90 refer to 
variables calculated in the real-time intervals of 15, 30, 60 and 90 minutes prior to the close.  Tr1, Tr2, Tr3 and 
Tr4 refer to variables calculated in the transaction-time intervals corresponding to the last, second to last, third 
to last and fourth to last trades for the day.  To maintain a consistent sample, when the value of a variable cannot 
be calculated in a particular interval the value is taken from the closest interval in which it can be calculated 
(e.g., if a stock only has three trades on a particular day, return in the Tr4 interval is calculated from the third to 
last trade).  Reversal does not depend on the interval because it is calculated from the closing price to the 
following morning’s bid-ask midpoint.  
Panel Interval n 
Return 
(%) 
Reversal 
(%) 
Frequency 
(trades per 
hour) Spread (%) 
Abnormal 
Trade Size 
(%) 
Combined 184 2.60 1.71 12.00 3.27 -4.98 
Re15 184 1.81 1.71 8.00 3.27 -27.17 
Re30 184 2.07 1.71 6.00 3.25 -20.15 
Re60 184 2.06 1.71 4.00 3.25 -2.03 
Re90 184 2.04 1.71 3.33 3.25 -4.09 
Tr1 184 1.31 1.71 11.15 3.25 -50.08 
Tr2 184 1.65 1.71 12.63 3.27 -32.85 
Tr3 184 1.75 1.71 8.66 3.27 -14.73 
A: Manipulated 
stocks on 
manipulated days  
Tr4 184 1.99 1.71 6.20 3.25 0.00 
 
Combined 7,728 1.25 0.00 5.63 2.76 -10.19 
Re15 7,728 0.42 0.00 4.00 2.72 -22.29 
Re30 7,728 0.46 0.00 4.00 2.72 -17.82 
Re60 7,728 0.53 0.00 3.00 2.73 -10.49 
Re90 7,728 0.60 0.00 2.33 2.71 -7.64 
Tr1 7,728 0.31 0.00 6.21 2.75 -30.55 
Tr2 7,728 0.60 0.00 5.23 2.76 -9.40 
Tr3 7,728 0.42 0.00 3.46 2.74 0.00 
B: Manipulated 
stocks prior to 
manipulation 
Tr4 7,728 0.32 0.00 2.71 2.72 0.00 
 
Combined 7,912 1.42** 1.71** 7.77** 0.39** 5.79 
Re15 7,912 1.26** 1.71** 4.00** 0.41** 6.52 
Re30 7,912 1.63** 1.71** 4.00** 0.43** 5.43 
Re60 7,912 1.51** 1.71** 2.00** 0.43** 10.77** 
Re90 7,912 1.53** 1.71** 1.33** 0.44** 7.76** 
Tr1 7,912 0.97** 1.71** 6.08** 0.36** -5.85 
Tr2 7,912 1.17** 1.71** 8.20** 0.35** -5.84 
Tr3 7,912 1.35** 1.71** 5.02** 0.37** 0.00 
C: Before-after 
estimator for 
manipulated 
stocks 
Tr4 7,912 1.48** 1.71** 2.77** 0.38** 0.00 
 
Combined 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Re15 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Re30 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Re60 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Re90 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Tr1 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Tr2 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Tr3 5,954,856 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D: Before-after 
estimator for 
non-manipulated 
stocks 
Tr4 5,954,856 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 
Combined 5,962,768 1.46** 1.85** 7.90** 0.36** 0.00 
Re15 5,962,768 1.27** 1.85** 4.00** 0.37** 4.65 
Re30 5,962,768 1.65** 1.85** 2.00** 0.36** 2.06 
Re60 5,962,768 1.53** 1.85** 1.00** 0.34** 8.85 
Re90 5,962,768 1.47** 1.85** 0.83** 0.36** 5.13 
Tr1 5,962,768 0.97** 1.85** 5.54** 0.35** -10.63* 
Tr2 5,962,768 1.13** 1.85** 7.64** 0.36** -12.86* 
Tr3 5,962,768 1.43** 1.85** 4.77** 0.37** -7.39* 
E: Median 
difference-in-
differences 
estimator 
Tr4 5,962,768 1.55** 1.85** 2.58** 0.37** 0.00 
 
 181
 Measuring the day-end variables in the different intervals does not alter the 
general findings about the effects of manipulation.  The main difference is that the 
magnitude of the effects varies depending on how the day-end variables are measured.  
This is likely to be because, as discussed in Chapter 4, a ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
choosing an interval will either include too much normal trading in the window or 
miss some of the manipulator’s trades, if dealing with stocks of different levels of 
liquidity.  This is most apparent in the reduced magnitude of the frequency estimates 
when using the ‘one size fits all’ approach.  To understand why this occurs, consider a 
stock that usually trades at a rate of one trade every five minutes and has one 
additional trade made by a manipulator just before the close.  The increase in trade 
frequency in the last 10 minutes is 50%, but in the last 30 minutes it is only 17%. 
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Appendix E 
Experiment instructions an screen 
layout 
 
 
E.1 Instructions provided to participants 
 The following pages are a copy of the written instructions handed to 
participants in the experiment prior to the commencement of the experiment.  
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Experiment instructions 
 
Welcome to this experiment in market decision making.  The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a 
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.  Before we start, 
there are three ground rules: 
 
1.  No communication with other subjects of any kind.  If you have a question, 
bring it to the attention of the researchers by raising your hand. 
2. All mobile phones turned off. 
3. When told to use the terminal do not close any windows or rearrange the layout 
of the windows on your screen. 
 
In this experiment you will trade shares of a hypothetical company XYZ with the 
other 11 participants in several rounds of trading.  All prices and values are 
denominated in laboratory dollars.  Once the experiment is over participants will be 
ranked according to how many laboratory dollars they have earned and then paid out 
in real dollars according to a scale ranging from $15 to $45. 
 
 
How to trade 
You will now learn how to use your computer to trade.  Watch the demonstration on 
the large screen. 
 
Notice at the bottom of the screen a countdown of the time remaining in seconds in 
the current trading period.  Each of the trading rounds will last for 200 seconds – that 
does not apply to this demonstration.   
 
Next, notice in the top right hand corner your broker ID.  This ID allows you to 
identify your trades and orders.  Below your broker ID is the amount of cash in 
laboratory dollars that you currently have and next to the word “Position” is the 
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number of shares you currently own.  You will start every round of trading with $200 
and 4 shares.           
 
To trade you will use the “Order Entry” window to submit orders.  Orders are requests 
to buy or sell shares.  You can toggle between buy or sell orders by clicking on the 
“BUY/SELL” button.  In the field labelled “Volume” you will enter the amount of 
shares you wish to buy or sell.  You can toggle between market and limit orders using 
the “MKT/LMT” button.  A limit order is a request to buy or sell shares at a specified 
price, whereas a market order is an instruction to buy or sell at whatever the best 
available price is in the market at the time.  For limit orders you specify the price at 
which you wish to buy or sell in the price field.  Notice that when you toggle a market 
order the price field becomes inactive.  Once you have specified information about 
your order you can submit it to the market by clicking on the “Submit” button.  In this 
example I am submitting a limit order to buy 2 shares at a price of $45. 
 
I will now demonstrate how to submit a limit order to buy 1 share at a price of $47. 
I will now demonstrate how to submit a limit order to sell 3 shares at a price of $53. 
I will now demonstrate how to submit a limit order to sell 1 share at a price of $51. 
 
Notice that all of the limit orders are recorded in the “Market Depth View” window in 
order of price with the buy orders on the “Bid” side and the sell orders on the “Ask” 
side.  This window will show the orders submitted by every participant.  Each record 
shows the submitter’s broker ID, the number of shares and price of the order.     
 
Notice that your orders, while they are still active, are displayed in the “Trade Blotter” 
window.  You can use this window to cancel your orders by clicking on the grey “C”.  
Watch the demonstration. 
 
Let’s practice submitting limit orders.  Submit a limit order to BUY 3 shares at a price 
equal to your trader number (Broker ID).  For example, if you are “Trader 6” then 
submit a limit order to BUY 3 shares at a price of $6.  Do this now.  Were there any 
problems? 
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Submit a limit order to SELL 2 shares at a price equal to 30 plus your trader number 
(Broker ID).  For example, if you are “Trader 6” then submit a limit order to BUY 2 
shares at a price of $36 (30+6).  Do this now.  Were there any problems?  Notice all of 
the orders in the “Market Depth View” window and your order in the “Trade Blotter” 
window. 
 
Watch what happens when I submit a market SELL order for 1 share.  The best price 
at which I can sell is $12 because that is the highest any participant has offered to buy 
shares at, so a trade occurs at this price.  Notice my cash changes and “Position” 
(number of shares I own) also changes.  Watch what happens when I submit a market 
BUY order for 1 share.  The best price at which I can buy is $31 because that is the 
lowest price any participant has offered to sell shares at, so a trade occurs at this price.   
 
Let’s practice submitting market orders.  Submit a market order to BUY 1 share.  Do 
this now.  Were there any problems?  Submit a market order to SELL 2 shares.  Do 
this now.  Were there any problems? 
 
Now cancel all of your remaining orders by clicking on the grey “C” in the “Trade 
Blotter” window.  Do this now. 
 
Notice that all of the trades are recorded in the “Time & Sales” window in the 
sequence that they occur.  Take a look at the “Ticker Chart View” window.  From the 
second drop-down box select “1”.  This window plots the prices of all trades through 
time.  Green bars indicate trades that increase the price from the previous trade price 
(usually from buy orders) and white bars indicate trades that decrease the price from 
the previous trade price (usually from sell orders).  The blue lines at the bottom of this 
window indicate the number of shares traded. 
 
There are no brokerage costs associated with trading and short selling is not allowed, 
i.e., you cannot sell more shares than you own at that point in time.  There is no 
margin buying, which means that the trading simulator will not allow you to place 
limit orders to buy shares at a cost greater than the amount of cash you have at the 
time.  This includes the value of any active limit buy orders you have at the time.  For 
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example, if I have $200 cash and an active limit buy order for three shares at $50, i.e., 
value of $150, then effectively I can only place new buy limit orders for up to $50 
value.  This does not apply to market orders – they are executed regardless of your 
cash position. 
 
 
Payoffs 
You will now learn about the payoffs you can earn from trading.  Shares in the 
hypothetical company XYZ have one of three possible values at the end of each round 
– either $20, $40 or $80 – with equal probability.  At the beginning of each round, 
your clue sheet, the spreadsheet to the left of your trading simulator, will tell you one 
of the three values that will not be the ending value of the shares.  This leaves two 
possible ending values.  For example, if your clue sheet says the value is NOT $20 
then the ending value of the shares must be either $40 or $80.  Other participants may 
receive different clues. 
 
At the end of each round the shares you own will be converted to cash using the actual 
ending value and added to your total payoff pool together with any cash you have left.  
This amount is calculated automatically and displayed at the end of the round in the 
“Cash” field.  The actual ending value of the shares, i.e., $20, $40 or $80 will be 
displayed at the end of each round on your clue sheet.  Your payoff for each round 
will be saved to a database and your total payoff pool will determine how much real 
money you are paid at the end of the experiment.  As an example, if at the end of a 
round you own six shares that have an actual ending value of $40 and have $80 cash, 
your shares are worth 6x$40=$240, which is added to your cash amount of $80, so in 
total $320 is added to your payoff pool. 
 
If your clue is that the shares do not have an ending value of $20, then you know that 
the ending value will be either $40 or $80 per share.  In this case you could increase 
your payoff by buying shares for less than $40, for example $30, because at the end of 
the round they will be converted to either $40 or $80.  You can also learn from 
observing other traders’ orders.  For example, if you know the ending value is not 
$40, i.e., it must be $20 or $80, and you see other traders submitting buy orders at say 
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$30, you might infer that those traders have been told the ending value is not $20 and 
therefore deduce that the ending value is likely to be $80.  You can then profit by 
buying shares at prices less than $80.  Alternatively, if you see other traders 
submitting sell orders at say $60, you might infer that those traders know the ending 
value is not $80 and therefore, if you know the ending value is not $40, you might 
deduce that the ending value is likely to be $20.  In that case you would increase your 
payoff by selling shares at prices above $20. 
 
Specific instructions for treatment 1   
 
Take a look at the clue sheet.  The first line reports the current round, in this case 
“Practice round”.  The second piece of information is the clue about the actual value 
of the shares.  At the end of a round your clue sheet will change as will now be 
demonstrated.  The clue sheet now reports the actual value of the shares and asks and 
asks you to type “OK” and hit enter.  Do that now.  Notice how the clue sheet now 
displays new information for the next round.  When this occurs, read the information 
and wait for the next round to start. 
 
Specific instructions for treatment 2   
 
In some rounds, one participant may be selected at random to be a “manipulator”.  
When this occurs, the selected participant will be informed of this fact on their clue 
sheet.  Not all rounds will have a manipulator, the rounds which do are chosen at 
random.  The manipulator starts each round with the same amount of shares and cash 
as the ordinary traders; however, the payoff for a manipulator is different from what 
has just been described.  The manipulator receives a payoff of 15 times the difference 
between the price of the last trade for the round and the median price for the round.  
This payoff occurs regardless of the actual stock value and the manipulator’s final 
amount of shares and cash.  In addition the manipulator gets $250.  The median price 
is the middle price when trade prices are ordered from lowest to highest.  For 
example, if trades occur at $38, $41, $44, $52 and $58 then the median price is $44.  
If the last trade in the round occurs at a price of $58 then the payoff for the 
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manipulator in this example is ($58-$44)x15 + $250 =  $210 + $250 = $460.  This 
example illustrates that the payoff of the manipulator is larger the higher the price of 
the last trade, so the manipulator should try to maximise the last trade price. 
 
At the end of each round the clue sheet will ask ordinary traders to submit a guess as 
to whether or not they thought a manipulator had been selected in that round.  Guesses 
are entered into the clue sheet using “Y” for yes and “N” for no.  Correct guesses earn 
a bonus of $50 added to your payoff pool and incorrect guesses cost you $50 from 
your payoff pool.  If you do not submit a guess you will receive a penalty of $50.  If a 
manipulator was selected for the round, their clue sheet will ask them to guess how 
many of the other 11 traders they think will guess that a manipulator was selected.  
Correct and incorrect guesses will earn the same bonuses and penalties as just 
described. 
 
Take a look at the clue sheet.  The first line reports the current round, in this case 
“Practice round”.  The second piece of information is the clue about the actual value 
of the shares.  The third piece of information informs you whether or not you have 
been selected to be a manipulator for this round. 
 
At the end of a round your clue sheet will change as will now be demonstrated.  The 
clue sheet now reports the actual value of the shares and asks a question that must be 
answered before the next round starts.  Let’s practice answering.  No one was selected 
as a manipulator in the practice round so enter “N” in the yellow box and hit enter.  
Notice how after automatically recording your guess the clue sheet displays new 
information for the next round.  When this occurs, read the information and wait for 
the next round to start. 
 
A final word of caution for those selected to be manipulators.  The trading simulator 
does not allow limit orders with value exceeding your cash holdings.  To avoid having 
an order rejected at a critical point in time, ensure the value of your limit orders 
(including any active limit buy orders you have in the market) does not exceed the 
amount of cash you have.  For example, if you have no active limit buy orders and 
have $400 cash, you may submit a buy order for 5 shares at $80 (value of $400), but 
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an order for 6 shares at $80 (value of $480) would be rejected.  Alternatively you may 
wish to use market orders as they are executed regardless of your cash position. 
 
Specific instructions for treatment 3   
 
In each round one participant will be selected at random to be a “manipulator”.  The 
selected participant will be informed of this fact on their clue sheet.  The manipulator 
starts each round with the same amount of shares and cash as the ordinary traders; 
however, the payoff for a manipulator is different from what has just been described.   
 
If the manipulator trades and less than eight of the other 11 traders (approximately 
three quarters) guess that the manipulator traded they have avoided detection and 
receive a manipulation payoff of 15 times the difference between the price of the last 
trade for the round and the median price for the round.  This payoff occurs regardless 
of the actual stock value and the manipulator’s final amount of shares and cash.  The 
median price is the middle price when trade prices are ordered from lowest to highest.  
For example, if trades occur at $38, $41, $44, $52 and $58 then the median price is 
$44.   
 
If the manipulator trades and eight or more of the other 11 traders guess that the 
manipulator traded they have been detected and receive a detection penalty of 
negative 15 times the difference between the price of the last trade for the round and 
the median price for the round.  In addition to manipulation payoffs and detection 
penalties (which are zero if the manipulator does not trade) all manipulators also 
receive $250.   
 
In the previous example in which the median price was $44, if the last trade in the 
round occurs at a price of $58 and the manipulator traded then the payoff for the 
manipulator that is not detected would be ($58-$44)x15 + $250 =  $210 + $250 = 
$460.  The payoff for a manipulator that is detected would be -($58-$44)x15 + $250 =  
-$210 + $250 = $40 and the payoff for a manipulator that chooses not to trade would 
simply be the $250.  This example illustrates that the payoff of the manipulator that is 
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able to avoid detection is larger the higher the price of the last trade, so the 
manipulator should try to maximise the last trade price. 
 
At the end of each round the clue sheet will ask ordinary traders to submit a guess as 
to whether or not they thought a manipulator traded in that round.  Guesses are 
entered into the clue sheet using “Y” for yes and “N” for no.  Correct guesses earn a 
bonus of $50 added to your payoff pool and incorrect guesses cost you $50 from your 
payoff pool.  If you do not submit a guess you will receive a penalty of $50.  The 
manipulator’s clue sheet will ask them to guess how many of the other 11 traders they 
think will guess that they traded.  Correct and incorrect guesses will earn the same 
bonuses and penalties as just described. 
 
Take a look at the clue sheet.  The first line reports the current round, in this case 
“Practice round”.  The second piece of information is the clue about the actual value 
of the shares.  The third piece of information informs you whether or not you have 
been selected to be a manipulator for this round. 
 
At the end of a round your clue sheet will change as will now be demonstrated.  The 
clue sheet now reports the actual value of the shares and asks a question that must be 
answered before the next round starts.  Let’s practice answering.  The manipulator did 
not trade in the practice round so enter “N” in the yellow box and hit enter.  Notice 
how after automatically recording your guess the clue sheet displays new information 
for the next round.  When this occurs, read the information and wait for the next 
round to start. 
 
A final word of caution for those selected to be manipulators.  The trading simulator 
does not allow limit orders with value exceeding your cash holdings.  To avoid having 
an order rejected at a critical point in time, ensure the value of your limit orders 
(including any active limit buy orders you have in the market) does not exceed the 
amount of cash you have.  For example, if you have no active limit buy orders and 
have $400 cash, you may submit a buy order for 5 shares at $80 (value of $400), but 
an order for 6 shares at $80 (value of $480) would be rejected.  Alternatively you may 
wish to use market orders as they are executed regardless of your cash position. 
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 Are there any questions? 
 
The following page contains a quick reference guide of the payoffs earned in each 
round.  If at any time you have a question please raise your hand.  You must now wait 
for the first round of trading to start. 
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Payoffs at the end of each round (Tr1) 
 
 
 
 
 
(NumberOfSharesOwned x ActualShareValue) + RemainingCash 
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Payoffs at the end of each round (Tr2) 
 
 
 
For an ordinary trader (everyone unless your clue sheet says you are a manipulator) 
 
For trading 
 
 (NumberOfSharesOwned x ActualShareValue) + RemainingCash 
 
For guessing 
 
 $50 for a correct guess  
 -$50 for an incorrect guess or no guess 
 
 
 
 
 
For a manipulator 
 
 For trading 
 
 (PriceOfLastTrade - MedianPrice) x 15 + $250 
 
For guessing 
 
 $50 for a correct guess  
 -$50 for an incorrect guess or no guess 
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Payoffs at the end of each round (Tr3) 
 
 
 
For an ordinary trader (everyone unless your clue sheet says you are a manipulator) 
 
For trading 
 
 (NumberOfSharesOwned x ActualShareValue) + RemainingCash 
 
For guessing 
 
 $50 for a correct guess  
 -$50 for an incorrect guess or no guess 
 
 
 
 
 
For a manipulator 
 
 For trading 
 
 (PriceOfLastTrade - MedianPrice) x 15 + $250   if less than 8/11 of the 
        other traders guessed that 
        the manipulator traded 
 
 - (PriceOfLastTrade - MedianPrice) x 15 + $250   if at least 8/11 of the  
        other traders guessed that 
        the manipulator traded 
 
 $250         if the manipulator does 
        not trade 
 
 
For guessing 
 
 $50 for a correct guess  
 - $50 for an incorrect guess or no guess 
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E.2 Layout of experiment participants’ trading screen 
 Figure E.1 shows a screenshot of the trading simulator and clue sheet used by 
participants in the experiment. 
 
  
 
Figure E.1 Layout of experiment participants’ trading screen 
 
